

JPRS 70556

27 January 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1327

U S S R

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

20000202 142

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet journal articles displaying a copyright notice and included in this report are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Further reproduction of these copyrighted journal articles is prohibited without permission from the copyright agency of the Soviet Union.

JPRS-70556

27 January 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

NO. 1327

U.S. JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington,

Soviet journal articles displaying a copyright notice and included in this report are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Further reproduction of these copyrighted journal articles is prohibited without permission from the copyright agency of the Soviet Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS 70556	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.	
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1327				5. Report Date 27 January 1978	
				6.	
7. Author(s)				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
				11. Contract/Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above				13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
				14.	
15. Supplementary Notes					
16. Abstracts The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.					
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel					
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms					
17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C					
18. Availability Statement Unlimited availability. Sold by NTIS, Springfield, Va. 22151				19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	
				20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	
				22. Price PCF07	

27 January 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1327

CONTENTS

PAGE

Fighter-Interceptor Squadron Training Described (A. Puzanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Sep 77)	1
Adverse Effects of Self-Satisfaction on Combat Training Discussed (A. Sadovnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Sep 77)	4
Tank Company Training Deficiencies Discussed (M. Malygin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Sep 77)	7
Tank Proving Ground Operations Described (G. Miranovich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Sep 77)	10
Abuse of Sick Leave Discussed (V. Preobrazhenskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Sep 77)	14
Naval Training and Related Activities (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)	16
Submarine Crew Combat Training, by Ye. Shabalin On Pacific Fleet Ship, by F. Gnatusin Concept of Crew Training, by G. Savichev Cruiser Commander on Combat Traditions, by B. Kiryushatov Missile Patrol Boat Training, by R. Saakyan	
Missile Units: Training Activities and Results (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)	28
Moscow Air Defense District, by V. Seledkin Air Defense Missile Regiment, by Yu. Orlov Transbaykal Military District, by D. Vatolin Turkistan Military District, by V. Nikolayev Air Defense Missile Battalion, by V. Zharko	
Combat Training in Tank Units (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)	39
Tank Regiment in Northern Group of Forces, by A. Pimenov Shortcomings Noted in Combat Training, by P. Chernenko Tank Company Training Described, by A. Khorunzhiy	

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Parents of Serviceman Initiate False Leave Request (P. Vakarov, V. Burtovoy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Oct 77)	50
Combat Training in Tank Units (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)	52
Tank Regiment Training Results, by A. Khanin Tank Company Political Training in the Field, by Parfenov Training in Tank Regiment in Northern Group of Forces, by A. Pimenov	
Inculcating Command Qualities in Young Officers (A. Volkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Oct 77)	63
Service Experiences of Two Warrant Officers Contrasted (F. Nikiforov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Oct 77)	67
Specialist Rating System in Radar Unit (G. Belostotskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Oct 77)	70
Chemical Defense Battalion Training Activities (A. Sholokhov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Oct 77)	72
Inhumanity and Coercion Seen as Basis of U.S. Forces Training (T. Belashchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Dec 77)	75
Service Chiefs on Lessons Learned in Great Patriotic War (VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 77)	79
Peredel'skiy on Artillery, by G. Peredel'skiy Babadzhanyan on Armored and Mechanized Troops, by A. Babadzhanyan Aganov on Engineer Troops, by S. Aganov Belov on Signal Troops, by A. Belov Deputy Chief Sobolev on Party-Political Work, by M. Sobolev	
Civil Defense Training Activities (VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA, Dec 77)	119
Results of Medical Aid Team Competition, by G. Svetsitskaya Problems Noted in Medical Aid Team Training, by G. Tashchiyev	

FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 77 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Puzanov, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Attacks in the Stratosphere"]

[Text] The command post assigned the mission to military pilot Lieutenant I. Krutov when his missile carrier was already gaining altitude. The young pilot would have to intercept an "enemy" bomber flying at supersonic speed in the stratosphere. The designated line was near. The lieutenant attempted to carry out each command from the interception controller as precisely as possible and to search carefully for the target. Now, he was sending out a report: "I see the target at a distance of...".

The target and the interceptor were rapidly coming together. "Launch!", the lieutenant reported.

When the recorder tape was interpreted it was revealed that Krutov had destroyed the target with great accuracy. When the squadron commander, Captain Yu. Shvarev, learned of the results of this interception, he approached his deputy, Major A. Berezin, and, shaking his hand firmly, said with a feeling of gratitude:

"Congratulations, Aleksandr Ivanovich: your training is in evidence. Thanks for your concern for the young pilots!"

Yes, communist, Major Berezin deserves a great deal of the credit for the fact that the flight and tactical training of the young fighter-interceptor pilots is improving by the day. Of all the squadron instructors he has made the greatest contribution to the lieutenants' professional development. An experienced methods expert, Aleksandr Ivanovich has thoroughly studied the individual qualities of each young pilot and structures his work with the flyers on this basis. The Major's painstaking work aimed at developing highly skilled air fighters and his personal skill have earned him a high award: the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3d degree.

The same awards have been conferred upon squadron commander Captain Yu. Shvarev, and flight commander Major A. Firsov. They have devoted a great deal of effort to the achievement of consistent successes in socialist competition. Incidentally, the squadron has held first place in the unit [chast] for several years now. A great deal of this has to do with the fact that the young pilots there are developed into skillful air fighters within an extremely short time.

The joy felt by the squadron commander upon learning of the successful attack by Lieutenant I. Krutov in the stratosphere is understandable. This was the first time the young pilot had independently performed one of the most complex exercises involved in intercepting an air target and had coped brilliantly with the mission. Furthermore, he and his colleagues had only this year begun learning to fly the interceptors and they were already performing combat patrol duties. This demonstrates the fact that the training process in the squadron is distinguished by a high level of organization and efficiency and by progressive methods of training and indoctrinating the flyers.

The conviction has long since been reached in the squadron that tasks of combat employment are most successfully resolved where the tactical training of the flight personnel, especially the youth, is highest. Without losing sight of lectures and reports on problems of tactics, great importance is attached to tactical exercises and group training sessions carried out jointly with crews from the command posts. Such training sessions are conducted regularly in a complex tactical situation. They are dynamic and abundant with various hypothetical problems. They include discussion of the feasibility of one or another technique or method of action, depending on the specific situation. This helps the young aviators rapidly to orient themselves in combat, to demonstrate initiative and activeness, and to make the proper decision.

Things do not always go smoothly in the combat training process, however. Blunders and miscalculations occur. It must be said to the credit of squadron commanders, however, that errors are not permitted to take root here. Their causes are thoroughly and carefully analyzed while the track is fresh, as they say, and effective steps are immediately taken.

The case of Lieutenant D. Valuyev is a good example of this. The commanders committed the sin, as they say, of overlooking the fact that the young lieutenant had developed an indifferent attitude toward the tactical training sessions. He justified his attitude by reasoning that everything would become apparent during the course of a battle, that the decision would be obvious, that the pilot's initiative can resolve everything. His words gave the impression that the modeling of situations is simply a waste of time. This could have had an unbalancing effect on Valuyev's comrades. An unfortunate incident soon occurred, however. During an interception of a high-speed, maneuvering target in the stratosphere the pilot lost the initiative, precisely that quality which he himself valued more than anything else.

This was a graphic lesson for everyone. The squadron commander, his deputies, and the party activists, however, decided that they could not count on passive influence on the flyers, even the influence of a fairly instructive example. Captain K. Kotov, secretary of the squadron party bureau, convened an expanded meeting, inviting all of the flight commanders. After conferring among themselves, the communists decided to conduct explanatory work as a preventive measure, not with Valuyev alone but with all the pilots.

This is just what they did. They analyzed in detail the dynamics of that attack in the stratosphere in a special short exercise. The pilots' actions were evaluated from the point of view of modern tactics. Examples from the Great Patriotic War and tactical flight exercises were well represented. The pilots left this brief session firmly convinced of the benefits of preparing thoroughly and profoundly on the ground for all changes in the air situation.

The training year is nearing an end. It was an intense one for the squadron. The subunit collective had accepted high socialist commitments in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. During their discussion of the draft Constitution of the USSR the airmen decided to raise the outlined goals even higher. And now, the squadron commander and communists note with satisfaction the large new step taken by the subunit on the path of continued improvement of combat readiness and maintenance of regulation order and organization. The crews have achieved a high level of training. All of the first-class specialists have reconfirmed their skills. The flight commanded by Military Pilot 1st Class, Major A. Firsov solidly retains its first-place status in the squadron.

When the preliminary results of the year were totaled up the commanders were especially happy with the young squadron pilots: they all achieved the training level of 2d-class military pilots. New heights lie ahead.

11499
CSO: 1801

ADVERSE EFFECTS OF SELF-SATISFACTION ON COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 77 p 1

[Article by Maj Gen Avn A. Sadovnikov: "Be Very Demanding"]

[Text] Captain I. Klimov, duty officer at the command post, glanced at the examiner with concern, as though trying to read the solution to the hypothetical problem in his eyes. The officer from district headquarters, however, only shrugged his shoulder, indicating that the captain was being given the opportunity to demonstrate his own independence and ability to function in a difficult situation.

Captain Klimov also understood this. The air "enemy" unexpectedly employed a diversionary maneuver. What were his true intentions? The hand on the stopwatch indifferently ticked off one second after another. Captain Klimov finally made his decision and hastily gave the command.

The examining officer raised his brows in an indication of perplexity. Klimov's instructions clearly lacked precision. The captain had recovered, but it was already too late...

The unit [chast] chief of staff was saddened when he heard of his subordinate's blunder.

"I can't understand what happened to Klimov," he stated with amazement. "Previously, he performed competently in any situation, and suddenly..."

And in fact, Captain Klimov had indeed demonstrated great skill and enviable self-control even quite recently. And suddenly -- this sort of blunder. Did it really occur suddenly, however?

Careful study of all the circumstances revealed the following. During the last training year, Captain Klimov had achieved excellent results, and his name was mentioned as a winner in the competition at meetings and conferences only in combination with laudatory epithets. Little by little he himself became accustomed to the idea that he had achieved a pinnacle on which there was nothing

left to do but rest serenely on his laurels. He stopped being highly demanding of himself and drifted further and further back, as though with the current. Complacency and attempts to "take a break" in the forward movement lead to stagnation in the training process, to routine performance and formalism in the competition, and retard the search for reserves for improving the combat training of the soldiers. Officer N. Alekseyevskiy's men had achieved good results in the competition for several years in a row. They were given deserved praise and received awards, and their experience was extensively publicized. This produced a mood of complacency among unit specialists: we are out front, after all, and what we have already achieved is enough.

While classes conducted with the fighters were formerly distinguished by creative quest, methodological innovation, and an abundance of progressive techniques, they now took place in a permanently established pattern. There was a great deal of formalism in the organization of competition. It is not surprising that all traces of the former successes soon vanished.

This is when the critical comments began to be made with respect to Officer Alekseyevskiy.

One automatically asks himself whether it would not have been better had this note of criticism resounded earlier, when the deterioration first set in in the training and competition of the missilemen.

Both the example of Captain Klimov and the unfortunate case of Officer Alekseyevskiy, and other such incidents demonstrate the fact that complacency flourishes best where day-to-day demandingness based on principle is absent, where an atmosphere has not been created which prompts the officers to evaluate the state of affairs of organization of the training process and competition in a critical and serious manner.

Klimov's immediate superior need only have delved into the training of his subordinate, and he would have easily detected the flaws in the latter. The chief of staff considered it awkward "to bother" the officer excessively with questions. After all, the officer himself understood the need for constant training. Why indicate a lack of confidence in him?

It is such an attitude which gives birth to complacency, condescension, a desire to smooth things out. This is contrary to the standards of army life and to party requirements. It was stressed at the 25th Party Congress that all aspects of the work of this or that organization, this or that worker, must be evaluated objectively, and that confidence and respect for people must be combined with a high level of demandingness for the assigned job.

It follows from this that confidence in an officer and respect for his work require not a complacent pat on the shoulder but real concern for his development, the indoctrination of a self-critical attitude toward the results achieved in combat training. Self-critical! Even at the moment of his greatest success an officer is required critically to evaluate what he has

achieved, to make strict and broad demands of himself. And this is all the more important now, at the end of the training year, when the commanders, political workers, and party organizations must do everything possible to eliminate existing shortcomings and to see that socialist commitments are totally fulfilled.

The commander of a technical battalion rarely sees a missile in the launcher. He is accustomed to viewing it on a handling trolley, on a transport and loading vehicle or near a control and testing mobile unit.

Lieutenant Colonel L. Klimovitskiy, however, does not regret that he sees the missile in the unfinished course of care-filled workdays, when it is still possible to glance into its most secret corners, feel the cold surface of the metal with his hand, and listen to the flawless beat of the electric heart. It is at these times that we feel with special depth and clarity the great diversity and the entire responsibility of the tasks assigned the subunit specialists, first and foremost, the commander.

Once, in the heat of combat work, the battalion was assigned a special, hypothetical problem, the resolution of which required considerable acceleration of the speed with which the missiles were readied and checked. Nonetheless, the missilemen successfully coped with the extremely difficult assignment.

When his colleagues congratulated Leonid Yakovlevich on the good evaluation, someone from among them said with envy:

"Now, you can take it easy"!

Lieutenant Colonel Klimovitskiy frowned when he heard this.

"I am not thinking about an easy life right now," he said with restraint. "During the course of the exercise I also clearly detected certain deficiencies and imperfections in the specialists' training. We are still not training them enough at reduced strength. And what if the leading specialists should be put out of action in combat? We must prepare a fully capable replacement for them more vigorously."

It is precisely his feeling of self-criticism, his tireless creative zeal, his quest in the organization of training and competition which for a long time now have helped Klimovitskiy to achieve excellent results in combat training. National discussion of the draft national Constitution and preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution have evoked a great outpouring of patriotic enthusiasm on the part of the missilemen. They are already close to fulfilling their socialist commitments in the competition for a fitting reception for the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

This example is worthy of emulation.

TANK COMPANY TRAINING DEFICIENCIES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 77 p 1

[Article by Maj M. Malygin, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Positions Lost"]

[Text] Tankmen of the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant R. Rakhimov were performing an exercise in operating vehicles in sandy desert at night, using landmarks. The most experienced specialists took part in the first run. The officer monitoring the exercise did not count the results, however.

It turned out that the speedometer was not working on one of the tanks. It was therefore impossible to determine the true speed, which was required by the exercise conditions. The engine on another machine would not start for a long time because the batteries were weak. The radio set was not functioning on a third. The equipment had thus practically not been ready for the exercise. It took several hours to eliminate the deficiencies.

This was a disappointing incident, all the more since it had occurred in a company which was considered one of the best in the unit [chast] and which had accepted a commitment to become an excellent company by the end of the training year. Senior Lieutenant Rakhimov explained that the main reason for the failure was the fact that his men had had to perform the exercise on training tanks assigned to an adjacent subunit [podrazdeleniye]. This can hardly be considered justification, however. The company had known long before the beginning of the exercise that they would have to operate at night, using the machines of "others."

What should the company officers have done? Before dark, they should have checked the working order of all the assemblies and mechanisms on the tanks and seen that they were in good working order. They did not do this, however. The company commander saw the tanks in operation the evening before and considered this adequate. In addition, the deputy battalion commander for technical matters, Captain V. Lebedev, had told the company commander that in any case there would be another three training machines ready in the rear. When the exercise began, however, it was determined that the three "reserve" tanks had not been thoroughly prepared to operate.

The officer monitoring the exercise gave the men time to eliminate the malfunctions. What can be done in a few minutes in daylight, however, is not so easily accomplished at night. Uneasiness began to show in the actions of the tankmen. Senior Lieutenant Rakhimov appeared to be out of place. Instructions came now from battalion chief of staff, Captain N. Bebes, now from Captain V. Lebedev, now from the regimental chief of communications.

The malfunctions were finally eliminated. And they were eliminated by staff officers of the battalion and regiment. It is a good thing that they were capable of doing this, naturally. The very fact that it was necessary for them to step in, however, is an indication of poor training on the part of the company specialists. Why had they been helpless in the face of these essentially simple malfunctions? The future course of the exercise showed that the company driver-mechanics could operate the machines at high speeds and with adequate confidence in the desert at night, but as soon as it was necessary to eliminate malfunctions they gave up and waited for the officers to rescue them. It was obvious that they were accustomed to depending upon others in such situations.

The company had only recently been cited as an example of good special and technical training. The subunit contained many rated specialists. The night exercise showed, however, that the rating process is not the highest, so to speak, test. Its quality leaves a great deal to be desired. A highly rated specialist must be able to do more than simply "roll along" rapidly along a route. He absolutely must be capable of servicing a machine well and of rapidly eliminating malfunctions which may arise, including those occurring on the battlefield.

What is the cause of this "onesidedness" in the training of specialists? I feel that complaints should be leveled against those who are responsible for the state of technical training and for the organization of socialist competition.

One of the causes is inadequately strict control over how the driver-mechanics ready the equipment for exercises and service it. The situation also reflects tutelage, a lack of confidence in the specialists, and a tendency to take over for them in situations such as the one described above.

One would think that now, in the concluding phase of the training year all reserves of socialist competition should be activated. There is no fervor felt in the competition, however, which was graphically demonstrated in the night exercise. Furthermore, such previously used forms of work as competition for best specialist, technical competitions, and quizzes have been forgotten in the company and battalion. The insufficiently concrete level of the work is also demonstrated by the fact that Captain Lebedev did not know how many 1st- and 2d-class specialists there were in the battalion or which of them had accepted commitments to ready themselves to meet the standards for a higher rating. Such a lack of information is especially unforgivable now, when the days are numbered, so to speak, until the results of the training year will be summed up.

A great deal is said about the need to struggle for quality and effectiveness in the company and in the battalion as well. Is it not sometimes forgotten, however, that quality and effectiveness are concrete concepts, which demand that careful preparations be made for each exercise?

11499

CSO: 1801

TANK PROVING GROUND OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Sep 77 p 1

[Article by Maj G. Miranovich: "Routes of Courage -- At the Armored Vehicle Proving Ground"]

[Text] The route set up for running tests is only one of the proving ground's many elements which I had the opportunity to see. One had only to negotiate it in a tank, however, and it was immediately clear just how difficult it was for the people working there. Deep depressions filled with water alternated with almost perpendicular inclines. As it climbed the next hill the tank would sigh with relief, as though taking on air, and then dive like a pike into the murky abyss, raising clouds of spray. At those moments it was necessary to grab hold of something in order to stay in the seat.

"But then, there is no dust," smiled platoon commander, Lieutenant S. Denega, when we came to a halt in order to stretch ourselves a little after having sat so long beneath the armor. "Absolute comfort...".

From the mouth of the young officer this sounded absolutely sincere. Accustomed to such tests, he simply did not notice those difficulties which struck the outsider immediately.

The proving ground stretched out for many kilometers in all directions. Observation posts, targets, dug-outs, shelters... in general, all of this can be seen at any other proving ground. And even the work of the military testers appeared at first glance to be no different from that which the personnel of an ordinary tank subunit [podrazdeleniye] engaged in. The rumble of tank guns could be heard in the firing section -- weapons were being tested. In the water-testing area exercises were being worked out in operating afloat and submerged. Alongside, polished by the trackpins, a concrete track shined in the sun. At the curves it reminded one of a cycle track. This is naturally where the high-speed performance is tested. At the same time, the driver-mechanic's capabilities are tested for operating vehicles on roads with hard surfaces.

All of the busy life of workers at the proving ground is imbued with a struggle to achieve quality in the armored equipment and efficiency in its use. Therein they see both the meaning and romanticism of their difficult service. To test a vehicle intended for adoption by the military, down to the last little screw, to provide the forces with appropriate recommendations on rules for operating it -- this is the main task, to the accomplishment of which everything is directed there. For the sake of this, the tank test-drivers plunge into fire and water, together with the vehicles, negotiate quicksand and swamps, and make their way through snowdrifts and across rocky passes...

The more familiar one becomes with their work, the more one becomes convinced that not only are the machines tested at the proving ground but that real human characters are forged there. Therein probably lies one of the unique features of the tester's profession -- one must truly believe in one's job and possess iron self-discipline in order to repeat one and the same operation dozens of times a day and to do it conscientiously and well. And there are probably ten or more operations performed at the water testing ground, for example, where the equipment is tested afloat and submerged.

The skill of the testers grows from operation to operation. A newcomer arrives at the proving ground from a training subunit. In six months he is already a real master of tank affairs. After serving out their regular service term, many remain there, linking their fate with the army and its equipment for always. Warrant Officer [praporshchik] I. Makarenko, for example, is such an individual. He served as an instructor-tester for more than 30 years. How can one leave the proving ground, if one has become attached to it in his heart?

"And so I requested command to assign me to the positions of subunit first sergeant. And my request was granted. It still keeps me close to our work," said Ivan Pavlovich, concealing behind his back his strong hands, which have still not grown out of the habit of handling the levers.

Men and tanks... As one learns of the proving ground's history and that of its workers it becomes especially clear how closely interwoven are the fates of the men and those of the vehicles and how they influence one another.

The first testers arrived there more than 40 years ago. They all had to begin from scratch: neither the required equipment nor housing was available. Nonetheless, equipment testing began three months after the Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] issued the order calling for creation of the proving ground. As they tell the fighting men about those times proving ground veterans I. Makarenko, A. Fedorov, M. Tikhonov, P. Bednyy, and others are performing a great deed, instilling in the youth a love for the heroic profession.

And the veterans have something to tell.

The proving ground played an important role in the job of motorizing and mechanizing the Red Army prior to and during the war. Hundreds of series-produced and many models of new tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts underwent

thorough testing there during the Great Patriotic War. Along with the testing of Soviet armored equipment and the study of captured equipment, manuals and instruction booklets on operation of the vehicles in various climatic conditions were developed for the crews at the proving ground, and the most effective methods of combating enemy tanks were worked out there.

Proving ground personnel took an active part in the formation of units [chasti] and subunits sent to the front. As early as July 1941 a separate battalion had been formed with personnel from the proving ground and the Academy of Armored Troops, which took part in fighting on the Northwest Front. And a march tank battalion equipped with T-34 and KV tanks was formed there in August. During all of the war years proving ground personnel helped to form three mechanized corps and three divisions, six tank brigades, two heavy tank regiments, and twenty separate tank battalions.

Many of the proving ground workers were assigned to the forces to assist with the study of new armored equipment models. Many of those who serve at the proving ground today fought near Moscow and Leningrad and took part in the liberation of Leningrad, the Battle of Kursk, the liberation of Belorussia and the taking of Berlin. The new generation of testers are indoctrinated and learn courage and skill from their example.

Gaining the heights of professional skill is one of the glorious traditions of the proving ground. This is vividly reflected in the soldier's commitments, accepted in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. To become a master operator and gunner, a 1st-class or 2d-class specialist -- these are the goals for which the testers are striving in the pre-October competition. Many have already achieved their goal. On the right flank of the competitors today are senior instructor-testers, Warrant Officers V. Prilepskiy and V. Lobanov, senior driver-mechanic-testers, Junior Sergeant S. Limanskiy and Private V. Drey. The crew headed by Junior Sergeant N. Yermolayev has been judged best crew of recent months, based on competition results.

While Lieutenant Denega and I were covering the route set up for running tests I sat at the position of Junior Sergeant Yermolayev. He and his crew were resting at that time. The soldiers had already completed a march lasting many hours. I looked through the commander's observation device, through which there were glimpses now of earth, now of the sky, and, it appeared to me that I began to understand what it means to work for ten hours in a row, completely enclosed in a tank rumbling along a totally broken-up route...

A tester's skill is the result of intense combat training and socialist competition. Plus... as he told about the subunit's multifaceted life, political worker Captain V. Levchenko enumerated the activities recently conducted. These included meetings with veterans, technical quizzes, an exchange of know-how among master operators and gunners, and classes in technical and firing groups...

The road leading away from the route passes by an obelisk honoring proving ground workers who did not return from the war. There are 79 names engraved in the granite. Everyone stops there. There, the people are recharged with the courage so essential in their difficult work.

11499

CSO: 1801

ABUSE OF SICK LEAVE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Sep 77 p 2

[Article by Eng-Lt Col V. Preobrazhenskiy: "Personal? No, State "]

[Text] Editors: I was prompted to write this letter by a desire publicly to dispute an opinion which, unfortunately, sometimes exists among the officers. I shall begin with an example. Once, at the beginning of a servicing day, Lieutenant Khapayev asked me to relieve him of service duties because of eye problems. The unit [chast] doctor was not available, and the condition of his eye was cause for concern: it was swollen and red. I gave the lieutenant permission to leave the job, promising to find the doctor and send him to the lieutenant's house. Some time later I learned that Khapayev had received medical assistance and that out-patient treatment had been prescribed.

After dinner the officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki] who liked to fish began gathering near the entrance in order to leave in a group for the lake. To my surprise, among those preparing for the trip was Lieutenant Khapayev. He in no way resembled an individual relieved of duty due to illness.

"Comrade Lieutenant," I asked Khapayev, "why are you, a sick man, preparing to go fishing?"

I must say that his answer dismayed me. "Service hours are over," the lieutenant answered, "and whether or not I am sick is my own personal business..."

This incident became the subject of a thorough-going discussion with the unit officers. The strange thing, however, is the fact that sometime later I was in another collective and heard similar arguments.

Article 382 of the Internal Service Regulations states: "Permission to be relieved of service duties (classes) due to illness is given military personnel by the subunit [podrazdeleniye] commander in accordance with a doctor's (medic) diagnosis. The relieving of officers and warrant officers from service duties (classes) and their return to work following an illness are announced in a

regimental order." In my view, however, when a serviceman is relieved of duties this requires him to engage conscientiously in treatment for his illness, to follow all of the doctor's instructions and the requirements put forth by medical personnel. And there is hardly any question as to whether or not this applies only to service time.

Unfortunately, instead of undergoing intensive treatment, officers and warrant officers sometimes use the time during which they are relieved of duty due to illness in order to do things which a healthy person is not always capable of. Warrant Officer Usov, for example, worked in his personal plot while relieved of duty and suffered a heat stroke, as the result of which he was entered into a hospital for a lengthy period. Officer Gryaznov, sick with the flu, spent his sick leave repairing his personal automobile, instead of following the doctor's orders. Another colleague used the time to repair his apartment.

The other extreme is also frequently seen. A serviceman is sick, but, claims that he is so busy with his service duty that he cannot see a doctor. And some commanders see this as service zeal, which should be used as an example for the others. Is this correct? Of course not. Without even going into the harm caused by self-treatment, such a serviceman sometimes causes those around him to become ill and he himself is sick for a longer period. It is with good reason, after all, that the regulations require a serviceman not to conceal his illness and to see a doctor upon becoming ill, with the permission of his immediate superior. This is dictated not only by concern for the health of the serviceman himself, but also, if one takes a broader view of things, by concern for the subunit's level of combat readiness.

The health of a serviceman is not only a personal matter. It is also a matter affecting the state. And, in my opinion, it is not just a right but also the duty of a serviceman to protect his health.

11499
CSO: 1801

NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Submarine Crew Combat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank Ye. Shabalin, submarine captain: "Examination at Sea"]

[Text] Our comrades who met our submarine barely hid their amazement as they recalled how we decided to tie up during a strong wind and virtually zero visibility. Was it worth it to take such a risk after successfully completing the difficult cruise and practically having already fulfilled the pledges in honor of Great October's 60th anniversary? But, what are any successes achieved at sea worth then if we are unable to honorably find our way out of the difficult situation we encountered?

Here are several of the achievements we brought back with us to our home base. Now, three-quarters of the sailors in our fully class-rated crew are masters of military affairs and first-class specialists. Eight officers passed their tests for access to responsibilities at a level higher than their present responsibilities. A considerable amount of energy was conserved thanks to the growing professional skill of the crew.

Recalling the cruise at this time, I am secure in the thought that everyone is deserving of the praise and everyone gave it all they had. Such selflessness in comradely labor is the best manifestation of approval of the draft of the new USSR Constitution. Our slogan during the cruise was "Excellent Accomplishment of Combat Training Missions at Sea Is Our Gift to the Motherland on the Eve of the Extraordinary Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet."

At one of the party meetings the question arose as to how best to vitalize socialist competition. Communists were of the opinion that more attention has to be placed on competition's moral incentives. Travelling prizes were instituted and a stubborn struggle unfolded to win them.

The names of Captain-Lieutenant N. Dubov, Warrant Officers [michman] V. Seregin and P. Panarin, and Seaman V. Sobolev always come to mind when one thinks of competition leaders. . . . And deservedly so. Each merits being discussed in detail. Division commander Captain-Lieutenant N. Dubov is rightfully

rated as the best watch officer, the entire crew is familiar with the mastery of sonar team leader Warrant Officer V. Seregin, Warrant Officer A. Matskov, navigation electrician team leader, is fully capable of fixing any instrument, Seaman V. Sobolev has introduced more than a dozen labor-saving suggestions. . .

Yes, our crew is blessed with remarkable people, masters at their jobs, people devoted to the motherland, to the party cause. Those who spoke at the meeting held after the cruise stated that they are ready to again put to sea to carry out any mission. And, I am convinced that should such an order come down, the sailors would take their places at their battle stations so as to confidently, reliably, and exactly accomplish everything the motherland orders.

On Pacific Fleet Ship

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 77 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank F. Gnatusin, ship's captain: "In a Regimen of High Stress"]

[Text] The entire life and training of our ship's crew this year elapsed with the earmarkings of a fitting greeting for Great October's 60th anniversary and in an atmosphere of overall exultation. It is noteworthy that the meeting at which the sailors unanimously approved the Fundamental Law of the Country of Soviets took place 1 hour prior to our putting out to sea to accomplish the next combat training mission. And, the combat attitude and fervent desire to accomplish their service duty in the best possible manner, given birth to by the meeting, greatly facilitated our successfully completing the assigned mission.

Studying the statutes in the USSR Constitution which address the entire multifaceted life of a society of developed socialism, we troops primarily concentrate our attention on the sacred duty of the Armed Forces to the people, as reinforced in the Fundamental Law -- to reliably defend the socialist fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

We are proud of the fact that we serve in the Pacific, that we are defending the eastern borders of our great motherland. A majority of our ship's officers graduated from the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School imeni Admiral S. O. Makarov.

Recent months for our crew have been replete with missions calling for us to often go to sea in order to accomplish them. Each such cruise perhaps was short but represents for the crew an important step en route to refinement of combat training. Especially memorable are the training battles where we were called upon to employ weapons, attack varied targets, and go one-on-one with "enemy" submarines. All the torpedoes launched by our ship successfully destroyed the assigned targets.

Back when I was a lieutenant and had to go on long cruises lasting about a year, I came to the conclusion that it was these very cruises conducted in a regimen of high stress that become the highest school both for the commander and for the entire crew. It is at sea that drills at battle stations are especially intensive and standing watch at equipment in operation is most instructive. It

is at sea that such qualities as responsibility, vigilance, and bravery in making decisions are polished. I was again convinced of this when I observed how, in this training year, the crew's actions became more and more confident from one cruise to another.

The difficulty arose because we began to sail with a restored crew and all missions had to be accomplished at sea due to it having been established and thrown together. The regimen of high stress created aboard ship in the training and in service turned out to be very fruitful for the officers. If certain officers at the start of the year had gaps in their practical training, then it can now be said that they all now feel confident of their abilities and have become more skillful both in tactics and in their dealings with people.

The ship's sailors warmly support the patriotic initiative of the workers from Naro-Fominskiy Rayon, who unfurled competition with the slogan "A Shock Finish to the Jubilee Watch!" The sailors are putting forth all their efforts to successfully complete the training year. The preliminary results are already in. The radio-technical service commanded by Lieutenant V. Vasil'yev and the electrical and engineering division led by Captain 3d Rank-Engineer A. Zhdanov were rated excellent. By the way, that subunit [podrazdeleniye] is the best division in the formation [soyedineniye]. Among the best are also master of military affairs A. Avtekin and V. Anan'yev, both warrant officers and team leaders.

It is a pleasure to see both the rise in combat qualification and the increase in the sailors' ideological tempering. This, in particular, is given witness to by the wrap-up political lessons in sailor and petty officer groups and the seminars in the officer Marxist-Leninist training groups. We prepared ourselves for them while at sea and returned to base just prior to the wrap-up lessons. The sailors demonstrated good knowledge and the students in the officer groups received excellent evaluations.

We widely use the know-how accumulated during cruises when accomplishing missions at the end of the training year, including during preparations for the competition for first place in the USSR Navy.

Concept of Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"The Crew -- One Family"]

[Text] When the crew of the training ship "Borodino" won their battle against the typhoon, Captain 2d Rank A. Belik, the ship's captain, stated: "If it wasn't for the harmonious, brave actions of all sailors, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers, I do not know if our encounter with the typhoon would have been so favorable."

Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, noted Russian naval commander, said "a cruise during peacetime is a school for war." I recalled that saying once during a cruise. The training ship "Borodino" was en route from Columbia to Cuba at

the time. Once, a storm struck in the middle of the night. This was a surprise to the crew. Usually the weather maps received by radio and the forecasts gave timely warning of the genesis of a typhoon and its route. In this instance, it was several hours later before the first information was received. It said that the typhoon was named Fifi and names are only assigned to severe storms.

To a certain degree everything transpired just like in war and several factors inherent in actual combat were at hand. Both surprise and the changeability of the situation and uncompromising nature of the clash. The Soviet sailors emerged as the victors in this struggle.

And then Belik, who had not left the bridge for several days straight, gave his opinion of the crew. Certainly, a great deal also depended upon the construction of the ship, on the reliable operation of the machinery. But, the commander captured the main thrust. The cohesion of the crew, its harmonious, brave actions -- one of the vital factors which guarantee victory in a struggle.

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of goal-oriented, united actions. At the same time, unity can only be given birth to in a collective. For the best human qualities, ideological tempering and the political consciousness of the members are consolidated in the collective.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Chairman of the Constitutional Commission, said in his report at the extraordinary seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "The entire life of a society -- economic, political, and spiritual -- is reflected in a labor collective, in the work of its party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations. In essence, this is the primary cell of not only our economic but our political organism as well."

These words are fully applicable to such specific collectives as a ship's crew and a military subunit. However, both the subunit and the crew can only be referred to as real collectives when they achieve the highest successes in combat and political training, when its leaders, party, and Komsomol organizations base their work on the laws of life of our socialist society, on socialist traditions.

A young officer takes over command of a division, one of the worst divisions on the entire ship. The subunit is rated as excellent a year later. Success was achieved thanks to correct and goal-oriented work to rally round the collective.

When it was suggested that Senior Lieutenant Leonid Mel'nik transfer to the large antisubmarine warfare [ASW] ship "Zhuguchiy" and take over command of the navigation division, he became despondent. There had never been a meeting at which this BCh [division] had escaped criticism.

But, Mel'nik agreed anyway. He decided to test his abilities, as he himself says, under extreme conditions. And, here he is aboard "Zhuguchiy" to find all his fears confirmed, and then some. The equipment is not in the best condition, several areas had been completely neglected, and the personnel were inert, sluggish.

The young officer's head spun. "Where do I begin?" After giving it some thought, he decided to find the real reasons for such an unsatisfactory situation. First off, the division commander noted that his subordinates had poor knowledge of the equipment. Was this the cause of their indifferent attitude towards the equipment?

Then this thought gave birth to another. "The equipment in the division is for collective use. It requires collective efforts from the people, collective knowledge. Take that gyrocompass over there. It is within the purview of the navigation electricians, but its data are used by the helmsmen, the missilemen, the radar technicians, and the torpedomen. In addition, the gyrocompass itself would be dead if the ship's electricians did not provide it with uninterrupted electric current. Consequently, indoctrination in collectivism is the basic questions with which to initiate my efforts."

And, collectivism was lacking within the subunit. Moreover, the isolation of the personnel was evident, as was frank individualism at times. Petty Officer 2d Class M. Popok, section commander, for some sort of reasons of his own conducted the lessons with youths formally. He did not assist them in gaining in-depth knowledge of the complex equipment. Later, the officer understood that, in so doing, the petty officer created an aura of irreplaceability around himself. No one other than myself knows the equipment, nor can anyone else do so.

Socialist competition in the subunit had not been developed to a sufficient degree. But, it is this very competition that is the best school for indoctrination of collectivism. During the competition process, mutual assistance is developed and this facilitates rallying the people round.

Mel'nik also noted that the Komsomol organization in the subunit had not demonstrated any special vitality. Certain personalities, who themselves were not shining lights, set the tone in the organization.

So, the work began. The senior lieutenant intensified the supervision of the specialty training lessons. Moreover, he changed their character somewhat. He began to conduct lessons at which specialists possessing somewhat related skills attended.

Mel'nik began to conduct technical conferences more often. "People are better able to assimilate complex questions during a general discussion," he said to his coworkers. "In addition, let the collective know who is worth what."

It was at these very conferences that several experienced sailors who considered themselves luminaries in the sphere of equipment use turned out to possess a lower level of knowledge than did first-year servicemen. They had to reexamine the views on their personal capabilities, the capabilities of their comrades, and on collectivism.

Competition began to play a special role in the matter of rallying the collective round. Mel'nik carefully studied all pledges and noted those points that involved mutual assistance. With the direct participation of section commanders and the secretary of the Komsomol organization B. Shirayev, he advised

several sailors to reexamine the pledges and to set higher goals. He advised experienced specialists to provide assistance to those with less experience.

Some time passed and with no fanfare the talk aboard ship about how poorly the equipment in the navigation division operated ceased. The subunit's Komsomol organization began to receive more and more praise. The names of the helm and navigation electricians appeared on the board citing the ship's leaders. The news got around that a tight-knit collective exists here. Then the day arrived when the order of the ship's captain was published in which the navigation division on the BPK [large ASW ship] "Zhiguchiy" was announced as being an excellent subunit. You had to have seen the faces of the petty officers and the sailors, Mel'nik's subordinates, at that moment, the joy and happiness!

From a telegram received by the editorial board: "The crew of the ship led by Captain 3rd Rank A. Pechkorin demonstrated high successes in combat and political training in the competition for a fitting greeting for Great October's 60th anniversary."

Captain 1st Rank V. Luk'yanov, a political worker, advised the following. "Visit Pechkorin and you will see a really tight-knit collective." I arrived at the ship in the morning. It was sufficient to glance at the upper deck, to see the order which reigns here, to look at the accurately placed mooring lines, the spotless covers on the reels in order to make a definite conclusion. Yes, naval culture is held in respect here, as is organization of service, and the discipline is at a high level.

The commander and I met and chatted. "How did you initiate the rallying round of the collective?" I asked him.

"The atmosphere which reigns aboard a ship materially influences rallying the collective round," Pechkorin answered. "If it is healthy and cheerful, if it is replete with a spirit of competition, if you see on the sailors' faces not despondency but a smile, if songs are often sung here, then you can be sure that, on this ship, things are better, here you have a harmonious energetic crew. As far as the songs are concerned, they have become a sort of cult on our ship. We sing as a choir not only patriotic but nautical tunes as well, in our free time, prior to the start of Komsomol meetings, and during emergency work. Everyone participates in the choir! I, the ship's captain, and my deputy for political affairs, and all the officers, warrant officers, petty officers, and sailors."

Listening to Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Pechkorin, I thought that, in actuality, the common spirit and moral climate that reigns in the crew directly affects its cohesion. But singing? A good song has a healthy effect on peoples' mood, especially on long cruises.

The thematic evening "Why Do I Love My Motherland?" held after one cruise comes to mind. It left a strong impression. And this impression was formed not only due to the effect of the sincerely and emotionally read poems and tales about home towns, but also because everyone was linked together by a special sense of unity.

In conclusion, the song "Shiroka strana moya rodnaya" [My Motherland Is Vast] was sung by the choir. The song resounded in the spaces and reached the outside through the open portholes. Across the ocean flew the words "I know of no other country where a person breathes so freely. . . ."

Later on we exchanged opinions with officer I. Narozhnyy, a political worker. "Can you believe," said Ivan Petrovich, "that when they sang the song I somehow was touched. I sensed an affinity, a solidarity with each person that was there. The sensation was such that it seemed like we all were like fingers clenched in a fist."

Thematic evenings are only one of the forms of indoctrinating personnel in the spirit of socialist traditions. There, far from their native shores, leading commanders and political workers, developing in the young people the best qualities inherent in the Soviet people -- high patriotism, deep ideological conviction and political consciousness, internationalism, rallying round the Communist Party, comradeship, and a respectful attitude towards each other -- use the most varied methods and forms of indoctrinational work.

This spring a detachment of Soviet military vessels returned from a long cruise, where I had the opportunity to observe the actions of one of the commanders, Captain 2d Rank G. Bronikov. As is known, the captains of ships on long cruises spend a lion's share of their time on the bridge. Bronikov was no exception. However, he found various ways to avoid being cut off from the crew so that he could always influence their spirit, their mood, and in the final analysis their cohesion.

Thus, for example, Bronikov continually informed the crew personally about everything that happened off the ship, about his ideas, his plans, and his activities. You can imagine how favorably this influenced the mood of the sailors, especially those standing watch in isolated spaces. Separated from the whole crew by the steel bulkheads, they nonetheless felt themselves to be with the captain, with the other sailors.

I have often had occasion on long cruises to see the actions that experienced indoctrinators take to rally the collectives round. Thus, Captain 1st Rank K. Bogomazov stressed careful study of his subordinates' moods and maintaining optimism in the collective. He developed initiative and creativity.

I crossed the Atlantic twice beneath the flag of Vice Admiral G. Stepanov. In his work with youths, Georgiy Fedorovich uses combat traditions with exceptional skill. His speeches to the personnel and his tales of combat friendship arouse among the sailors respect for the combat past and a desire to emulate their older countrymen.

Another officer, formerly commander of the missile cruiser "Groznyy," Captain 1st Rank V. Korneychuk has the ability to inspire a crew to accomplishment of the most complex missions. It is no accident that the sailors in "Groznyy" are distinguished for their solidarity.

It should be stated that, in spite of some differences in the methods of rallying collectives round, all of the commander-indoctrinators enumerated above

possess a common trait -- dedication to their cause and the fervent desire to find new ways to rally collectives into a single combat organism, a single family. And, if you will, this is the key to the successes crews achieve in combat and political training.

Cruiser Commander on Combat Traditions

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank B. Kiryushatov, captain of the cruiser "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya": "Named After the Revolution"]

[Text] Fidelity to traditions is a clear distinguishing trait of many generations of sailors who have served beneath the flag of "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya." And, the history of the ships that have borne this glorious name cannot be separated from the great events of our century.

The battleship "Gangut" was built in the summer of 1914 at the Admiralty Plant. The Tsarist government looked for the battleship's crew to be a reliable defender of its interests. But things did not turn out that way. The crew followed the Bolshevik course. In 1915 a revolt against Tsarism erupted aboard the battleship and was led by Bolshevik Vladimir Polukhin (later to become one of the 26 Baku commissars). The crew aboard "Gangut" participated in the storming of the Winter Palace in October 1917. Sailors from the battleship gained undying fame at the fronts during the Civil War. For special services to the October Revolution, the ship was awarded the revolution's name in 1925.

During the prewar years, the battleship's crew was renowned for high naval and firing training and was the front-runner of the fleet on more than one occasion. In battles during the Great Patriotic War, the sailors multiplied the glory they had won in training battles and cruises. They valiantly battled the enemy, demonstrating courage and steadfastness.

Petty Officer 1st Class Ivan Tambasov, a communist and a gunlayer, performed a brilliant feat on 16 April 1943. The tarpaulin upon which the ammunition reserves lay caught fire after being hit by an enemy shell. Tambasov ran to the box containing the shells and began to toss them overboard. The sailor's uniform was in flames and the deck beneath him was burning. The last shell exploded in the hero's hands.

The battleship "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya" provided the firepower for a Baltic squadron which played a significant role in the defense of Leningrad. During the Great Patriotic War, the battleship's gunlayers repulsed more than 250 enemy air attacks, shot down 13 enemy aircraft, and destroyed three tank columns and several vehicle columns, three heavy batteries, and an ammunition dump.

On 22 July 1944 the battleship was awarded the title Red Banner.

It roamed the waters of the Baltic for a long time after the war. Then a modern cruiser which took its proud name took its place in the combat formation. With its sharp lines and mighty turrets, it is greatly reminiscent of the battleship. But the main thing is that the troops of the new generation sacredly revere and are multiplying the revolutionary and combat traditions of their fathers.

Daily at the evening inspection, the name of Ivan Tambasov is the first one read from the roster. There is an annual contest among the gunlayers each year on the anniversary of the hero's feat to determine the winner of the Ivan Tambasov prize.

Awards from the present period are preserved in the museum cabin along with the battleship's relics from the war years. Here one finds the Memorial Banner of the CC CPSU, of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and of the USSR Council of Ministers which was awarded to the cruiser in honor of the 50th jubilee of Great October. Our ship has won the Soviet Navy Prize for Tactical and Firing Training. The cruiser distinguished itself during the Okean [Ocean] maneuvers and fittingly represented the Country of Soviets in foreign cruises to Sweden, Norway, France, Denmark, and Yugoslavia.

The link of time and the inseparability of the traditions of the two ships named after the revolution are also traced aboard in the fates of people. Captain 1st Rank A. Palekhin, one of the first captains of the cruiser, attended the school of naval service aboard the battleship. Another captain of the cruiser, Captain 1st Rank I. Petrov, departing the vessel and saluting its Colors for the last time, met his son on the wharf. He met Lieutenant P. Petrov, who was embarking on his first assignment as an officer. And, the beginning of the Petrov military dynasty was laid by Captain 1st Rank (Retired) Pavel Ivanovich Petrov, a participant in the Civil War. Cadet Valeriy Mazharov, who has now also become an officer, assimilated the ABC's of service under the strict authority of his father Captain 1st Rank Yu. Mazharov, presently the captain of the cruiser.

All of our officers and the party and Komsomol committees continually concern themselves with business-like generalization and creative development of everything with which the ship's history is replete. During this jubilee year, this is most clearly manifested in the area of competition, of an integrated approach to the sailors' training and indoctrination. The crew accomplished the high pledges made in the competition for a fitting greeting for Great October's 60th anniversary under the conditions of a difficult lengthy cruise. Contests to select the best specialist have become a tradition aboard ship. When determining the winners, they take into consideration not only specific professional knowledge and skills, but moral factors as well. Identical strict criteria are also used when determining the best sea detail shift.

The cruiser's veterans accomplish a great deal of indoctrinational work with youths. One of them is Captain 2d Rank I. Lubyanskiy, commander of BCh-2 [fire control division]. He went through his officer's youth aboard the cruiser and has now brought to it maturity and a high degree of mastery.

In particular, the complex night gunnery became a serious test of the gunners' training. An excellent tactician, Captain 2d Rank Lubyanskiy quickly drew up a firing diagram and provided for "enemy" countermeasures. When the situation suddenly changed, the BCh-2 commander proficiently prepared a new decision for weapon combat employment and provided the young officers an example of high professional culture. The gunnery received a high evaluation for all indices. Lubyanskiy's pupils Captain-Lieutenants N. Sergeyev and I. Shereshnev often excelled when accomplishing combat drills.

Another of the cruiser's veterans, Captain 2d Rank-Engineer V. Nechitaylo, the commander of BCh-5 [electrical and engineering division] also arms the young officers with pedagogical know-how in just the same thoughtful and consistent manner. Following his instructions, division commander Senior Lieutenant-Engineer S. Volkov along with political worker Lieutenant V. Kul'pinov steadfastly develops in the sailors a sense of responsibility for training and competition results, for the solidarity of the military collective. He skillfully employs the requirements of pedagogy and psychology in working with people. The division became a leading subunit in a short period of time.

The struggle for competition viability and for effectiveness and quality in comradely labor is senseless without decisively surmounting shortcomings, without fully utilizing hidden reserves for raising crew training and discipline. The party committee headed by Captain 3rd Rank N. Sarapul'tsev occupies an important position on this question.

A very instructive conversation took place at one party committee meeting on how to strengthen the influence of competition in consolidating compliance with regulations, emphasizing the traditions of the ship while doing so. The impetus behind the conversation, in particular, was errors made by officer A. Lopushnyan, a chief of a service, who limited himself to insuring the external "gloss" at battle stations and did not look deeply into the true condition of the equipment and the progress of training and competition. I had occasion along with Captain 3rd Rank V. Stepanov, the cruiser's deputy for political affairs, to participate in this serious conversation at the party committee. Activists fervently stated that cleanliness at battle stations without a reserve of reliability, the external bearing of the sailors without a reserve of durable knowledge is more like whitewash than it is true naval order. Our ships are always known for their cleanliness and order and their crews are distinguished for their bearing. But, this has always been a reflection of the deep sense of discipline which is primarily embodied in high readiness for combat. The meeting and subsequent organizational work by the party committee gave a good impetus to the struggle for a universal increase in the effectiveness and quality of comradely labor.

The party committee sharply raises the question of the work style of communists, primarily of the officers, underscoring that its most important component is the authority of knowledge. A business-like approach without in-depth competence also gives birth to confusion sometimes. In this regard, subunit commander Senior Lieutenant V. Zhdanov was given some instructive council.

A comprehensive plan is used aboard the ship for the training of young officers in tactics, navigation, communications, electromechanics, naval practice, military pedagogy, and psychology. Training of the lieutenants is conducted sufficiently confidently and rapidly in an atmosphere of friendly exactingness and constant assistance on the part of senior personnel. Lieutenants Yu. Lukashov and A. Bykov are successfully commanding subunits. The skills and knowledge of Lieutenant S. Deyneko, who during a long cruise passed the difficult examination to become a watch officer, are becoming more firm before our very eyes.

The crew these days is laboring with unheard-of patriotic enthusiasm. Reading the crisp lines of the Fundamental Law, the sailors note that in it are embodied

the results of the glorious path of the Soviet people for 60 heroic years and they are proud of the fact that upon them has fallen the honor in the year the USSR Constitution was passed to serve aboard the ship which bears the name of the October revolution.

Missile Patrol Boat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank R. Saakyan, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "Guards Efficiency"]

[Text] The Guards subunit occupies first place in the fleet for tactical and firing training for the third year running. This success is insured by the continuity of the traditions in the military collective and goal-oriented introduction of leading know-how.

Every time the missile patrol boat departs the wharf and the wind wraps the Guards ribbons around the panels of the flags, each sailor experiences a natural sense of emotion and pride. We have been given the honor of greeting the jubilee of Great October in the ranks of a subunit whose troops gained glory in combat for the socialist fatherland, troops who earned the right to be called Guards. They sank 17 enemy vessels. Four officers were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The glory of the Guards, achieved by our fathers in combat, spurs us on and urges us to set an example in socialist competition and in fulfillment of our military duty.

And, when you analyze the results of the collective's comradely labor, you conclude that their foundation rests in the patriotic desire of the present generation of sailors to sacredly preserve and multiply the glorious traditions of the Soviet Guards, with true Guards efficiency to assimilate the modern equipment, to accomplish missions with high quality.

Special attention is placed in the subunit on transferring the know-how of the experienced patrol boaters to the young sailors. This is not done on a case-by-case basis, but is handled systematically. At practically every drill, in each contest on the specialty rating of master, first-class specialists teach the youths specific lessons of diligent combat work. This is the very approach taken by Guards Captain 3rd Rank A. Belyy, captain of the excellent patrol boat, who has been awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," Third Degree and by Warrant Officer I. Tuchin, on whose chest along with the front-line medal "For Services in Battle" hangs the medal "For Excellence in Military Service," Second Degree earned in our time.

The unique sponsorship by tacticians and methodologists of young officers permitted many of them to pass the tests for access to responsibilities on a level above their present jobs, that is, to reach the main point in the socialist pledges of the jubilee year. It is useful to underscore that, under the conditions of a small boat with a small crew, an increase in the number of sailors

possessing such access in reality insures interchangeability at command posts and battle stations.

Of course, Guards efficiency is acquired primarily during exercises, difficult cruises, and missile firings. Military rituals such as taking the oath, initiation into the Guards ranks, as well as conversations, thematic evenings, and memorial meetings also facilitate the preservation and multiplication of the Guards traditions. Veterans and battle heroes frequently visit the sailors. Hero of the Soviet Union Captain 1st Rank (Reserve) M. Malik and Warrant Officer (Reserve) G. Luk'yanichev participated in a thematic evening devoted to the Fundamental Law of the Country of Soviets.

The Guards patrol boaters were called upon to perform difficult missile firings at the finish of the training year, during the remarkable days of the work of the extraordinary seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which passed the new USSR Constitution. Everyone received the highest marks. The crews of the patrol boats commanded by Guards Captain 3rd Rank A. Belyy and Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Kashuba especially excelled. Having received data on the "enemy" located beyond radar range, in the shortest possible time they made tactical computations and fired a volley. The missiles destroyed the target. The patrol boats then laid a new combat course and destroyed yet another target with the next volley.

The Guardsmen have some things to report to the motherland on the eve of Great October's glorious jubilee. But, it is against their rules to be satisfied with what has been achieved. We are replete with resolve, banking on the know-how gained during the jubilee competition, to gain new boundaries of military mastery.

7869

CSO: 1801

MISSILE UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS

Moscow Air Defense District

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Seledkin, Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District:
"With Redoubled Energy"]

[Text] The voice of the firing officer, V. Budnikov, reverberated like a tinkling echo in the loudspeaker:

"Azimuth.... Range...."

Two more points flashed at the lower edge of the screen. The sweep swept over the glass like a broad wing and the small pin-like lights rose higher.

The guidance officer, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Sidorchenko, and the other specialists are operating confidently.

And immediately afterward the firing officer breathed out hurriedly into the microphone:

"Target locked on!"

The screen rippled with light salt-like spots. And one of the two spikes remaining from the sweep's measured rotation melted away and disappeared in this dense dancing changeability. Officer Budnikov's eyes narrowed and darkened. He did not want to, but that's how it turned out--he cast a glance in the direction of the guidance officer. Perhaps this involuntary movement would not have occurred if Captain Litvinov had been at the console as usual. But he was not there, Mikhail Andreyevich was on leave. Today the technician, Senior Lieutenant Sidorchenko, was in his place. A first-class specialist who had mastered the allied profession of guidance officer in an excellent manner, he had demonstrated excellent results on drills many times.

But now, it was a special case. The missilemen of the battalion had immediately supported the patriotic initiative of the workers of Naro-Fominskiy rayon,

Moskovskaya oblast, who decided to make each day remaining to the 60th anniversary of the Great October a day of shock labor, high effectiveness, and outstanding quality.

"And following the example of the Naro-Fominskites, we should make each day remaining to the jubilee of the Great October a day of outstanding training," proposed the secretary of the party organization, Senior Lieutenant S. Sirotkin.

The struggle for the accomplishment of the increased obligations flared up literally on the very next day. And it began with a painstaking search for unused reserves for an increase in combat skill.

The subordinates of Lieutenant S. Sokolov proposed an interesting undertaking. Its realization permitted a considerable acceleration in the rates of drills, increasing the load on the specialists, and making the lesson conditions as close as possible to a situation in actual combat.

Each minute of training time also became more weighty. The first to feel it were the missilemen of the section commanded by Junior Sergeant A. Bortyshev. After only drills the launchermen were able to exceed the norm established for an excellent grade.

The party activists, headed by Senior Lieutenant S. Sirotkin, were concerned that the results of each drill should become known to all the men of the battalion. Printed news flashes reported on the leaders who had attained the highest results. One such report told about the successful actions of Engineer-Lieutenant A. Savchenko. The young graduate of a higher military school received an excellent grade for preparing the equipment for a training firing.

Senior Lieutenant Sidorchenko also gave his word to operate on the forthcoming drill in an excellent manner. He prepared thoroughly for the training firing and attentively studied the procedure for accomplishing the most difficult missions and the special features of combat work under various conditions.

...The experienced glance of the firer remembered the barely noticeable spike which had been left at the lower edge of the screen. But did the guidance officer pay attention to it? Yes, he did. Well, that was good. A tense silence hung over the position--everything is ready for the launch.

...The missilemen gathered in a training classroom for the critique of the firings. From the sparkling of the eyes and the loud exclamations it could be seen at once that the men were satisfied with the results of the lesson. They had kept their word--all targets were destroyed at maximum range with high accuracy.

"Such excellent results should be attained every day," said officer Budnikov. "Only then will we be able to report with every right that we did everything to greet the special seventh session of the Supreme Soviet USSR in a worthy manner and to mark the 60th anniversary of the Great October with new achievements in soldierly labor."

Air Defense Missile Regiment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Col Yu. Orlov, commander of an air defense missile unit: "Always in Combat Readiness"]

[Text] This year will go into the glorious chronicle of the history of the Country of Soviets as a brilliant page. Preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October and the nationwide discussion of the draft Basic Law of our life caused an extraordinary rise in the activity and enthusiasm of our country's workers and the men of the army and navy and demonstrated even more brilliantly their indissoluble solidarity around the native Communist Party.

For the personnel of our regiment this year was also noteworthy in that we stepped forth as the initiator of the competition in the National Air Defense Forces for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the Great October. A great honor, the highest responsibility. I can say without exaggeration that all our soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers [praporshchik], and officers realized this deeply. Subunit commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol activists explained to the personnel daily and skillfully the tasks for improving combat training, strengthening discipline and organization, and raising vigilance and combat readiness.

They say that the language of statistics is dry. But for me, the commander, our total indices in the competition are more eloquent than any words; they sound like good music. The lofty socialist obligations which the regiment assumed prior to the start of the training year were completely accomplished. And accomplished ahead of schedule!

Just where are the sources of these successes? They are in the people themselves, in their high moral and political qualities, and in their ardent striving to serve their socialist Fatherland in an exemplary manner and be the dependable guardian of its aerial boundaries.

The high patriotic attitude of the missilemen was manifested with special force in the course of the discussion of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR. If all their statements were collected together, an exciting book would be obtained which tells about the ardent love for the Leninist party, pride in the historic accomplishments of the Soviet people, and the readiness of the men to guard the aerial borders of our Motherland reliably against the encroachments of any aggressor. And so that the word of the missilemen does not deviate from deed, they always prove it convincingly and ponderably.

I had the occasion to participate in firing on the range many times. And each time my heart beats with emotion when sighting the exciting picture: the missile destroys the target accurately. It is obvious that all the missilemen on the range experience the same excitement. Each firing here, as they say, is skill, inspiration, and a most serious check of soldierly maturity and the ability to fight in the contemporary manner.

We also passed such an examination this year. The missilemen brought back from the range a trophy most honored for us--a piece of scorched target which smelled of powdery cinder.

The following distinguished themselves on the range: Lieutenant Colonel V. Galatenko, Captain A. Simakov, Senior Lieutenant M. Tsyplenkov, Lieutenant B. Murashko, Warrant Officer D. Tsaduryan, Sergeant V. Bozhidayev, Private First Class I. Svistunov, Privates I. Isamutdinov, S. Gordyukov.... And let not other comrades complain to me that I did not mention their names here. For then it would be necessary to make known the entire list of the specialists who participated in the firing examination.

I recall how, on the eve of the training year, Senior Sergeant N. Klyanchin requested that Lieutenant Colonel V. Galatenko transfer him to the post of chief of the lagging launch section. And having received "good," he undertook the training of his subordinates with such ability and persistence that the section became the best in the regiment in a short time.

Private I. Svistun came to the missile guidance station as a novice. Seeing how Sergeant M. Kalashnikov and other operators work at the scopes, he asked only how much time he would need to work at the same level. And he undertook the training with persistence. On recent competitions of missilemen of the National Air Defense Forces Svistunov, who had been awarded the rank of private first class, was adjudged the best missile guidance station operator. The honored titles of best specialists were also awarded to our comrades-in-arms, firer Lieutenant Colonel V. Galatenko, guidance officer Senior Lieutenant V. Zotkin, and driver of the transporter-erector Private I. Dzhabbarov. And as befits the right guides of the competition, in the course of these important contests they demonstrated a high level of tactical and special training and won first place.

And how can we fail to say a good word about Senior Lieutenant M. Tsyplenkov, Sergeant V. Samborskiy, and other young enthusiasts who installed an excellent trainer to train the operators!

All these are only individual lines but even they, I think, show graphically the great striving of the missilemen to achieve the best results in combat training and greet the October jubilee in a worthy manner.

We had to overcome many difficulties and wage a persistent struggle against shortcomings, indulgences, and simplifications in combat training. And I see the great service of the unit's political section, staff, and the party and Komsomol activists in the fact that a situation of intolerance toward the slightest manifestations of indiscipline, conceit, complacency, and low-quality conduct of lessons and drills was created in the collective.

Exciting events in the life of our people are approaching. In several days, the seventh special session of the Supreme Soviet, which will consider the country's draft constitution, will open in Moscow. A little more than a month remains to the glorious 60th anniversary of the Great October. These days,

the patriotic appeal of the Naro-Fominskites sounded throughout the entire country--to make each pre-jubilee day a day of shock labor, high efficiency, and excellent quality and to initiate socialist competition under the slogan, "A shock finish for the jubilee watch!"

The missilemen of the regiment, just as all the Soviet servicemen, are ardently supporting this initiative. A persistent struggle is under way in the subunits to see that each training day which remains to the October jubilee becomes a day of strained soldierly labor and only excellent accomplishment of all training tasks and norms. The communists and Komsomols are in the front ranks of the competitors.

The Motherland and the people can count on us, the servicemen: we are always on the alert, always in combat readiness.

Transbaykal Military District

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col D. Vatolin, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "Masterful Handwriting"]

[Text] The missilemen arrived at the designated area by sunrise. The long march, in the course of which many tasks were accomplished, was completed successfully. And now, at the concluding stage, the main test: live firings. A year of strained training is behind them. What did the missilemen learn during this time? Did they take new positions in combat improvement?

Alive launching will give the answer. The men have grounds for confidence in success. The collective has retained the title of "excellent" for five years already. At the start of the training year, it stepped forth as the initiator of socialist competition among the district's missilemen for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the Great October and the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces. According to the results of the first training period, the unit occupied one of the leading places in the district. Excellent knowledge, skillful employment, exemplary care of armament and combat equipment, high rating qualifications of the specialists, complete interchangeability in the sections--these are the positions attained by the collective. The numerical figures are higher than those of last year.

A wealth of experience has been accumulated in the battery commanded by Major I. Goncharov who has been awarded the Order of the Red Star for the skillful training and indoctrination of his subordinates. Skillful planning and a high level of productivity from combined exercises are typical of organization of the training process in this subunit. The novices are assimilating the "ABC's" of combat work quickly thanks to intensive operation-by-operation drills on the equipment. They are offered the opportunity not only to see the exemplary actions of the best specialists but also, in addition, to work under their direction as they polish each motion and work out each element of an operation. The rate of combat work is increased gradually. When it approaches

the normative rate, the young soldiers are drawn into the first combined drill. The coordination of the section begins.

Every condition has been created in the unit to improve the training of the men. A quality material base permits the conduct of lessons and drills in a situation as close as possible to a combat situation. Operating models, electrified displays, and diagrams graphically disclose the essence of the physical processes which occur during the operation of various assemblies and instruments. Planned lessons are regularly supplemented by contests between sections and section members and by the exchange of the best specialists' experience, technical soirees, and quizzes.

All this provides good fruits. Check lessons confirmed the high level of the missilemen's field training. Excellent training was demonstrated by Senior Lieutenants V. Shaposhnikov, Yu. Ryabchuk, and their subordinates. How are they working together now, at the concluding stage?

The missilemen operate in accordance with a rigid schedule. Each operation is accomplished skillfully by Lieutenant K. Rakhmatulin, Private First Class S. Markov, and Privates N. Minayev and V. Lushnikov. Reports follow one after the other. Here is the last one: "Missile aimed at target, ready for launch." A check shows that the aiming is accurate, the norm has been exceeded, and the quality of the work is high.

The new schedule which was worked out by Lieutenant Shaposhnikov for bringing the equipment to the highest state of readiness withstood one more check. Through a combination of individual operations and a change in their sequence, the time to accomplish the mission was reduced by three minutes. The missilemen accomplished all tasks on the concluding exercise by reducing the normative times with excellent guidance accuracy.

But the launching of the missile was the weightiest proof of the personnel's increased skill. These were exciting minutes. A mighty blow shook the Transbaykal hills. The missile took off into the sky swiftly....

They reported from a distant range: target destroyed. By their excellent grade, Major Goncharov and his subordinates confirmed their loyalty to the word which they gave a year ago. They greeted the jubilee of the Great October with the complete accomplishment of their socialist obligations.

Turkestan Military District

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Capt V. Nikolayev, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Ex-actingness"]

[Text] How many times the missilemen participated in this solemn ceremony, and they were always seized with emotion when they heard the clear words of the order: "Go on combat duty to guard the aerial borders of the Motherland!"

A lofty responsibility which moved all other concerns to the background lay on the shoulders of the people.

It is not by chance that the subject of high vigilance and constant combat readiness was the basic motif at the battery's party election meeting. The report by the secretary of the party organization, Lieutenant N. Tuganov, and the speeches of the communists were permeated with these thoughts.

In looking over the path which had been covered in the jubilee year, the communists comprehensively analyzed the results with which they are greeting the 60th anniversary of the Great October and evaluated critically what had been done. The battery won the title of "outstanding" five times, and in honor of the seventh special session of the Supreme Soviet USSR which adopted the new constitution of our country the sponsors of the missilemen awarded the battery-men, winners in the socialist competition, the Challenge Red Banner. However, at the meeting they spoke least of all about achievements. At the center of the conversation stood a specific person and his attitude toward the accomplishment of service duties and party assignments. Such an exacting approach helped in the comprehensive evaluation of who made what contribution to the matter of increasing the subunit's combat readiness.

Senior Lieutenant N. Isakov received the missile battery half a year ago. A businesslike person, with a clearly expressed creative streak, he immediately began to reorganize the training process and introduce new methodological procedures into it. The commander's striving was praiseworthy. Much of what he introduced actually increased the effectiveness of instruction. But, at the same time several of his suggestions required a deeper check. The battery's communists suggested to the commander in a businesslike comradely atmosphere both in personal talks and at party meetings that some of the forms and methods of training and indoctrination of the missilemen which were previously employed had shown up well and, therefore, it was hardly necessary to ignore them or replace them with new ones which had not been sufficiently checked in practice. At the same time the secretary of the party organization, Senior Lieutenant Tuganov, supporting and developing the best undertakings in every way, corrected him tactfully and restrained him from hasty actions. Senior Lieutenant Isakov soon understood that he must listen more keenly to the opinion of the communists and make more complete use of the party collective's creative capabilities. This was also furthered in considerable measure by the party meeting with the agenda, "The battery's combat traditions and the tasks of the communists in the accomplishment of socialist obligations assumed for the 60th anniversary of the Great October."

That conversation is also memorable today. At that time, the communists spoke frankly and in a party manner about making wider use of the leading experience in training and indoctrination to include that accumulated in the battery and conducting more persistent searches for new, unused reserves for raising the quality in working out the norms.

This meeting became a sort of determining one in the further close coordination between the commander and the party organization. And subsequent events showed

that the matter gains in many ways when the commander relies on the party organization skillfully and directs its collective efforts and will toward the accomplishment of specific tasks.

Feeling the support of the secretary and of all communists, Senior Lieutenant Isakov together with Senior Lieutenant Tuganov worked out and introduced special graphs which daily reflected the results in the combat work of the sections and platoons. This simplified monitoring the effectiveness of the lessons and drills and made the summing up of the socialist competition's results more graphic.

The creative enthusiasm and spirit of a constant search for progressive forms and methods of training and direction of socialist competition which emanated from the commander and the secretary of the party organization were transmitted to other communists and Komsomol activists. On check lessons, all platoons and sections demonstrated good tactical and special training. And Lieutenant Fedotov's subordinates exceeded all expectations: they reduced the normative time much more than the others.

How did this become possible, who was responsible? A commission was established and it was given the assignment to time each operation in the accomplishment of this norm. It turned out that Lieutenant Fedotov introduced several simple rationalizer suggestions. For example, to improve the working conditions of missilemen Numbers 2 and 3, runningboards were attached on the trailers. In the platoon, they also had a wise approach to the solution of other problems which provided a mass of inconveniences especially under night conditions and, in total, reduced the working rhythm. For example, they made a device for the precise driving of the vehicle up on the platform and for illuminating the work site of Number 1. Lieutenant Fedotov experimented with the drivers for several days and tried out various versions of illumination until they found the most optimum one. The innovation helped the section to save several precious seconds.

The platoon commander's experience was generalized and disseminated and he, himself, in addition to deserved praise was forced to answer at a party meeting as to why he did not share the secrets of his drill procedure with others. I think that this fact tells eloquently about the nature of interrelationships in the small collective of communists.

At the election meeting, many other creative finds by the battery's communists were also discussed from this critical viewpoint. And not only in questions of mastering new equipment, but also in the matter of indoctrinating the personnel and the solidarity of the military collective. The communists made skillful use of the patriotic enthusiasm of the men which was caused by the discussion of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR to make the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October more active, and they introduced much that was new in the practice of its organization. For example, on the suggestion of Senior Lieutenant Tuganov they began to sum up the results of the socialist competition in a new way in the battery:

in a differentiated manner, by categories of specialists. The gain here is obvious. Both practical and moral. First of all the people's interest in the summing up of the results was increased (formerly, let us say, what interested the senior member of a launcher section remained a matter of indifference for the driver and Number 2); second, this permitted a detailed analysis of each man's actions, extracting something instructive for all specialists of a given category, and studying more purposefully and collectively checking their work experience.

The communists of the battery are distinguished by a high sense of responsibility to the party for their words and deeds. This perfect party quality is instilled and developed constantly. Each CPSU member and candidate has an assignment here and each one reports regularly to his comrades on how he is accomplishing his party and service duties.

The election meeting showed that the wonderful alloy of initiative, creativity, and exactingness with which this party organization is famous have given and will continue to give good fruits and will raise the combat readiness of the subunit even higher.

Air Defense Missile Battalion

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 77 p 1

[Article by Col V. Zharko: "Only Sniper-Like"]

[Text] The concluding lesson in the air defense missile battalion began with a usual special situation: "enemy" aircraft are approaching the defended objective.

The section commanded by first-class specialist Sergeant N. Shcherbina had hardly turned on the radar when it became clear that the forthcoming work would be most strained. The "enemy" aircraft came from different directions and at various altitudes, employing jamming and an antiradar maneuver. Literally in minutes, the situation heated up to the limit. The missilemen understood clearly: now, it is not enough to conform to the normative time; it is necessary not to commit a single error and to display the highest skill.

The acting battalion commander, Major A. Trubachev, did not see many of his subordinates now but he had a good impression of them at their work sites: in the darkened radar van--first-class specialist Captain S. Koypish, at the firing position surrounded by a golden autumn forest--the experienced commander of the launchermen, Senior Lieutenant G. Khanevich, at the command post--accomplishing difficult tasks with everyone else, also a first-class specialist, political officer Major A. Kovalevich. The firer had firm faith in each of them.

Trubachev recalled the case during recent live firings on the range. The aerial situation was also difficult but the specialists coped successfully with their tasks. The command "Launch!" had already sounded, and suddenly--heavy jamming.

The manual tracking operators and other specialists demonstrated a high level of self-possession then. The actions of people who differed in experience, age, and nature, who represent a single whole in battle, were the equal of automation itself in clarity and precision. Thanks to this, they also managed to straighten out the situation in time and guide the missile to the target.

The collective functioned just as skillfully on the check which summed up the jubilee training year. On the eve of the exercise, Major A. Kovalevich talked with the missilemen about the Constitution of the USSR. Many officers, soldiers, and sergeants shared their thoughts about the party, the Motherland, and the lofty purpose of the Soviet serviceman--Russian V. Rebin, Ukrainian N. Shcherbin, Belorussian S. Okolokulak, Azerbaydzhanian I. Kurbanov, Turkmenian B. Durbayev, Estonian A. Raye, and representatives of other peoples of our country. They all gave their word to operate at the weapons and equipment with the maximum straining of strength and to do everything to greet the jubilee of the Great October in a worthy manner.

And now word had to be confirmed by deed. The "enemy" aircraft had barely crossed the distant boundary of the detection zone when the operators took them under manual tracking confidently right away. Captain S. Koypish's training had its effect here. From the very start of the training year he had taught his subordinates not only to have confidence in the automatic equipment, but also to be able to "help" it in time and back up the operation of the electronic systems. And for this, the skill of the operators must be irreproachable. Many dozens of times, the officer himself sat at the scope, showing how to accomplish various tasks in the detection, lock-on, and tracking of a target. Drilling on actual airplanes was of great value. The battalion was concerned about combining integrated lessons with flights at the adjacent airfield.

The launchermen also functioned clearly. The efforts of communist Senior Lieutenant G. Khanevich which were directed toward a constant growth in the effectiveness and quality of the sections' combat work were felt here. He achieved a reduction in the time for the accomplishment of the norms from lesson to lesson.

The officer also had to expend much energy on working out in practice a scheme whereby the specialists could mutually check each other's actions as well as a procedure for the section members to render assistance to each other. The men had the striving to help a neighbor at a difficult moment earlier, too. But at times, the arbitrary actions of the soldiers and sergeants introduced turmoil into the work and hampered rather than helped the matter. Therefore, in the battery they changed over to a system of planned assistance during combat work. Thanks to this, on the concluding lesson the launchermen prepared the missiles for action more rapidly than usual.

The firer, Major A. Trubachev, joined the efforts of all the battalion's specialists together by clear commands. And he did this calmly, confidently. One could only guess his inner stress from the droplets of sweat on his face.

Thus, the missilemen passed the next examination with a grade of "excellent." Now the commander, staff, and communists are thinking of how to improve the planning and monitoring of combat training and how to make the lessons and drills integrated.

In recent years the missilemen have been accomplishing firings on the range only as snipers. They are filled with resolve to attain even greater successes in the new training year.

6367

CSO: 1801

COMBAT TRAINING IN TANK UNITS

Tank Regiment in Northern Group of Forces

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 77 p 1

{Article by LtCol A. Pimenov, Northern Group of Forces:
"The Cost of an 'A' for the Commander"}

{Text} The final exercises are over. Their preliminary results attest to the fact that the jubilee year's socialist competition had a favorable effect on raising combat readiness and on increasing highly qualified specialists. The officers' increased professional expertise is especially gratifying.

The ridges of the small hills, covered with brown patches of fall heather, are barely visible in the foggy haze. The "enemy's" main line of resistance passes through there. Tanks, antitank guns and machine guns are under cover in his strong points; but no matter how hard I look through the binoculars at the command and observation post's tower I am not able to make out his fire weapons. They will only show themselves when the attack begins.

Today, the soldiers of the guards tank regiment are being tested here, at the moving target gunnery range. The 3rd tank battalion commanded by Guards Maj V. Ponomarenko is firing. The battalion CO, chief of staff and the battalion

deputy commander for political affairs are the first to accomplish the mission. The result: the commander and his deputy Guards Maj V. Zabarin, scored an outstanding; the chief of staff, Guards SrLt V. Sergeyev, scored a good.

Then the tankers of the 8th company performed the exercise. The overall result was outstanding. The commanders of the outstanding tank platoons, Guards SrLt V. Astaf'yev and Guards Lt Yu. Simakhin, demonstrated an especially high level of expertise. Guards SrLt V. Astaf'yev destroyed the first target, a tank in a pit, literally immediately; the target barely had time to show itself. He destroyed the antitank gun and the other targets just as accurately.

During the final exercises I visited several of this regiment's subunits and everywhere I saw this picture: against a background of good overall statistics the officers distinguished themselves with the highest results; for example, in weapons training 7 out of every 10 officers' ratings in the regiment were "A's." And, for example, in the very same 3rd battalion 80 percent of the officers who fired received a rating of outstanding and the remainder received a rating of good. The results of the battalion's soldiers and sergeants were slightly lower, however, the subunit as a whole received a rating of "outstanding" in weapons training. It goes without saying that the "A's" received by the officers played a large role here.

The commander's "A"...It is difficult to overevaluate its role in the soldiers' combat training process. The commander's combat expertise also has a great deal of significance as a mobilizing factor.

The commander teaches and indoctrinates his subordinates not just by word but first and foremost by his personal example. Increasing the officers' individual combat expertise has presently become one of the main directions in the work of the commander and party organization in the guards tank regiment. A lot has been done to achieve the present goal. From the very first days of the training year, a steadfast struggle

has been waged to increase the quality of exercises planned for officer personnel. Earlier, during these exercises, the main emphasis was only put on methodological training, but now, along with methodology, greater attention has begun to be devoted to the officers' individual training in their specialties. Specifically, more exercises are being conducted with so-called officers' crews where they not only perform the role of gunner but they also accomplish all the combat norms specified for a tank crew.

Weapons conferences--which can truly be called the school of advanced experience--were also efficiently used in the regiment along with the planned exercises, courses of instruction and commander's training. As a rule, they are conducted before beginning the study of a new topic and before accomplishing the next firing exercise. The best gunners present papers and demonstrate the procedures for accomplishing the mission. They also discuss methodological problems here.

The socialist competition for a welcome worthy of the 60th anniversary of Great October was an important factor in the growth of the officers' weapons training. The command group, the party committee and the staff were striving to achieve a concrete definition of it and to increase its effectiveness. Besides the weekly evaluation of results in the platoons and companies, an analysis of the accomplishment of socialist pledges is conducted monthly in the battalion and on a regimental scale. The introduction of a challenge cup for the best officer-gunner in the regiment was an effective stimulus which mobilized the officers to achieve the heights of weapons expertise.

The regimental party organization is conducting a great deal of work. The party organization is using the adoption of the new USSR Constitution and the preparations for the Great October jubilee as a very important means for mobilizing personnel to achieve high ratings in combat and political training. No matter what agenda item is submitted for discussion at the party meeting, the problems of the officers' personal example are invariably a topic of conversation for the communists.

Based on the party committee's initiative, the experience of the best gunners, Guards SrLts V. Zaytsev and V. Kaptyushin, was summarized.

In short, a lot has been done in the regiment to activate an officers' competition which is directed at increasing their professional expertise. You can judge the results of the work which was done by these statistics: by the end of the year there were twice as many weapons experts among the officers in the regiment and the ranks of first class specialists increased by almost the same amount. It is to the point to mention that the regimental commander was one of the first to meet the standard for a combat qualified expert. Many young officers also became experts. Among them were Guards SrLts V. Kaptyushin and M. Matveyev, Guards Lt A. Bezrushchenko and others. They are all communists.

Shortcomings Noted in Combat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Oct 77 p 2

{Article by Maj P. Chernenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Reports and Elections in Party Organizations: A Belated Alarm"}

{Text} The tank company commanded by communist Lt V. Yuzvak was considered the best in the battalion. When--at the beginning of the training year--the tankers pledged to win the title of outstanding for the subunit, this news was received in the unit as being self-evident. Nobody doubted that they would make it. Their initiative was supported at the battalion and regiment; they promised all-round assistance.

Now the time has arrived to evaluate the results of the training year. They were not favorable: the tankers did not fulfill their pledges; the company was not outstanding.

No, this was not an accidental failure, as several comrades in the regiment are now trying to represent it. Listening

to the speeches of the company's communists at the reports-and-election meeting, one can conclude that the unsuccessful finish was normal.

In his report the party group organizer, Lt Yuzvak, talked a lot about the work which the communists conducted to increase combat readiness and the tankers' professional expertise. The subunit communists worked without respite. They were always where it was difficult; by word and personal example they aroused the company's soldiers' interest in accomplishing the assigned missions. It is to the point to state that all the communists are outstanding specialists. They also confirmed their superior expertise during the final exercises.

Nevertheless, the company's communists deserve sharp criticism. Alarming symptoms that the tankers' pledges could remain just on paper appeared a long time ago. Exercises at the training center were aborted many times. The officers were diverted from fulfilling their direct responsibilities; individual soldiers achieved low results during combat firings. In their appearance at the reports-and-election meeting communists V. Yuzvak and S. Lobanov cited a lot of similar examples. Here is one of them.

The night field firing has just ended. But it did not make the company's tankers happy: several of those who fired received unsatisfactory ratings. Two of them were platoon commanders. Naturally, night firing is not an easy matter. But a "D" for it is an unprecedented event. It would seem that this should have alarmed the communists; it should have forced them to analyze the cause of such a failure. Unfortunately, this case did not alarm them. It also did not disturb the party organization or the battalion command group.

At that time I was having a talk with Capt A. Gassel'bakh, the acting battalion commander, and Capt L. Stetsyura, the battalion deputy commander for political affairs. They unanimously stated that this was an accident, that poorly prepared equipment was at fault in everything and that the company is strong and it will fulfill its pledges.

The company is strong...During the summer training period I heard these words many times from many of the unit's officials. I guessed there was a certain complacency behind them. This led to the fact that the company actually slipped from the memory of the battalion party organization and the unit's party committee. The collective is strong--this means it doesn't need help. This was the existing opinion.

It is not an easy task to win the title of outstanding subunit. It presumes the solution of an entire group of combat and political training problems and it should have been based on a clear cut organization of the training process, the efficient utilization of training time and the activation of the entire gamut of political and indoctrination work. The communists would have undoubtedly accomplished a lot if the senior comrades had come to their aid.

During the summer training period cases of exercise disruptions became more frequent in the company. Once a vehicle was not allocated for a trip to the training center, then the exercise director sent them to perform another assignment and personnel were sent to work on the economy. The company commander reported this up the chain and he requested help in organizing the training process in the company. A single answer came back--make up for it.

During a combat training inspection in the company, senior commanders discovered gaps in the officers' methodological expertise. Both Lt Klyushin and Lt Lobanov and the subunit commander himself were making blunders and errors in the tankers' training. It would have been reasonable to discuss the problem of improving the officers' methodological expertise and their professional training level at one of the battalion party organization meetings. But during the entire training year, the battalion party bureau headed by Capt O. Pikha did not find the time to discuss this problem.

There is another factor which had a negative effect on the tankers' combat training results. This is the low efficiency

of the measures conducted by the company's communists. Party meetings were held and good decisions were adopted but it didn't go any further. It is written in one of the party meeting's decisions that it is necessary to systematically summarize the advanced work experience and to achieve a situation where advanced methods for operating combat equipment are accessible to everybody. How was this decision implemented? It wasn't. Lt Lobanov is the company's best gunner and a skillful driver-mechanic. Of course it would be worthwhile to summarize the office's experience and give him a party assignment to help his comrades. The communist did not receive such an assignment. The work experience of the best tank commanders and gunners should also have been summarized and disseminated in all the crews. But this also was not done.

At times it happens like this: A subunit adopts socialist obligations, puts them in the appropriate documents and this is the end of it. In a short time, both the unit headquarters and the party committee already have a hard time naming the subunits which are striving for the title of outstanding. They only remember this when it is necessary to evaluate the results. But they don't tally with the pledges. Then they begin--very late--to sound the alarm.

Something like this happened to the company commanded by Lt Yuzvak. It seems to me that if the battalion party organization and the unit party committee had more attentively followed the course of their fulfillment of the socialist obligations and if they had pointed out the errors in the organization of combat training to the communists on time and helped them eliminate the shortcomings, then the company would have fulfilled the adopted pledges. The collective had all the data to achieve its goal.

The reports-and-election meeting demonstrated that now the company's communists, the battalion party organization and the unit party committee are trying to examine everything and determine the causes for the failure. This is alright. It is impossible to achieve high results in the future without detailed analysis of the mistakes which were made.

Tank Company Training Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 77 p 1

{Article by Maj A. Khorunzhiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"Coordination"}

{Text} The company is the center of training and indoctrination work. In the final analysis the state of affairs in the company determines the level of the unit's combat and political training.

This is why now--during the evaluation of the year's results--special attention is being paid to the company, battery and equivalent subunits. This makes it possible to see the sources of success better and to more deeply uncover the reasons for shortcomings. The tank company commanded by Capt A. Lubin is one of the best in the regiment. When the results were being evaluated, its soldiers' expertise was especially clearly demonstrated at the company tactical exercise with field firing which is related below.

Studying the information which was received on the "enemy," Capt Aleksandr Lubin clearly understood the entire complexity of the forthcoming battle and he understood what means were needed to accomplish the assigned mission; he thought through the procedure for their employment and alternative operations in the event of sudden changes in the tactical situation.

This is also a test for him--the company commander and the organizer and leader of the battle. Capt A. Lubin knows very well that his personnel's selflessness and their high training level will not save the situation if the commander incorrectly evaluates the situation, assigns the mission

to his subordinates in a vague manner and hesitatingly leads the battle. He understands very well why the regimental commander insists on high standards in the individual training of officers and warrant officers.

"You cannot teach your subordinates what you don't know yourself; you cannot instill qualities which you don't have yourself," he has reminded them more than once.

The experience and skill of the platoon commanders and specialists 2nd class SrLt Yuriy Filippov and WO Aleksandr Dmitriyevich cannot be replaced. But how will young Lt Sergey Miroshnikov--who recently arrived in the regiment--conduct himself in a combat situation? How will the tank commanders show themselves?

Capt A. Lubin devoted special attention to the commanders. During tank gunnery exercises and other drills, he steadfastly strived for mutual understanding, precision and coordination in their operations. According to the company CO's firm conviction, the sergeants are the first link from which the single chain of the soldiers' training and indoctrination begins. This is why both he and the platoon commanders taught the sergeants to bring their influence to bear on the soldiers with consideration for their individual traits; they taught them to see not only the official but also the moral point in all their relationships with subordinates and they taught them to efficiently utilize the mobilizing forces of socialist competition.

What was happening at times? A particular commander talked with pride about the fact that a tank is a collective weapon which can demonstrate its threatening power only in the hands of a collective which is coordinated, merged into one and psychologically cohesive. But he did not always consider this in everyday affairs. What was sometimes found during exercises? In the heat of battle another tank commander was so carried away that he forgot that other crews were accomplishing the combat mission alongside him--only his voice was heard on the radio. The platoon commanders also made such errors at times.

It was necessary to more thoroughly work out the problems of fire control during the tank gunnery exercises. It was with a definite purpose that today, after giving the combat order Capt A. Lubin again specified the control and coordination procedure.

The company left for the assault line at high speed. The artillery and mortars had barely transferred fire from the main line of resistance to the depth of the "enemy's" strong point when the tank company rapidly deployed in an extended line and attacked the "enemy" from the march.

The company commander's tank is in the center of the subunit's combat formation. To his left is SrLt Yuriy Filippov's vehicle. WO A. Dmitriyevich's tank is covering the company's left flank.

Suddenly the targets--two tanks in pits--appear.

Seconds--and gunfire is already thundering.

"Target destroyed," the cheerful voice of Lt Miroshnikov is heard again. "Good work gunner; keep it up!"

WO A. Dmitriyevich's crew put the second "enemy" tank down to its credit.

There are new targets ahead. Without decreasing speed the tankers destroyed them with machine gun fire. It is obvious that a lively competition has developed between the crews and platoons for the best accomplishment of each mission.

The tactical situation is becoming more difficult. This time the "enemy" tried to stop the attacking force with ATGM fire.

"I see the target! I see the target..." the commanders' voices are heard on the radio...

WO A. Dmitriyevich's crew also destroyed this target at maximum range with the first shot. The gunners of the other tanks expended two shells each to destroy the ATGM.

While moving to the depth of the "enemy's" defense, a counter attack was suddenly mounted against the company's flank by tanks and infantry. By making favorable use of the terrain and firing from a halt, the attacking force repulsed the counter attack...

Company personnel entered a significant line in the report of the regiment's soldiers for the Great October jubilee: the socialist pledges were fulfilled--by the end of the training year every second person in the subunit was a combat and political training expert; almost 75 percent of the tankers have a first or second class rating.

9001

CS0: 1801

PARENTS OF SERVICEMAN INITIATE FALSE LEAVE REQUEST

Moscow K~~R~~ASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 77 p 4

[Article by Capt-Lt P. Vakarov and Sr Lt V. Burtovoy: "Rust — on the Subject of Morality"]

[Text] Sadness could be read on Smn Vladimir Serbinov's face. He was preparing to go on leave for family emergency; his father was gravely ill. The news had come in an urgent telegram. His fellow servicemen shook their heads sympathetically and tried to console Serbinov, who was receiving such bad news from home for the second time already in his short period of service on board ship. The first time the seaman had gone because his grandmother was gravely ill; she recovered soon after and now his father was sick.

Somehow it feels wrong to degrade a person by suspicion, but this repetition of circumstances so soon put Sr Lt I. Tsvik on guard. Soon he held in his hands two very similar telegrams. He shared his thoughts with the ship commander, after which a query was sent to the chairman of the rayon people's control committee. The response said: "Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Serbinov (V. A. Serbinov's father) was not under medical treatment during this period and no certificate of illness was issued to him. The telegram was given by operator Proskurina. The certificate of illness issued in the case of the grandmother's illness was also invalid because the grandmother was not under treatment at that period. The doctor who issued the fictitious certificate of illness will be strictly punished."

No one will say that parents do not miss their children. They dream of their son coming home on leave, telling about the service, and resting. But leave and a trip home are a reward that must be earned. Serbinov's parents, however, apparently had no hope that their son would be outstanding in the service. Their blind love (it cannot be called anything else) drove them to deception. The fictitious telegrams followed. Their thinking was simple; they knew that the commanders were solicitous and would release their boy.

We are not going into detail here about the material loss to the state from these trips, although if this loss were calculated it would be an appreciable sum. But we would like to discuss the moral damage inflicted on the seaman by his parents. Yes, our commanders are sensitive and responsive to the concerns of their subordinates. And how unseemly it is to use a lie to attempt to take advantage of these lofty, moral qualities, a lie which is justly compared with rust that eats out the soul.

The years of service have a substantial positive effect on a young man. He grows physically and spiritually strong in the military collective. And it is very good for the parents of the fighting men to continue participating in their upbringing together with the commanders. For example, the seamen listen with great attention to letters from veterans of the front, telling of their war-scorched youth and calling on today's fighting men to be worthy of the glory of their fathers and grandfathers. And certainly, there are many other forms of such work. Many ships and units have developed a tradition of holding interesting meetings with parents who come to see their sons off.

When new recruits arrive experienced commanders and political workers find it useful to consult by letter with the parents of certain newcomers in order to study the personalities of their subordinates and their traits and habits more fully and, most importantly, quicker; they try to structure the process of moral guidance more effectively and strive for excellent results in combat and political training in their collectives.

It is a shame that some parents forget that they are not released from their job as moral guides even when their sons are serving in the military. And that is why units and ships sometimes receive fictitious telegrams.

11,176
CSO: 1801

COMBAT TRAINING IN TANK UNITS

Tank Regiment Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 77 p 1

{Article by LtCol A. Khanin, tank regiment commander, in the column "The Main Thing is Efficiency and Quality": "Stages of Development"}

{Text} So, the training year is behind, a year of intense combat training. Looking back on the path traversed, one cannot help but rejoice at the tankers' increased military expertise. Many companies and platoons completely fulfilled their adopted socialist pledges and became outstanding.

How did we begin? First of all, we jointly planned and discussed the resources for increasing the efficiency and quality of the training process at an open unit party meeting. A lot of proposals and critical comments were expressed. Special attention was devoted to increasing the quality and efficiency of tank gunnery practice. Not everything was alright here. At times only the number of training hours allocated to practice was considered. But, how much time did the gunners spend directly at the stabilizer console? This is the main determinate of training efficiency.

According to our calculations, during a two hour exercise each tank commander and gunner only trained a total of 10-12 minutes. And the return was not great. This was explained by the fact that only three-four training vehicles were

earmarked for the company. Of course the tankers did not sit idly by: they disassembled and assembled the machine gun and practiced other norms. But after all, all of this could have been done in the classroom and in the motor pool!

During the summer training period we expanded the capacity of the weapons training area by installing additional frames and allocating a greater number of tanks. During a course of instruction on training methods and later during a practical demonstration, we tried to arm all commanders with progressive methods for conducting tank gunnery practice and for organizing competition for it. By the end of the summer the gunners were working directly at the stabilizer console or aiming mechanisms 90 percent of the time; they discovered their targets, determined the range to them and conducted fire with rifle rounds or from the subcaliber tube.

It is hard to overrate the role of subunit commanders in the area of training tankers to fire accurately. I especially want to emphasize the role of the battalion commander. He has broad possibilities for rendering concrete assistance to the company and platoon commanders.

Maj V. Shachinov's work experience deserves attention. He personally teaches the officers subordinate to him; he goes into the long range and current planning of weapons training in great detail; he shows a constant concern for developing the methodological training of company and platoon commanders; he participates directly in the organization of tank gunnery practice and range practice. Therefore, the company exercises are always conducted in an interesting and productive manner here. It is not by accident that the best gunners in the regiment are in this battalion. The two companies commanded by Capt N. Ban'ko and A. Zhukov have won the title of outstanding for the third year in a row. The commander of the outstanding battalion was awarded the order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces," third degree.

Life shows that the struggle for efficiency and quality in the tankers' combat training is impossible without the efficient organization of the commander's work. Today success comes to

those commanders who rely on the scientific organization of work and who make efficient use of their official time. After all, it is no secret that the same task can be accomplished in different ways: drawn out or in the shortest possible time. The problem of the officer's personal time is directly dependent on this.

It has become a rule in the regiment: when planning combat training the necessary manpower and equipment is calculated precisely. The accomplishment of plans and socialist pledges is strictly supervised.

In addition, the regimental staff constantly graphs each company's tankers' improvement in weapons expertise. It graphically reflects the results of range practice to one-tenth of a point. If the line steadily rises, this means that the crews' training is correctly organized; but, if it stabilizes or begins to drop, it becomes clear: there are irregularities in the training process; something is being done wrong; mistakes are being made somewhere.

I remember how we were alerted when the next stage on the graph for the development of the tankers' weapons training was too "long" in the battalion commanded by Capt V. Sarnatskiy. The staff officers and members of the party committee, Maj V. Padalka and Capt O. Rymar, tried to delve deeply into the subunit's training process. They analyzed the monthly plan and the course of drills and practice.

The main shortcoming which was influencing the results of range practice and tactical exercises consisted of the fact that officers were not controlling firing firmly enough. A test exercise disclosed the inability of several of them to quickly orient themselves during combat, to give correct commands and to use light, sound and flag signaling equipment. These problems were not practiced properly during the exercises with young officers.

The party committee held Capt V. Sarnatskiy strictly accountable for the fact that he had relaxed his personal leadership

and supervision over the commander's training for the battalion's officers. At the same time he was given help. Weapons society work was activated in all the companies. A party meeting was held in the battalion with the agenda "On the Status of Commander's Training and Measures for its Improvement." A weapons conference--at which battalion commander Capt A. Makausov, company commander Capt A. Zhukov and platoon commander Lt A. Pechurkin shared their experiences in commanding subunits in battle--was held at the unit level.

Now that the final followup is over, it is encouraging to realize that the efforts were not in vain. The battalion headed by Capt Sarnatskiy fulfilled their socialist pledges. The personnel received an outstanding rating on weapons training.

While preparing for a welcome worthy of the 60th anniversary of Great October, regimental personnel are planning new targets and new pledges. Among them are the following: continue the search for resources to increase the efficiency of combat training and achieve a further increase in the level of weapons training. We do not have the right to rest on our laurels: new business, new stages of development, are ahead of us.

Tank Company Political Training in the Field

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 77 p 1

{Article by LtCol Parfenov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"Inspiration"}

{Text} It is quiet and overcast in the woods.

"It is going to rain..." The company commander, Lt Vasilii Arkhipov, looked up and then at the camouflaged tanks along the battered road. "We have a hard march and attack ahead of us and the route is so bad..."

Smiling, the lieutenant added:

"But don't you worry; we will finish the exercise just as we started it."

While heading to the field, the tankers pledged to accomplish the entire mission with an outstanding rating. During the first stages of the exercise they earned the praise of their senior commander--who, by the way, also advised me to accompany them.

And here I am with the tankers. Arkhipov ordered everybody to assemble at the lead tank.

"A 'window' has appeared and I decided to talk with the men about our new Constitution."

He began the conversation in an unusual manner. Turning to driver-mechanic first class Jr Sgt Ivan Nalivayko he said:

"If you will, please read the letter you told me about."

Ivan Nalivayko, a thickset, heavy fellow, found the envelop and with his white teeth flashing began:

"...In short, we need mechanics very much. Don't take it into your head to apply somewhere else. If, you say, a young lass has bewitched you, bring your fairy princess to your native land. We will arrange a wedding for the entire neighborhood and we will give you an apartment with all the conveniences immediately."

"Now I will cite another case," the officer took a pad of paper and began to read: "My name is Detlef Dekho. I live in Bremen. I am twenty years old and a mechanic by trade... At the present time I am unemployed."

The lieutenant told about Detlef Dekho's appearance in the movie theater of the Alushtinskaya vacation camp of the L'vov Polytechnical Institute where a meeting of representatives from USSR and FRG young people's organizations took place in September of this year.

"You can understand how Detlef's report sounded after the members of the Soviet delegation talked about themselves-- production leaders, students and deputies of local soviets. They do not know unemployment and a lack of confidence in tomorrow. This has been erased from our lives forever. You and I were just convinced of this again based on Jr Sgt Nalivayko's example. He is still in the service and they are already calling him to work. And how they are calling him!"

"We take this for granted," slowly stated WO Timofey Semin. "And why? Because our law is this way: everything for the individual, for his happiness. Here is article 42 of the new constitution. Do you remember it? To the effect that citizens of the USSR have the right to health care. Free, skilled medical assistance... I was unfortunate this past spring-- my daughter was seriously ill. The immediate intervention of a highly skilled specialist was needed. Frankly, my wife and I were desperate. But then we found out that the local doctors had already contacted Kiyev. That very day a well known professor arrived by helicopter at the rayon hospital. Under his supervision, a very complex operation was successfully performed on my daughter."

Listening to Semin, we did not notice that a cold drizzle was coming down. We were paying attention to him when a voice hurriedly rang out from the tank:

"Comrade Lt, you are urgently needed at the radio set. It's the battalion CO!"

Arkhipov rushed to the tank and a minute later his command rang out: "To your vehicles."

The engines roared and the tanks, stretched out in a column, moved along the forest path.

The tankers arrived at the battle area on time; they conducted the battle very successfully and earned a superior rating. When we met after the attack, Vasilii Arkhipov told me:

"I have never seen such inspiration in the soldiers like they displayed in today's operation. They are greeting the adoption of the new Constitution in a guardsman-like manner. But, it couldn't be any other way. You know, I feel that each of its articles arouses deep, good feelings of pride in the homeland and gratitude to the party; it calls us to active, creative work."

All the soldiers are experiencing the same feelings. After returning from the range, I dropped in at the district political directorate to acquaint myself with the reports from the units and military institutes.

"It is a joy to be a defender of a country like ours. An immense concern for the Soviet man permeates the adopted USSR Constitution. This inspires us soldiers to new successes in military labor. I am exerting all my efforts so that the subunit entrusted to me will greet the 60th anniversary of Great October as one of the outstanding subunits. Sr Lt N. Osipchuk." "We became acquainted with the text of the new Constitution at the range. Our overall impression was that we are proud of the homeland and proud that we are its defenders. Right here at the range, our entire platoon pledged to fulfill the field firing drills only in an outstanding manner. We kept our word. Lt A. Mikhalevich."

After approving the country's new Constitution from the bottom of their hearts, the soldiers of the Red Banner Kiyev Military District are fulfilling their duty as defenders of the socialist homeland with dignity and honor.

Training in Tank Regiment in Northern Group of Forces

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Oct 77 p 1

{Article by LtCol A. Pimenov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Northern Group of Forces: "With the First Shot."}

{Text} The Komsomol members of the Army and Navy are the leading spirits of many of the useful projects in the socialist competition for a

welcome worthy of the 60th anniversary of Great October. Our correspondent tells how the Komsomol members and young soldiers of the Northern Group of Forces conducted a struggle to hit targets with the first shot, with the first burst.

The tank crew commanded by Komsomol member Guards SrSgt V. Khropov from X guards regiment stepped forward as the initiator of this movement. At the beginning of the training year, the tankers decided to struggle to hit the targets with the first shot, to decrease the time for accomplishing combat norms by 14 percent and to master weapons and combat equipment in an outstanding manner. The crew addressed this appeal to all the soldiers of the Northern Group of Forces (NGF).

The patriotic initiative of the tankers-Komsomol members was approved and supported by the NGF Military Council and it found widespread dissemination among the group's forces. The initiative was taken up not just by the tankers but also by missilemen, motorized riflemen, artillerymen and soldiers of other specialties. And now they are evaluating the results of the patriotic movement.

I was visiting one of the units. The company finished accomplishing the drill and received an outstanding rating. Only three men accomplished the drill with a rating of "good," and the rest fired in an outstanding manner. The overwhelming majority of the tankers hit the targets with the first shots, with the first burst.

Later, I was talking about the results for the training year with the company commander, SrLt A. Mesyatsev. I asked him to tell us what participation in the movement to increase weapons expertise had done for the company.

"In my opinion, the exercise results themselves tell the story best of all," answered the officer. "This is not the first year the company has maintained the title of outstanding, but we have not attained such statistics, specifically in weapons

training, before. The high statistics are the result of the competition which literally embraced each crew and each soldier, sergeant and officer.

It must be pointed out that the company achieved outstanding results in the socialist competition not only in weapons training but in all the training subjects. However, the highest accomplishments were in field firing. Among the soldiers who are required to have a rating on weapons training, 95 percent are first and second class specialists.

And how are things going in the other subunits? I addressed this question to the regiment's deputy commander.

"Overall the regiment was rated outstanding in weapons training according to the training year results," he said. "These results were specifically achieved by the subunits headed by SrLts Konov, Mikurov, Svetlolobov and others.

The crews' movement to hit the targets with the first shot undoubtedly played a large role, emphasized the officer, in the achievement of these successes.

To hit the target with the first shot... It is hard to over-rate the significance of this in contemporary combat which--along with other features--is characterized by the immeasurably increased value of each second. In fluid combat duels, it is especially important to prevent the enemy from inflicting a strike, from executing a hit. The birth of the tankers' patriotic movement was also dictated by an in-depth understanding of the nature of contemporary combat.

It brought gratifying results. While competing for a high level of weapons training, many of the crews attained the planned frontiers--they learned to hit the target with the first shot.

While thinking about the results of this movement, I automatically want to return to its sources... I have known the crew-initiator since last year. The soldiers are serving in the tank

company which until recently was commanded by Guards SrLt A. Shkrobot. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already told about this outstanding subunit. Earlier, the crew commanded by V. Khropov--at that time a guards sergeant--did not especially distinguish itself. Why was it precisely this collective that came forth as the initiator of the patriotic movement? It is hard to answer this question. I know that no special conditions were created for the crew. But the initiative was born here because soldiers--Komsomol members with initiative were gathered together here; they were tempered in workers collectives: Vasilii Khropov worked in a mine in Gorlovka before coming into the army; the gunner, Guards Pvt Viktor Goloimov, was a mechanic; and Guards Pvs Kayerkesh Bilyalov and Viktor Yakovenko worked at sovkhoses.

Rushing ahead, I will say that the crews successfully accomplished its pledges. Complete interchangeability was achieved in the collective; all its members increased their rated skills.

Participation in the competition promoted the development of the crew members' esprit, combat and moral qualities. A strong soldierly friendship, cohesiveness and each person's desire to help his comrade developed in the collective. The regimental party organization took Guards SrSgt V. Khropov into its ranks. Guards Pvt V. Goloimov entered a military institute...

While talking about increasing the effectiveness of socialist competition, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "Good projects and good initiatives need not just praise but also constant support in deeds." This is precisely the businesslike support which the initiative of the tank crew's Komsomol members received. After approving their patriotic initiative, the NGF Military Council recommended that commanders, political agencies and staffs widely develop the competition to increase weapons training and to expertly master combat equipment and weapons. All conditions to successfully accomplish socialist pledges were created. The good training facilities ensured that exercises were conducted with a high level of quality. Weapons societies worked in many units and subunits; moral incentives were widely used to stimulate the leaders everywhere.

Recently the commander of the Northern Group of Forces issued an order on the results of this patriotic movement. Pointing out the good results achieved during the competition for a welcome worthy of the 60th anniversary of Great October, he gave a high rating to the patriotic initiative of the Komsomol members of the tank crew commanded by Guards SrSgt V. Khropov. The competition winners were rewarded. The members of the crew-initiator were presented honorable certificates at a meeting of the NGF Komsomol activists. The crew commander V. Khropov was promoted to the next military rank of master sergeant by order of the commander.

9001

CS0: 1801

INCULCATING COMMAND QUALITIES IN YOUNG OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVZEDA in Russian 25 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen A. Volkov: "The Power of Example"]

[Text] Capt D. Gutman, commander of an outstanding subunit, was leaving to take state examinations at a higher educational institution. Along with a feeling of happiness for his subordinate, Lt Col M. Savinskiy also was worried. After all, sometimes an officer will bring his subunit into the ranks of the leaders, go off on a business trip or leave, and return to find trouble: combat training marks are down and violations of discipline have occurred. Would this happen this time too?

"No, it should not," Lieutenant Colonel Savinskiy decided. Nonetheless, he kept a close eye on the work of Lt V. Zhalnin, who was made acting commander of the subunit. And the more he observed the young officer the more he noticed the similarity between his workstyle and that of Captain Gutman. The same high level of organization in everything, and an endeavor to rely on the aktiv and party and Komsomol organizations. The warrant officers (praporshchiki) V. Fedorov, A. Grechin, and P. Artemenko continued to work their hardest as before.

Of course, Lieutenant Colonel Savinskiy helped Lieutenant Zhalnin. But this help never went too far, to the point of petty overseeing. The young officer had room for creativity and initiative. The subunit achieved its objective and there were no violations of military discipline.

I would like to cite an example which illustrates that fighting men of this subunit have a highly developed sense of responsibility for the honor of the collective, for its successes and good name.

Once one of the soldiers was on pass and told his comrades to return to the subunit without him, he had to stay behind. "If I am late for evening inspection, think up some kind of excuse for me," he asked. His comrades tried to persuade him not to, but he insisted: he had to be

at a certain place and that was that! Then one of the fighting men said:

"How are you going to look in the eyes of the commander when he comes back. You'll be ashamed, won't you?"

These words forced the soldier to think seriously. His comrades were right: he could not let down the commander.

This is certainly an index of the authority which Captain Gutman enjoys among his subordinates. And it is no accident that Lieutenant Zhalnin tries to be like his commander in everything. The chief thing that distinguishes Captain Gutman is a high level of self-discipline. He is demanding of others, but he applies his high standards first of all to himself. Subordinates carry out all his orders and instructions quickly and precisely.

"To be an effective teacher," M. I. Kalinin said, "one must not only know one's work well, but also have a pure soul... After all, the teacher does not influence students only by giving them certain knowledge, but also by his behavior and way of life." Each commander should remember that indoctrination work to bolster conscious military discipline must be backed up by personal example. Any flaw in one's own behavior, rudeness, lack of tact, or desire to act in an "ordinary," not regulation manner will be noted by the men immediately and will have a negative effect on them.

I recall the following incident. The day before exercises the subunit commander was holding a meeting with officers and warrant officers. A call came from unit headquarters at this time. The commander listened carefully to instructions. "We have to report on the readiness of our equipment for the march," he told his subordinates. "But we still haven't finished the inspection. We are behind our neighbors." The lieutenant responsible for means of transportation rose and began giving ardent assurances that, even though the inspection had not been completed, he was absolutely confident that everything was in order. The commander immediately picked up the phone and reported to headquarters that the equipment was ready.

In fact the inspection was soon completed and, as the lieutenant had assured them, everything was in perfect order. At the exercises later there was not a single breakdown. It seemed that there would be no unpleasant consequences. But a few days later the commander found out that the same lieutenant had reported to him that an order had been performed although he had not yet completed the task. The subunit commander wondered to himself: where did the young officer pick that up? He recalled the meeting and realized that his premature report that the equipment was ready for the march and the lieutenant's actions in this case were links of the same chain. This must be taken into account in educational work with officers.

Unity of word and deed should be a law of life for the commander. Listen to fighting men discharged into the reserve or those who served their time long ago. What do they say about the man they remember best? "A demanding commander, but fair." This is the highest praise for a teacher and moral guide. It is earned by those who skillfully combine regulation principles with personal example. But if a commander does not set an example in work, if he takes up the path of connivance and liberalism, he undermines his own authority. Shortcomings in indoctrination work are always reflected in the results of combat training and service.

Lt A. Ostanin allowed such mistakes, to cite a specific example. He often reminded his sergeants of the importance of high standards, but he himself did not set an example. He would call subordinates to account strictly, but only in the presence of senior officers. When he was alone in the subunit, he would immediately become a "regular guy": where he should have ordered he asked, and where he should have punished a soldier for violation of the regulations, he would give admonitions. The sergeants began copying his actions. This slackening of educational work and lowering of standards led to violations of military order in the subunit and a loss of enthusiasm in combat training and competition.

Lieutenant Ostanin had to be taught to structure his relations with subordinates correctly. This proved to be difficult. And it was not because the young officer was unable to grasp what his superiors taught him. The problem was that it was already hard for him to influence certain of his subordinates. They were used to seeing him as a "kind" commander, but now he had suddenly begun using his full authority to demand excellent performance from them.

To the credit of the young officer, he did draw the correct conclusions and he is trying to win real authority by hard work and effort. I believe the time will come when the men will say of him: a real commander, demanding and fair.

The officer's personal example should flow from profound ideological conviction and show itself constantly in his work. The internal service regulations emphasize: "The commander (chief) must set an example for subordinates of strict observation of moral and ethical norms of behavior and irreproachable fulfillment of the requirements of Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, and his own service duties."

That describes Maj N. Stepanov, a subunit commander, exactly. He has been awarded a watch by the USSR Minister of Defense for his successes in the service. The subunit now commanded by Major Stepanov is one of the best in the unit. They have a long-established rule there that whatever error a fighting man may make, he will immediately report it to his commander. No one even thinks of concealing or covering up a mistake.

"Everything comes from commanders such as Captain Martynov, Senior Lieutenant Tarakanov, Warrant Officer Mel'nichuk, and Junior Sergeant Savchenko," Major Stepanov says.

To be precise, however, everything comes from the subunit commander himself. His high principles, honesty, and upright behavior are the true model for imitation. His subordinates learn these qualities from Major Stepanov.

Sometimes we find cases where a recent school graduate seems to be trying, but the proper order cannot be established in the subunit. The officer is perplexed: why not? After all, he is working as hard as the others. He conducts many training periods himself and, when necessary, takes the automatic weapon and demonstrates how the fire training exercise should be performed. That is certainly an example for his subordinates, is it not?

But people are made in such a way that they usually learn from and follow the example of those who are close to them and accessible. In this case it is enough to say "Do it like I do it" and your example will be followed. But some of our young commanders think that they must uphold strict service relations with their subordinates at all times. As a result, it turns out that even though they do have things which the men could learn, the men are not drawn to them, they consider them "cold." That is how it was with a certain school graduate who was a model of self-discipline, regulation external appearance, and military bearing but simply could not achieve the main thing, close contact with the men.

Nothing is trivial in an officer's behavior; everything is important and every step has educational meaning. Subordinates are quick to note whether their commanders are friendly with one another, how they behave in everyday life, what kind of competitors they are, and the role they take in public life. The personal example, unity of word and deed, and harmonious, coordinated efforts by officers, warrant officers, and sergeants help bolster regulation order, unite military collectives, and create a healthy moral atmosphere in them.

11,176
CSO: 1801

SERVICE EXPERIENCES OF TWO WARRANT OFFICERS CONTRASTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Col F. Nikiforov, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District:
"Two Men — Warrant Officer Service"]

[Text] There is a great deal that is common in the fates of the men I want to talk about. They both performed their duty in exemplary fashion during regular-term military service, showed exceptional organizational capabilities, and felt a call to return to the military as warrant officers (praporshchiki). Their service in this new capacity could also have developed in the same way, but it did not...

Vyacheslav Nazarov returned to his native unit three years after being discharged into the reserve. The former first sergeant of an outstanding antiaircraft missile battery was well remembered there. And when Vyacheslav told them that during these years, while working in a mine, he dreamed of returning to the military collective, they understood.

Soon Nazarov and his wife arrived at the battalion site, hidden among the low hills. They were given an apartment from the commander's reserve.

Vyacheslav was appointed chief of a station and in this position he worked without regard for time. He himself felt this was necessary because the equipment was complex. The battalion commander and his deputy for political affairs also helped Nina Nazarov find work. They visited the young family several times and looked into various everyday matters.

The days, weeks, and months flew by. Each week the commander invited Warrant Officer Nazarov in for a talk and asked how he was doing in mastering the electronic equipment and what help he needed. Vyacheslav would report with pride what he had managed to learn and demonstrate his skills.

At the check inspection the warrant officer proved that he had studied the equipment thoroughly. But his success did not turn his head. Even

more difficult missions faced him. He was offered the position of platoon leader in place of an officer who had gone off for an extended work trip. Everything seemed to start over again for Vyacheslav.

Training periods with personnel were hard for Nazarov. After all, he had to learn about military psychology pedagogy and teaching methods during the actual work. People gladly helped Vyscheslav, who soaked up good advice and instructions like a sponge. WO S. Zenin, secretary of the battalion party organization, suggested better ways to resolve various difficult situations and insure unity between training and moral indoctrination. Capt V. Vetrov, the political worker, was always at his side.

After graduation from secondary school, Vladimir Bezrukov did not get admitted to military school; he lost out in competition. But he did not give up his dream of becoming a regular military man. During his extended service, like his three older brothers in their day, he won outstanding ratings in training.

Bezrukov was appointed first sergeant of an artillery battery. This was no mistake. Under the guidance of Capt I. Sysuk he became one of the best first sergeants in the regiment.

When he applied for warrant officer school at the end of his regular term of service Vladimir was accepted. After school, from which Bezrukov graduated with distinction, the young warrant officer was elected secretary of a battalion Komsomol organization. Soon all were convinced that Vladimir's affairs had gone well. He was working with enthusiasm and inspiration.

Warrant Officers Nazarov and Bezrukov served at different places in our Far Eastern region. They did not know each other. But it is clear now to the reader what I meant when I spoke of the things they had in common. They were both outstanding in training, battery first sergeants, and Komsomol activists. They were men with much of what it takes to be a warrant officer and capable of developing their potential. Their subsequent service could have continued along an identical path, except that there was a sharp reversal...

Upon becoming a warrant officer Vladimir Bezrukov experienced not only a spiritual uplift, but also an unaccustomed feeling of lack of constraints. He had no particular difficulties in his work. At school he had been taught how to run Komsomol meetings and sessions of the committee, to write up minutes and prepare draft resolutions, to collect membership dues, and so forth. Of course, at school they often stressed that Komsomol life is by no means just a matter of carrying out planned activities, that the secretary also has individual work to do with the Komsomol members.

But Vladimir did not trouble himself with what was not written on paper. He worked as much as required, but dealing with the men did not become a duty or a calling for the young warrant officer.

Bezrukov lived in a dormitory which senior officers occasionally visited. In their leisure time the men there often drank. The situation did not change even after the warrant officer settled in with his family.

All this was not properly assessed in the unit; in his work Bezrukov seemed to be exemplary. The first unpleasant conversation occurred only when Vladimir appeared at headquarters smelling of alcohol. Lt Col Ye. Kurakin, who at that time was secretary of the party committee, dressed him down severely. Bezrukov "gave his word." But now this was the "word" of a man who had lost his will.

Only now did others recall that a full year earlier Bezrukov's father, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, had sent a worry-filled letter to the unit. From thousands of kilometers away, he could sense that his son had taken the wrong road, that he was ceasing to value the honor of a serviceman. The letter got set aside in the drill unit and no one even answered it.

Warrant Officer Bezrukov continued to slip inevitably downward. They tried to test his abilities in a different job by making him first sergeant of the same battery where he had served his regular term so well. But this no longer helped. An officers' court of honor was convened...

I recently had occasion to visit some garrisons with which I was familiar from earlier trips. I learned that WO Vyacheslav Nazarov has led his platoon to an outstanding rating, become a specialist 1st class, and been elected secretary of the party organization.

News also arrived from the elder Bezrukovs. They write that their son is now a metalworker at a plant. They were able to do the main thing and get Vladimir to stop drinking. In the evenings, his parents write, he often takes the green blouse and shoulder boards of a warrant officer from his suitcase and sits for long times, thinking...

There is probably no need to say that Bezrukov (I changed his name for obvious reasons) found himself out of line and parted from his dream primarily through his own fault. Drunkards are sent off without regret. I did not tell Vladimir's story from sympathy. I am simply convinced that if Bezrukov had been in different conditions, perhaps in the battalion where Warrant Officer Nazarov is continuing his service, everything might have been different.

11,176

CSO: 1801

SPECIALIST RATING SYSTEM IN RADAR UNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 77 p 2

[Article by Capt-Engr G. Belostotskiy: "The Objectivity of the Evaluation"]

[Text] Today, when the training year has come to an end, we return in thought again and again to those training periods and drills that we attended. When reflecting on their results, we realize once more how important the objective evaluation by the commander of the results of military labor is in stimulating the efforts of the competing soldiers.

The drill is over. Now there will be a review and every radarman is concerned to find out how the commander will evaluate his actions and who will take the lead in the competition to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy fashion. Sr Lt V. Pominov understands this very well. He tries to see that his evaluations are always objective and take account of the men's successes and shortcomings. How is this done? At the most heated moments of combat training work it is hard for Pominov to monitor the actions of each individual specialist. But he finds an answer by assigning the best-trained operators to write down the mistakes made by their fellow servicemen. It seems to be a small innovation, but it has a substantial impact. The experienced specialists become his active assistants.

It is also interesting that the entire crew takes part in evaluating the actions of each specialist. Data from objective monitoring equipment is used for this. The actions of all the specialists are analyzed in order. First the crew members speak out, and then the officer totals the results. In this case one can hardly doubt the fairness of the evaluation.

Skillfully using the evaluation as a means of indoctrination, Senior Lieutenant Pominov strives for continuous growth in the men's combat skill. The officer's success in training and indoctrinating his subordinates has been noticed; he was recently promoted to a higher position.

Unfortunately, not all officers make correct use of the stimulating role of evaluations. Here is a specific example. Capt V. Neustroyev was summarizing the results of a crew's combat training work. The training period had been intensive, with the air situation becoming very complex on several occasions and demanding precise, coordinated, and enterprising actions of the specialists. And although not all of them achieved the same results, Captain Neustroyev assembled the crew and announced that he was giving each member an outstanding evaluation.

This is where everything ended: something for everyone, so to speak. It was as if there had been no struggle for first, no competition. Let us grant that all the soldiers deserved a positive evaluation. Nonetheless, the contributions of the individual members to the overall success were different. For example, Pvt A. Kuritsyn tracked considerably more targets than Pvt V. Korshunov. Also he did it much better. However, their actions were evaluated with the same grade.

Thus, an outstanding evaluation without thorough analysis of the work of each specialist did not help raise the spirit of competition at drills and training periods.

I have also encountered mistakes of the opposite kind in practice. For example, Lt A. Potapov seldom gave his subordinates good evaluations even though they deserved them. In the books and display cases the most common marks were two's and three's. "It is better to give too low a mark than too high," he figured. But certainly it is better to go between the two extremes!

The results of competition are being totaled in the subunits these days and the lessons learned are being assimilated. I think it is very important for us not only to identify problems with using the educational power of the evaluation, but also to eliminate these difficulties in the near future. This will make it possible to raise the level of the training process and competition even higher in the new training year.

11,176
CSO: 1801

CHEMICAL DEFENSE BATTALION TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Oct 77 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt A. Sholokhov: "Mastery — the Leaders of Socialist Competition in 1977"]

[Text] The chemical defense battalion commanded by Lt Col-Engr V. Podgornov was completing a march. Reconnaissance had reported that a contaminated sector of terrain lay ahead. The chemical troops were rushing there to give the men and equipment special treatment and restore their fighting effectiveness.

The engines of their special vehicles roared with effort. It was hot and stuffy. But chemical troops cannot, they do not have the right to, remove their protective gear; such is their service.

After ordering special treatment of the equipment and personnel to begin, Lt Col-Engr V. Podgornov issued the necessary instructions on what to do and the best way to do it in order to meet the rigid time standards. Time standards...How often they had put the officer in difficult situations. But the chemical troops had never let him down.

Commander of a chemical defense subunit. He has enormous responsibility for the men, for their training and indoctrination. It is not enough for him to have a detailed knowledge of the radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments and special treatment vehicles. He has to know navigation equipment, communications equipment, the physical and chemical properties of poisons, and much more. In addition, extreme precision is required when working on contaminated terrain. Like the mines specialist, the chemical soldier does not have the right to make a mistake. Mistakes would be too costly in battle.

Vladimir Grigor'yevich began his service in the chemical troops as a soldier. Then he was admitted to military school. After graduation he became a platoon leader. His subunit held the title of outstanding for several years. As a capable, diligent officer he was promoted to higher positions. But Podgornov did not cease his creative searching and persistently improved his knowledge. By extension study he graduated from the engineering faculty of the Military Chemical Defense Academy.

The profound technical knowledge received at the academy was very useful in practice. It helped him get the most out of the combat equipment, master new models of weapons more rapidly, and efficiently train his subordinates for work with them. Lt Col-Engr V. Podgornov's heroic labor was rewarded by the Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd degree. All this was accepted as proper: he deserved it.

Capt S. Kiselev, commander of the special treatment company, approached the battalion commander. He reported that the mission was accomplished.

Glancing at his watch Podgornov said, "I am glad for you, Comrade Kiselev. The subunit has surpassed the time standard."

But Kiselev knew very well that credit for today's success also went to the commander, that it was a result of his high standards and concern for the development of subordinate officers. Kiselev certainly did not understand all the fine points of operating the special machines at first and he was not always able to organize training periods for technical training of personnel in a methodologically correct manner. Vladimir Grigor'yevich spent considerable time and emotional effort helping the new officer. He gave him regular assignments, advised him what to read, and tactfully corrected him when the officer made some mistake or other. And now he, Captain Kiselev, was a master of chemical troops like his teacher.

The captain recalled an incident that had occurred several years earlier.

That summer was very dry and there were forest and peat fires. The subunit commanded by V. Podgornov was enlisted to fight the fires. Once a particularly difficult situation developed. Thick pungent smoke from burning peat prevented them from reaching the burning forest. But they had to break through because the fire was destroying public wealth. The officer looked at his soldiers. He knew that if he gave the order they would walk straight into a fire. But Vladimir Grigor'yevich decided to proceed differently. Before giving the order the officer himself drove his special vehicle into the center of the fire.

The pungent smoke made it hard to breathe and tears formed in his eyes. But it seemed that Podgornov did not notice. Masterfully using the special equipment of the vehicle, he beat down the flame and extinguished it, making a corridor in the fiery curtain. The other vehicles went through it to reach the forest. In these critical minutes Podgornov somehow resembled a mine specialist at the front who, under enemy fire, makes a breach for subunits ready to dash to the attack.

After breaking through to the forest the vehicles did their work and the heart of the fire was put out. The officer was awarded the Fire-fighting Valor medal for his skillful leadership in extinguishing the fires.

After this incident Kiselev was filled with a special respect for his commander and began trying to imitate him in everything. And he was by no means the only one! Practically every soldier in the battalion measured himself against the communist Lt Col-Engr V. Podgornov. His personal example and excellent reputation as a specialist helped Vladimir Grigor'yevich train and indoctrinate his chemical troops skillfully. He can often be seen with the men. The officer led a technical study circle on his own initiative and regularly gives lectures to personnel on timely topics.

The senior officer summarized the results of the exercise. He emphasized that the excellent results achieved by personnel on the eve of the 60th anniversary of Great October were a major contribution to fulfillment of the socialist obligations of the anniversary year and he wished the fighting men continued successes in their service. Then he also warmly commended their commander.

11,176

CSO: 1801

INHUMANITY AND COERCION SEEN AS BASIS OF U.S. FORCES TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Dec 77 p 3 LD

[Capt T. Belashchenko article: "No Rights, Cruelty and Fear"--names in parentheses as transliterated]

[Text] Private (Linn Maklyur), age 20 years, died in a Texas military hospital, according to his death certificate, "from skull injury and brain hemorrhage." He was brought in from the San Diego (California) Marine Training base unconscious and bearing marks of blows from a blunt instrument around the head and body. An accompanying letter said that the "injuries were received during combat training exercises."

In fact (Linn Maklyur) was simply savagely beaten by Sergeant Instructor (G. Bronson), which has subsequently been varified in court. Reporting the incident, the U.S. NAVY TIMES military newspaper wrote that such events are long-established in the U.S. armed forces. At the same San Diego Training Base the command was forced to debar Sergeant (M. Benninger), who had carried out beatings on soldiers on a mass scale and used other forms of physical violence, from working with recruits. Instances of soldiers' deaths as a result of the humiliation inflicted by commanders have also taken place at another training base--Paris Island--and in a number of U.S. army training and active units in Europe and the Far East.

The army newspaper OVERSEAS WEEKLY has written, for instance, about First Lieutenant (DZH. Gretser), company commander of the 55th infantry regiment at the Hamburg Garrison in the FRG, who made himself a "private" jail in the unit in a cold, damp cellar, where he kept miscreant soldiers for several days or even weeks in a cold and hungry state without either trial or investigation. The sentries guarding this cellar were ordered by him "not to stand on ceremony with the rabble and to shoot them as mutineers if anyone dares to open his mouth."

Many examples could be quoted of such "disciplinary practice" in the U.S. Army. Why do harsh customs abound in U.S. barracks and in every other bourgeois barracks?

The bourgeois armed forces, as is well known, are one of the main instruments of the exploiter society and a tool for suppressing the people in the country and for aggression and plunder abroad. Their internal life and all their institutions faithfully reflect the situation existing in bourgeois society as a whole.

"The problems of a social nature," the U.S. military bulletin THE COMMANDERS DIGEST says, "which are currently upsetting the entire nation equally disturb the armed forces. The weak spots of U.S. society as a whole are just as much weak spots in the military community. Drug addiction, alcoholism, racial friction, conflicts in the work sphere, disagreement with policy and protests against it are today equally worrying both to civilian leaders and military chiefs and cause just as much despair among both."

That is a logical situation in a society where an insignificant minority of big business magnates--the uncrowned kings of the military--industrial complex--exert their authority over tens of millions of working people and rule the entire nation with the aid of economic coercion and force. "Order" in this society is maintained primarily by suppressing the will of the people, persecution for any dissent, political deception and demagoguery.

V.I. Lenin, speaking of the bourgeois army, said that it is "the strongest instrument of support of the old system and the firmest bulwark of bourgeois discipline and of support for the supremacy of capital, for maintaining and fostering slavish submission and subjugating working people to it."

All this applies in full to the modern U.S. Army, where soldiers and sailors are called on to protect a system which objectively contradicts their interests and to fight for goals which are hostile to working people.

As is known, since 1973 the United States has staffed its armed forces on an entirely professional basis. Such a hired soldier, in the views of ruling circles, is most in accordance with the goals of U.S. imperialist foreign policy and domestic anti-people's policy. Separated for long periods from the direct influence of the working people, isolated in barracks and subjected to thorough ideological brainwashing in the spirit of bourgeois propaganda cliches, professional soldiers and sailors are the genuine hirelings of capital in its struggle against labor and progress and participate with equal fervor both in armed violence against the working people and national minorities in their own country and in various overseas adventures and aggressive wars.

One of the major foundations for molding such an outlook among servicemen and the moral spirit necessary to the ruling classes, apart from careful selection of personnel, material bribery and ideological brainwashing, is a carefully devised system for suppressing people and disciplinary practice based on the political disenfranchisement of the rank and file, oppression and punitive measures.

U.S. armed forces disciplinary practice is based on the principle of so-called "instinctive obedience,"--meaning the complete eradication of the fundamental principle of awareness in man's conduct--which is achieved primarily via stupefying drill, the suppression of even the smallest dissent and the implanting of fear of punishment. "A soldier must go into battle," one army manual says, "not because his conscience commands him or his sense of duty tells him but because his commander has ordered him." There should be no surprise that in the U.S. Army, as the commanders digest acknowledges, among most servicemen "the world discipline, as a rule, is associated with the word punishment."

It is characteristic in this connection that the concept of encouragement is completely absent from the uniform code of military justice, which is the U.S. armed forces' main document for regulating disciplinary practice, the system of military justice and all bodies maintaining law and order in the army and navy. Instead the punishments laid down are extremely harsh: arrest and detention in the garrison jail with hard labor for up to 30 days, assignment for extra duties for up to 45 days and prohibition of leave for up to 60 days, special significance is attached to penalties connected with material loss for a man who has been punished; the withholding of up to 50 percent of pay for up to 2 months and the complete confiscation of up to two-thirds of the monetary allowance for 2 months. It is characteristic that for a single transgression a commander can simultaneously impose two or even three punishments, one as a rule connected with material loss. "When I am implementing disciplinary practice in my unit," one officer wrote in the journal MILITARY REVIEW, "I prefer to hit a soldier in the most sensitive place--his billfold." If it is taken into account that today more than half of U.S. soldiers and sailors are family men and that the country's living costs are rising uncontrollably, then it becomes clear what officers are aiming at when implementing disciplinary practice.

An extremely vital role in the system of coercion and suppression of servicemen in the U.S. armed forces is played by the military justice service and the extensively developed system of military courts and hard labor establishments. Three categories of court-disciplinary, special and general--function in the army and navy.

It is remarkable that a disciplinary court can be conducted by a solitary unit (or ship) commander. Absence without leave, sleeping on duty, arguing with a junior commander and so forth fall within the jurisdiction of such a court. A soldier or sailor found guilty will not simply receive punishment but will also have a conviction.

As regards the special and general courts, these are the usual court authorities (jury courts), in which the jury consists of sergeants (if a private or sergeant is on trial) and officers appointed by a superior. The general court, as distinct from the special court, which has limited powers, can deal with any offenses or crimes by servicemen (or the members of their families if they live with the head of the family on U.S. bases or garrisons abroad) and pass sentences in accordance with the appropriate articles of the uniform code of military justice (even up to life imprisonment and the death sentence).

In the U.S. Army the military police service is an important punitive body. It is headed by the military police directorate and has its own set-up at all garrisons, troop formations and bases. Military police unit personnel are selected particularly carefully, undergo, special training and enjoy considerable powers, even to the extent of using arms. Soldiers with blue arm-bands marked with the letters "MP" perform guard functions and carry out patrols and are widely used to break up meetings, demonstrations, racial disturbances and so forth. The military police coordinates its activity with the military crime service, whose functions include carrying out investigations, catching criminals, transporting them and so forth. This service is usually called "The Army FBI."

Punitive measures are combined with other methods of influencing servicemen. A special place among them is occupied by widely practiced "rigorous training" methods, based on inhumanity, and sadism, with the aid of which sergeants and officers strive to embitter soldiers and transform them, according to the well known U.S. writer W. Saroyan, "into unthinking numbered automations." Such privileged formations of the U.S. armed forces as the marines, paratroop units, the Ranger sabotage and reconnaissance battalions, "special assignment forces" the Green Berets and others are particularly notable for such soldier "training" methods. "We do not break men at all," Lieutenant General Puller has cynically said of marine training. "We break their civilian habits and from soft human clay mold soldiers who are ready to kill anyone their commander shows them."

The Pentagon and other reactionary U.S. circles are making every effort to insure that the army and navy continue as the main instruments of U.S. policy and a tool of aggression and provocation. In this connection a number of measures have been implemented recently in the U.S. armed forces to further toughen disciplinary practice and widen the disciplinary powers of commanders. In particular, the procedure for implementing disciplinary penalties and sentences awarded by a commander's court has been speeded up and the number of offenses automatically punished by monetary deductions and fines has been increased.

The entire system of U.S. armed forces personnel training is aimed at inculcating aggressive reactionary views and ideas in the consciousness and conduct of people dressed in soldiers' or sailors' uniforms and fostering in them hate for the working people of their own country and for peace-loving democratic forces throughout the world.

CSO: 1801

SERVICE CHIEFS ON LESSONS LEARNED IN GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Peredel'skiy on Artillery

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 27 Oct 77 pp 30-37

[Article by Mar Art G. Peredel'skiy, commander of the Missile Troops and Artillery of the Ground Forces: "Artillery"]

[Excerpts] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet artillery blazed a glorious trail and grew into a mighty fire force. The heroic past and present of the artillery and missile troops, their history and military feats are inseparable from the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet people and their army which was created by the Communist Party. During the past war, Soviet artillery established for itself the role of the main fire strike force of the Ground Forces. It proved its superiority over the enemy artillery both in terms of combat capabilities and in terms of the art of its combat use.

In defining the role and place of the artillery in the war, the People's Commissar of Defense in the Order No 225 of 19 November 1944, noted: "Everyone knows that the Soviet artillery achieved full supremacy on the battlefield over the enemy artillery, and that in numerous battles against the enemy, the Soviet artillery and mortar troops covered themselves with the undying glory of exceptional courage and heroism, while the commanders and chiefs demonstrated high skill in fire control...."

The Soviet people highly praised the services of the artillery during the war years, and by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 21 October 1944, a holiday, Artillery Day, was established (from 1964, this has been the Missile Troops and Artillery Day), and this is celebrated each year on 19 November.

During the course of the entire Great Patriotic War, the questions of the organization and combat use of the artillery were worked out and tested out in practice. Here a great deal of attention was given to maneuvering, massing in the sectors of the main strikes, and the art of fire control over large masses of artillery.

The Supreme High Command [SHC] saw in the artillery not only a tactical but also an operational means for the fire defeat of the enemy. For this reason, along with the growth of the organic artillery, the artillery of the SHC Reserve also underwent great development both in organizational form and in terms of the quantity and quality of weapons.

The development of organic artillery occurred along the line of increasing the independence of the combined arms formations and field forces in combat and an operation, increasing the possibilities of the combined arms chiefs to influence the course of battle by the headquarters artillery, by creating better conditions for organizing cooperation with the infantry and the tanks, and by broadening the opportunities in organizing antitank defense and the combating of enemy artillery.

During the war, there was a continuous improvement in the methods of the combat use of artillery in offensive operations by the fronts and armies. These methods were elaborated most completely in the documents on an artillery offensive. The essence of an artillery offensive and the basic demands for it were outlined by the Directive Letter of Hq SHC of 10 January 1942. According to it, the artillery should not only prepare for the attack of the infantry and the tanks, but also advance along with them, creating the conditions for crossing the entire depth of the defenses. Three basic demands were made which would provide for the success of an artillery offensive: The massing of the artillery in the sector of the main strike, continuity of the artillery support for the actions of the troops to the entire depth of combat (operation), and the immediate use of the results of the artillery fire for achieving the aims of the operation. For increasing the effectiveness of artillery combat and for improving the organization of its control and interaction, the artillery offensive was divided into three periods: Preparatory bombardment for the attack, the artillery support of the attack and the artillery support for the actions of the infantry and the tanks deep in the enemy defenses.

During the war, the uninterrupted improvement in the methods of artillery firing and command was continued. New firing rules for the surface-to-surface artillery were worked out and issued to the troops in 1942. These included such important sections as the conducting of counterbattery bombardment, determining the settings for firing for effect on the basis of the data of ranging guns and so forth. Special attention was paid to creating effective artillery groupings both on the offensive and defensive, and to organizing fire control over large masses of artillery in conducting an artillery offensive. The history of the Great Patriotic War knows many examples of the effective and quickly carried out massing of artillery fire by an artillery corps and army.

The experience of the first period of the war showed that in the aim of better organizing command, it was essential to abandon the special artillery groups (long-range, for an initial massed strike, and countermortar engagement). The artillery chiefs and staffs began to set up general

purpose artillery groups in all the combined-arms units from the rifle regiment to the army, inclusively. The regimental and division artillery groups were sufficiently strong, and they were able independently to carry out the basic missions of supporting the combat of their regiments and divisions.

Such a grouping provided for effective fire defeat of the enemy, reliability and continuity in artillery control and close interaction of the artillery commanders with the combined-arms commanders.

As is known, the Soviet command assigned artillery the basic role in combating enemy tanks. Proceeding from the experience of the start of World War II, it drew the correct conclusion that it was essential to have large formations of antitank artillery capable of withstanding the massed enemy tank attacks.

In all stages of the Great Patriotic War, artillery reconnaissance and observation operated well, and this always worked in close interaction with combined arms and air reconnaissance. As a rule, by the start of active combat, the grouping of enemy artillery and weapons had been fully disclosed. Here a major role was played by sound ranging and visual observation as well as by the spotter reconnaissance aircraft which at the same time was subordinate in operational terms to the artillery commanders of the fronts and armies. Officer reconnaissance was carried out continuously at all observation posts.

The successful fulfillment of the missions by the artillery was inconceivable without well organized supply of ammunition. With an increase in the number of artillery and the scope of combat, the demand for ammunition continuously rose.

The experience of the war introduced much that was new in the art of organizing the counterpreparation fire in defensive operations, and this further increased the role of artillery on the defensive. Even in the autumn of 1941, counterpreparation fire, regardless of the limited number of artillery, was successfully carried out in a number of armies of the Western Front. Subsequently, with a rise in the number of weapons available, the counterpreparation fire became an important operational factor helping to defeat the strikes by large enemy groupings.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has shown that the conducting of counterpreparation fire is advisable on the operational scale (a front or army) in combination with the aviation. The most important condition for its effectiveness is the skillful choice of the objects of the strike and the time for carrying out the counterpreparation fire.

An important condition for the combat might of the Soviet artillery during the war years was the good state of its equipment and weapons, the guns, mortars, rocket launchers, the ammunition for them, and so forth.

Due to the unflagging attention of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government, our artillery entered the Great Patriotic War having advanced materiel which in terms of tactical and technical data not only was not inferior but even was superior to a number of analogous types of artillery in the Nazi army.

At the same time, combat practices posed definite demands to improve the military equipment and weapons of the artillery and to develop new types. As a result of the strengthening of the military economy, the growth of the metallurgical, chemical and machine building industries, as well as due to the heroic labor of the Soviet designers, engineers, technicians and workers, this problem was solved.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War, including the actual combat use of artillery in combat and operations, in being acquired at such a dear price and under such difficult conditions of armed combat, are of inestimable theoretical and practical significance for today's conditions. In using it, it is essential to consider the problems of the modern times, that is, to use the lessons of the past in the interests of the present and future in military arts.

A most important principle in the combat use of artillery which was most fully developed in the operations of the past war is the principle of the massing of artillery and its fire on the main sector for the fire defeat of the basic enemy groupings and objectives. Under present conditions, the art of maneuvering the artillery and its fire assumes special significance. For achieving success to an even greater degree than before, it is essential to concentrate the basic mass of the artillery and employ massed fire in the main sectors for the purpose of maintaining fire superiority and reliable neutralization of the enemy.

The possibilities of the artillery for the fire defeat of the enemy, as the experience of the war showed, can be effectively used only in providing reliable and uninterrupted control of it. To a great degree this depends upon the rational forms and the principle of creating the artillery groups. The formation of them in all units according to the organizational-tactical principle for the period of carrying out the combat missions best provides the opportunity of massing the artillery and its fire in the main sectors, continuity and flexibility of control and close coordination of the artillery with the combined arms units and formations.

The effectiveness of the combat use of artillery largely depends upon the organization and implementation of close and uninterrupted coordination of it with the other branches of troops and aviation. The methods and forms worked out during the period of the war for maintaining uninterrupted coordination between the artillery and the combined-arms units and sub-units are widely used under today's conditions. The basic ones of them are: The joint work of the combined-arms and artillery commanders in organizing combat; the compulsory elaboration of the basic questions of

coordination on the terrain; the providing of uninterrupted two-way communications; personal communication between the combined-arms and artillery commanders and the locating of them, as a rule, together at one command post or in immediate proximity to one another.

The experience of the war has shown that artillery fire achieves its greatest result when it is conducted against specific and precisely reconnoitered targets. For this it is essential to possess full intelligence data on the opposing enemy, and have precise target coordinates. In modern operations, when many new important targets have appeared on the battlefield, and a majority of them are armored and highly mobile, the effectiveness of the destruction of the enemy by artillery fire depends primarily upon the organization of artillery reconnaissance and observation and the results of carrying this out.

In the course of the war, an ordered system of antitank defenses was created, and this was based upon close coordination of artillery fire with all other antitank weapons. Here artificial and natural obstacles were skillfully used. Regardless of the rapid development of armored weapons by the probable enemies and the improvement in the methods of their combat use, the basic principles of employing the artillery in a system of antitank defense have not lost their significance under today's conditions. These are: The massing of the antitank weapons on likely lines of tank approach and the echeloning of them in depth; the close coordination with other weapons; the presence of powerful antitank reserves; the combining of antitank fire with artificial obstacles.

Also of important significance is the combat experience of organizing and carrying out counterpreparation fire as a method of fire destruction widely used in many defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. Counterpreparation fire against the main enemy grouping preparing for an offensive makes it possible to weaken the force of its initial thrust, and can lead to shifting the time for the start of the enemy offensive. This is important for completing the work to organize the defenses. In addition, the activeness of the defending troops is increased by the counterpreparation fire.

In conclusion, it must be noted that in studying the experience of the Great Patriotic War, of importance is not only the immediate application of the various procedures and methods of combat at present. Of great significance are the examination and elucidation of the patterns and trends in the development of military arts, and a profound elucidation of the sense and lessons of the experience of the past both for understanding today's problems and for foreseeing the future.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal," 1977

Babadzhanyan on Armored and Mechanized Troops

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 27 Oct 77 pp 38-44

[Article by Chief Mar Armd Trps A. Babadzhanyan: "The Armored and Mechanized Troops"]

[Text] The Armored and Mechanized Troops during the Great Patriotic War honorably carried out their duty to the motherland, and along with the troops of the other branches of troops courageously and bravely fought against the enemy from the first to the last days of the war. As is known, the war commenced under extremely difficult conditions for the Soviet Armed Forces. This was particularly true for the Armored and Mechanized Troops which were undergoing a period of reorganization and rearming, and for this reason were not fully ready to repel the powerful enemy strikes. However, on the very first day of the war they engaged the enemy in mortal combat and courageously defended each inch of Soviet land.

The Soviet tank troops in the historic Battle of Moscow covered their colors with undying glory. Our then small tank units and formations put up heroic defenses at Mtsensk and Maloyaroslavets, at Mozhaysk and Volokolamsk, at Naro-Fominsk and Istra, causing the enemy heavy losses. During the period of the counteroffensive, the Armored and Mechanized Troops, in cooperation with the infantry, aviation and artillery, pierced the enemy defenses and pursued the retreating enemy. They participated in the liberation of many towns and villages in the Moscow Area. The Soviet tank Guard was born in the defensive engagement at Moscow.

In 1942, due to the enormous organizational work by the Communist Party and to the efforts of all the Soviet people, the output of armored equipment was significantly increased, and this made it possible in the spring of the same year to start the organization of tank and later mechanized corps. The first tank armies were created, and these sharply increased the combat capabilities of the Ground Forces. The tank and mechanized corps in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshani and Voronezh-Kastornoye operations gave broad scope, speed and dynamicness to the offensive operations in the winter campaign of 1942-1943.

In the Battle of Kursk which had no equal in history in terms of the scale of tank engagements, the backbone of the Nazi army was broken and the specter of defeat in the war loomed ever greater for Nazi Germany. The Soviet tank troops along with the men of the other branches of forces crushed the crack enemy tank divisions having forced the enemy to abandon the offensive strategy. After the victory at Kursk, the strategic offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces, in essence, did not halt until the surrender of Germany.

During the offensive operations of the concluding period of the war, the tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps played a particularly

important role. Independently and in cooperation with the rifle formations, they pierced the deeply echeloned enemy defenses, they carried out maneuvers to encircle the enemy troops, they pursued them unabated, they captured important bridgeheads on major water obstacles and drove off fierce Nazi counterattacks. By bold maneuvering and by aggressive and decisive actions, the tank armies and corps did not allow the enemy an opportunity to stabilize the front, they split up and divided the enemy into parts, and created conditions for the defeat of large enemy groupings. This was the case, for example, in the Belorussian, L'vov-Sandomir and Iasi-Kishinev operations of 1944, and in the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian, Berlin, Prague and other operations in 1945. The Armored and Mechanized Troops played an enormous role in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

The motherland highly valued the military feats of the tank troops. Over 250,000 soldiers, sergeants, master sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals. Some 104 tankmen received the Order of Glory of the three degrees. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was received by 1,142 tankmen, and 16 of them received this title twice.

The heroism of the tankmen was of a mass nature. Feats were performed by entire tank and mechanized units and formations, and many of them were awarded orders of the USSR, they received honorary names and were turned into Guards units. In the course of the war, 6 tank armies, 12 tank and 9 mechanized corps received the title of Guards. The names of a number of liberated cities were enscribed in gold letters on the colors of the tank and mechanized units and formations.

During the war years, the tank armies were under the command of S. I. Bogdanov, M. Ye. Katukov, A. G. Kravchenko, D. D. Lelyushenko, P. A. Rotmistrov, P. S. Rybalko and others.

All the successes in the development of the Armored and Mechanized Troops and their victories on the fronts of the past war were inseparably linked with the activities of the CPSU. In showing constant concern for strengthening the defense capability of the nation, our party always gave great attention to this branch of troops, and considered its important role.

The Great Patriotic War was a severe and all-round testing of the basic prewar directions in the development of the equipment of the Armored and Mechanized Troops, their organizational structure and the theoretical concepts on combat use in battle and an operation.

The tactics of the Armored and Mechanized Troops were developed in close relation to the tactics of the other branches of troops, as well as with operational arts and strategy.

In the course of the war, particularly important changes occurred in the tactics of offensive combat which was the basic type of combat of the Soviet troops and pursued the aim of the complete defeat of the enemy. This was combined-arms combat. It was characterized by the mass use of

troops with diverse weapons and military equipment, including tanks and assault guns [SAU], artillery and aviation. Usually an offensive battle started with the piercing of the enemy defenses, as a result of which favorable conditions were created for committing the tank and mechanized corps and tank armies to the engagement for developing the offensive deep into the enemy defenses.

The success of the breakthrough of the enemy defenses depended upon many factors, one of which was the skillful use of the tank and mechanized units and formations. The experience of the war has shown that tanks produce the greatest effect in the instance when they are used in the sector of the main strike in close coordination with units of the other branches of troops and aviation. For this reason, in the first and partially in the second periods of the war, separate tank brigades and regiments were used in a centralized manner. They were attached to the rifle divisions and corps for immediate support of the infantry to the entire depth of its offensive. It was not allowed to break up these units and reassign them to the commanders of the rifle regiments and battalions. This was determined by the shortage of tanks at that time, as well as by the relatively weak defenses of the German troops.

Subsequently, with the significant equipping of our army with tanks and with the greater strength of the German defenses, the tank units and sub-units began to be attached to rifle regiments, and sometimes to battalions of the first wave which was fighting in the decisive breakthrough areas. This was the case, for example, in 1944 in the Belorussian and L'vov-Sandomir operations, and in 1945, in the Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other operations. This provided close coordination of the tanks with the infantry and artillery and a high rate of piercing the enemy defenses. The experience acquired during the war years was reinforced in the postwar manuals of the Ground Forces.

The broad use of tank (mechanized) units for operations as the forward detachments was a new feature in the tactics of the Armored and Mechanized Troops. In quickly outstripping their main forces after being committed to battle, they without halting crossed water obstacles, they captured important lines or objectives, thereby supporting the offensive of the main forces at a rapid rate. By the end of the war, forward detachments became an inseparable element of the battle order of the formations, and sometimes the operational order of the field forces.

The very rich experience of the offensive operations of 1942-1943 was the basis for a further improvement in the methods of the combat use of tank field forces and formations in the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War during which they were used as echelons for developing the success of the fronts and the armies. Here the basic method for using the tank armies was the committing of them to a breakthrough at the start of an offensive operation by a front. Such a form for using the tank field forces was explained by the desire to maintain to a maximum degree their fighting capacities for action in the operational depth, to give a fluid

character to the operations, and to raise the average daily rate of advance. The separate tank and mechanized corps consisted, as a rule, of echelons or waves for developing the success of the combined-arms armies which were advancing in the sector of the main strike. This made it possible for the Armored and Mechanized Troops to anticipate the approach of enemy reserves and to destroy them in meeting battles and engagements.

The massing of the Armored and Mechanized Troops in the decisive sectors during the last years in the decisive sectors during the last years of the war became a characteristic feature in their combat use. In the Uman'-Botosani, Proskurovo-Chernovtsy, and L'vov-Sandomir operations, two and sometimes three tank armies fought in one front. In the concluding operations (Vistula-Oder and Berlin), four tank armies and several separate tank and mechanized corps and brigades fought on one strategic sector as part of two fronts. These units numbered around 6,500 tanks and SAU, that is, more than in all the active fronts in January 1944. Such massing of the tanks and the large tank formations and field forces was one of the basic factors which determined the enormous scope and the fluid and decisive character of these operations.

The improving in the methods of the combat use of the Armored and Mechanized Troops on the defensive in the course of the war occurred under difficult conditions. At the outset of the war, as is known, our troops were fighting a forced defense. They assumed the defensive, as a rule, hurriedly and on an extremely broad front. Such a defense was characterized by a weak organization of the firing system and the engineering and other types of support. Under these conditions, the tank units and formations were used for reinforcing the rifle divisions and for covering their retreat to intermediate lines and for making counterattacks. Fluid defenses and actions from ambushes were widely used. Often the tanks were used for independent operations under the conditions of positional defenses in the aim of maintaining important areas, lines and objectives.

The organizing of new tank and mechanized units and formations in 1942 served as a prerequisite for further improving the methods of employing them on the defensive. Thus, in the Battle of Kursk they already were used in the second echelons and reserves of the rifle corps, armies and fronts for making counterattacks and counterstrikes against the enemy which had wedged into the defenses.

The Battle of Kursk showed that the use of the Armored and Mechanized Troops in a defensive operation went beyond tactical limits and assumed operational significance. Separate tank brigades and regiments were basically used for reinforcing the rifle troops which were defending the main and second defensive zones. The tank and mechanized corps, as a rule, comprised the reserve of the front and were used for making counterattacks and counterstrikes, and in a number of instances for the independent defense of the lines in the sector of the advance of enemy tank groupings. The latter was a new method for the combat use of the tank troops in a defensive engagement. The tank armies comprised the second echelon of the front and were

designed for increasing the forces of the defending troops on the crucial sectors and for making counterstrikes.

Often the tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps of the second echelon (reserve) of the front, in piercing the enemy troops did not make counterstrikes, but rather promptly went over to the defensive on favorable lines and represented an insurmountable armored shield in the sectors of the advance of enemy tank groupings. Such actions by the tank armies and corps cemented our defenses and significantly increased their strength (the First Guards Tank Army in the defensive battle at Kursk).

Analysis of the subsequent operations in the Great Patriotic War indicates that all of them were carried out under the conditions of a continuous rise in the role of the Armored and Mechanized Troops in carrying out the missions of combat, an operation and the war as a whole. During the war years, the basic methods of their combat use in an offensive were their joint actions with the infantry as a means of its direct support (NPP tanks) or independent actions to develop the success to the operational depth. On the defensive, the Armored and Mechanized Troops, as a rule, were used for making counterattacks and counterstrikes.

Due to the great attention given by the party and the government to the development of tank equipment, by the start of the war our nation had developed the world's best tanks, the superiority of which in terms of basic fighting indicators over the tanks of Nazi Germany and the other capitalist states was maintained during the entire war. By the fall of Nazi Germany the USSR had already commissioned the T-34 medium tank, the KV heavy tank, the light T-50 tank and the small amphibious T-40 tank.

The development of the T-34 and KV tanks was a new stage in the development of armor, marking the appearance of an independent Soviet direction in tank building. Both tanks had a number of features which were employed for the first time in tank building practices. Both in the medium and the heavy tank, the best combination of fire power, armor and mobility was determined in terms of the conditions of their combat use in combat and an operation.

Under the difficult situation of the temporary setbacks in the first period of the war, it was essential to select the main direction in tank building, that is, the basic type of tank. The T-34 became such a tank. It was a correct choice which had an enormous impact upon the conduct of subsequent combat. The basic tank should possess great universality for successfully carrying out a broad range of combat missions: Actions on the offensive, defensive, the combating of tanks, infantry and artillery, as well as diverse antitank weapons.

In showing unprecedented labor heroism, the tank builders even by the end of 1941 had been able to organize the output of the T-34 tanks on a new production base in the eastern regions of the nation. In endeavoring to

give the front as many fighting vehicles as possible, they sought out ever new sources for raising labor productivity and for improving the methods and organization of production. Having used for the first time in world practices the high productive method of casting large steel parts in metal molds instead of casting in earthen molds, as well as stamping in the place of casting, heat treating of parts with high frequency current, and automatic welding instead of manual, they successfully carried out this task.

As a result of implementing these and certain other measures, the labor intensiveness of many operations declined by 2-fold, and labor productivity was increased by 2-3-fold. Beginning with 1942 and up to the end of the war, the average annual production level of tanks and SAU as a whole for the USSR surpassed the output of tanks and assault guns in Nazi Germany. The T-34 tanks came off a conveyor and the Germans were unable to achieve this during the entire war in producing their basic tanks.

During the war the KV heavy tank and its subsequent modifications were a successful addition to the basic tank of our army, the T-34. In the course of the war, the development of heavy tanks occurred in a direction of strengthening their fire power and armor. After the development of the intermediate designs for the KV-85 and IS-1 heavy tanks with 85-mm cannons, from December 1943 the troops began to receive the IS-2 tank which was equipped with a 122-mm cannon.

A strengthening of the might of our Armored and Mechanized Troops was also achieved by developing the SAU which possessed stronger weapons than the tanks on which they were based. The purpose of the SAU was to provide fire support for the tank operations on the defensive and offensive. Their use in our nation started in 1943.

The experience of the past war showed that, regardless of all the merits of the T-34 tank, it was impossible to limit oneself to producing one, even a classic machine. Combat required diverse means of armored weapons, and for this reason the tank industry of our nation simultaneously produced vehicles equipped with 76-, 85-, 100-, 122- and 152-mm guns. During the war there was a continuous process of strengthening the fire power and armor of all types of tanks.

As a total during the years of the war our tank industry produced 104,000 tanks and SAU.

The growth of tank production and above all the T-34-85, the IS, and the SU-100, ISU-122 and ISU-152 assault guns made it possible in 1944 and the start of 1945 to convert a number of previous formations and units to new headquarters, as well as deploy new troop formations. A SAU brigade was incorporated in each tank army, and due to this the total number of tanks and SAU in it rose up to 800-930. In a tank corps, the number of self-propelled and other artillery was increased. At the end of 1944 and the start of 1945, guards heavy brigades were created on the basis of the IS tanks and the ISU-152 assault guns.

Thus, during the war years, on the basis of supplying new military equipment, a strict organizational structure of the Armored and Mechanized Troops was formed. One of the particular features of their organizational development was a continuous rise in the proportional amount of the tank formations and field forces as part of the Ground Forces. This provided their high strike force, fire power and maneuverability, and made it possible for our command to conduct large offensive operations at a high speed, to a great depth and with decisive aims.

The Great Patriotic War provided valuable material for the further development of the theory and practice of the organizational development of our Ground Forces. It showed that they, like the other services of the Armed Forces, required a further improvement. First of all it was essential to sharply increase their maneuverability, strike force and fire power. And since the tank troops were primarily the carriers of the first two fighting qualities, as was affirmed by the experience of the war, during the postwar years particular attention was given to their development.

The experience of the war has been considered and is presently considered in working out new models of armored equipment, in improving the organizational structure and in elaborating views on the use of the tank units and formations in combat and an operation under today's conditions.

During the first 8 postwar years, the experience of the war was the determining factor in elaborating the theoretical questions of conducting combat by the tank troops. The appearance of nuclear weapons came to have an enormous influence on a further deepening of the theory of military arts as a whole, and the use of the tank troops, in particular. The experience acquired during the war years has constantly been considered in our military theoretical and practical work.

The experience of the use of the tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps in the war has had a special influence on the development of the theory of the combat use of the postwar tank units and formations of the Soviet Army in offensive operations conducted by a front and an army. Regardless of the fundamental changes which have occurred in military affairs, this experience at present provides very rich material for the practical elaboration of operational missions by the tank troops under the new conditions. In particular, the experience of the war has had a substantial impact upon the further development of the types of maneuvers of tank formations. Of important significance are such procedures of combat of tank armies during the war years as the making of a powerful deep strike against the basic enemy groupings in the aim of splitting them up and destroying them piecemeal or encircling them in the course of an offensive. The broad and skillful use of these methods for fighting the enemy by our troops provided for the attaining of substantial military-political results during the years of the war. The surrounding of the enemy is also vital for today's conditions, and it is given important significance in the operational training practices of the troops and staffs.

The experience of conducting offensive actions by the Armored and Mechanized Troops on separate, sometimes isolated sectors also has a strong influence. Only on the basis of practice were the basic provisions defined for organizing troop command and training for conducting combat under modern conditions. And not only in isolated sectors, but also in conducting consecutive operations both in the former sector as well as with the shifting of the basic efforts to a new sector. Due to this, during the war years continuity was achieved in the troop operations, and consequently, the pace of the offensive was raised.

Under present day conditions, the problem of maintaining and restoring the combat ability of the troops generally and the tank troops in particular is especially urgent. For this reason, the experience obtained by the Armored and Mechanized Troops during the years of the past war and the conclusions from the local wars of the postwar period are the practical basis on the basis of which these questions are presently examined and elaborated. They can be of inestimable service in the scientific elaboration of the practical questions of restoring and maintaining the combat ability of troops in modern combat and an operation.

A thorough consideration of the combat use of tanks and SAU during the years of the past war and the postwar changes which have occurred in the views of conducting combat has made it possible to improve significantly the qualitative aspect of armored equipment, and to achieve full mechanization and motorization of the Ground Forces for which the tank troops as before remain the main strike and maneuvering force.

The experience of the war continues to have an influence on improving the organizational structure of the tank troops. The use of the tank units and formations in the different types of combat has made it possible to thoroughly test out in practice the conformity of the previous organizational forms of the tanks troops to the methods of conducting combat and an operation.

Thus, the experience of the use of the Armored and Mechanized Troops during the war years at present is particularly important. At present our Tank Troops are highly mobile and possess great strike force and fire power. Such, as a whole, are the significance and influence of the combat experience of using the Armored and Mechanized Troops in the Great Patriotic War on the development and use of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army in the postwar period.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal," 1977

Aganov on Engineer Troops

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 27 Oct 77 pp 45-52

[Article by Col Gen Engr Trps S. Aganov, chief of the Engineer Troops of the Ministry of Defense: "The Engineer Troops"]

[Excerpts] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Engineer Troops of the Soviet Army carried out the missions of the all-round engineer support of combat. Their aims were determined by the general nature of the armed struggle and by the specific situation which developed at the given stage.

In the initial period, the basic efforts of the Engineer Troops were aimed at impeding the advance of the Nazi hordes, tying down the enemy and creating favorable conditions for a victorious offensive of our army.

During the entire war, the Soviet command defined the missions of engineer support and endeavored to utilize the Engineer Troops as effectively as possible. The command improved their organizational structure and technical equipping, and widely involved all branches of troops in carrying out engineer missions.

The engineer support of combat and the use of the engineer men and equipment from the very start of the war was carefully watched by HqSHC. In the Order of 28 November 1941 "On the Underestimation and Incorrect Use of the Engineer Troops and Equipment" and later on in the Order of 2 July 1943 "On the Use and Crossing of Obstacles," headquarters defined the significance of the engineer troops who had a great influence on the course and outcome of the battle and operation.

Due to the concern of the party and the government, the Engineer Troops grew constantly stronger, their combat capabilities increased, their mastery was sharpened, and the number of glorious deeds was multiplied. In 1941-1942, the administrations of defensive construction alone erected 50,000 km of rear defensive lines involving 20 million m³ of earthmoving; 1.5 million different fortifications were created by the Engineer Troops. During the years of the war, they set out 70 million mines, and this was 70,000 km of minefields. Around 10,000 enemy tanks and military equipment were destroyed in these fields, as well as a large number of fascist soldiers and officers.

For the maneuvering and advance of the troops, the engineer units and formations prepared over 400,000 km of column tracks, and built crossings on all the rivers from the Volga to the Oder. More than 11,000 bridges alone were built.

In the course of the offensive, the Engineer Troops cut hundreds of thousands of passageways through enemy obstacles and cleared over 765,000 km² of territory of mines.

In order to confuse the enemy, they made and set up tens of thousands of dummies of military equipment and erected spurious installations.

For supplying water they dug 35,000 wells and drilled a large number of shaft wells.

In providing engineering support for the various branches of forces, the sappers, mine specialists and pontoon bridge troops showed courage and valor, initiative, resourcefulness, as well as military cleverness and boldness in the battles against the fascists.

For feats and labor for the glory of the motherland, more than 100,000 soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the Engineer Troops were awarded orders and medals; 642 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 266 became full winners of the Order of Glory. Over 200 engineer formations and units became Guards; around 800 engineer units were given governmental decorations and honorary names.

In the course of the war the arts of employing the Engineer Troops were continuously improved.

According to the prewar views, it was felt that the basic missions of engineer support for combat and an operation should be carried out by the Engineer Troops and only the simplest of them by the other branches of troops. In this regard the tables of organization provided for troop, army and district engineer, sapper, pontoon and other units. By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Engineer Troops comprised 6.5 percent of the total size of the army, while in the Russian Army they had been 1.5 percent.

The Engineer Troops supported the combat of the combined-arms, tank and other units and formations, and carried out engineer measures to strengthen the frontiers and prepare the theaters of war.

The authorized quantity of engineer equipment and weapons provided an opportunity to mechanize almost 30 percent of the work.

However, by the start of the war, the organizational questions in the Engineer Troops had not been fully solved. There were shortcomings in their combat training, since they had been engaged in building fortified areas on the frontier.

As a result of the surprise enemy attack on our motherland, the Soviet Army was forced to retreat in bloody battles into the interior of the nation. In this difficult time, the Engineer Troops were confronted with the mission of rapidly erecting defensive lines and creating strong obstacles on the route of advance of the enemy armored troops. They carried this out tenaciously and constantly, in taking an active part in the creation of a deeply echeloned operational-strategic system of fortifications. The fortifications included numerous defensive lines lying one behind the other and

running to a great depth; artificial obstacles which were deeply echeloned on the sectors of enemy operations, and multiple-line fortifications around the most important strategic regions and points (Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol', Stalingrad and others).

The mass use of defensive works and obstacles and the continuous improvement in the forms of their use were one of the factors which increased the defensive strength of the Soviet troops. It is particularly important to note the transition to a trench system for building the positions with numerous communications trenches and weapon pits for all types of weapons and shelters for the personnel.

As the basic strike force, the Nazi command used large groupings of armored troops. In combating them, our engineer units on a previously unprecedented scale used obstacles. They mined and destroyed roads, bridges, dams, they build barriers, they dug antitank trenches, and set up dragons' teeth, helping our troops to hold up the offensive and repel the strikes by superior enemy forces.

In the first battles and operations, one could clearly see a tendency for a sharp rise in the role and significance of all sorts of mixed minefields. Along with the early setting out of minefields on the probable sectors of the enemy offensive in front of the leading edge and deep in the defenses, mobile obstacle detachments (POZ) began to carry out mining on the routes of the breaking-through enemy tank groupings. With such a method of using minefields, the Nazi losses significantly increased, the rate of their advance declined sharply, and favorable conditions were created for destroying enemy tanks and personnel by the firing of artillery, tanks, aviation and rifle troops. For example, in just 4 days in an area of the Central Front on the Kursk salient, the Nazis lost 392 tanks in the minefields, of which 209 were in fields set by the POZ.

The enemy also recognized the skillful use of obstacles by the Soviet engineer troops. Gen. Mannstein in the directive to the troops of the Army Group "South" wrote: "The Russians skillfully and effectively employ mines. In going over from the offensive to the defensive, the enemy sappers in a short period of time set out minefields in the breakthrough areas. Even during combat in the last seconds the enemy sets antitank mines from shelters. Our counterattacks have been frequently stopped by the actions of flamethrowers and mines."

As a whole, Soviet military engineer arts during the war years developed effective methods of engineering counteraction against the advancing enemy such as the mass use of mixed minefields and the skillful equipping of the terrain. In using mixed minefields on the defensive, our sappers caused tangible injury to the enemy, they impeded its maneuvers and slowed down the rate of advance.

The art of engineer support for offensive battles and operations was continuously improved. In truth, during the first offensive operations, the

engineer support of combat still did not meet the demands made upon it. This was explained by the inexperience of the Engineer Troops and by the fact that they had a weak material and technical base. But already in the counteroffensive at Moscow, the missions of engineer support were clearly defined. In the subsequent offensive operations of the second and third periods of the war, these were supplemented and clarified considering the specific conditions of the situation, the nature of enemy defenses, the greater material and technical equipping of the Soviet troops and the acquired combat experience.

In organizing an offensive, the achieving of surprise was the most important demand of Soviet military arts. The Soviet Engineer Troops found effective methods for carrying out the technical missions of concealing the actual preparations for an offensive and for making a feint in other sectors, mainly by employing dummies. For example, in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, on the Second Ukrainian Front 20 spurious tank concentration areas and 40 artillery areas were created. These included 350 dummy combat vehicles and 1,000 dummy guns.

During the war years, experience was acquired in the engineer equipping of forming-up places for an offensive under various terrain conditions. The Engineer Troops were entrusted with the most complicated missions requiring special training. The following example shows their nature. In preparing a forming-up area for an offensive of the First Belorussian Front in the Bobruysk Operation, 127 km of new roads were built, 17 km of column track were laid, around 4,000 linear meters of wooden bridges were built, 1,700 linear meters of floating bridges were maintained, 44 km of terrain were cleared of mines, and 290 passageways through minefields were built.

In the course of preparing for major operations, a tendency appeared for a consecutive massing of engineering troops and equipment for carrying out the most important engineering missions. And the control of the Engineer Troops was left centralized and this provided for success.

In providing the engineer support for the piercing of enemy defenses, the Engineer Troops solved two most complicated problems: support for the crossing of the obstacles and the advance of the battle formations of the troops. For crossing the obstacles, obstacle clearing groups were created and these used Bangalore torpedoes for clearing passageways, and from the end of 1943, sweeps. The dependence of the success of combat upon the methods for crossing the obstacles was so great that the organization of the attack and the piercing of the enemy defenses came to be adapted to the "technique" of crossing the obstacles by the attacking troops through the passageways.

For supporting the movement of troops on a march, road and bridge detachments were set up and these were equipped with preassembled road and bridge elements. In certain instances these included rifle and even tank subunits. These detachments subsequently came to be called movement support detachments (OOD).

The problems of engineer support for pursuit of the enemy by large tank formations were successfully solved. For this, the OOD were organized, engineer subunits were assigned to the forward detachments, and the Engineer Troops and equipment were echeloned in the battle formations and tank columns.

The experience of the war showed that for successfully crossing rivers, it was essential to more rapidly bring up the basic mass of the crossing troops and equipment to the most important sector for ferrying over the troop grouping which had reached the water obstacle.

For carrying out the consecutive crossing of rivers, these forces were divided into two groups ready to act by leap-frogging. In the course of the crossing, there was extensive maneuvering of the crossing equipment along the front and from the interior to the areas where success was determined.

In the concluding operations of the war, for repelling enemy counterstrikes, mobile obstacle detachments were successfully used, and these often set out mines directly on the routes of the counterattacking enemy tanks. One could give many examples of the involvement of the Engineer Troops in destroying permanent fortifications and in battles in large cities. In fighting as part of the assault groups and detachments, the Engineer Troops destroyed permanent forts; they made passageways through obstacles and barricades, and cut holes in the walls of buildings.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War on the questions of engineer support and the combat use of Engineer Troops lies at the basis of modern military engineer arts and the military training of the troops. The trends which appeared during the years of the war in the organization and methods for executing the missions of engineer support and combat use of the Engineer Troops in the basic types of combat contribute to the correct solving of present problems involving engineer support of combat and an operation.

The development of the theory of engineer support and the improving of the organizational structure of the Engineer Troops and the principles of their combat use have occurred under the conditions of profound qualitative changes in the methods of combat as caused by the appearance and development of nuclear weapons, missiles and by the general technical progress in the area of weapons. Under the influence of these factors, important changes have occurred in the equipping and organization of the Engineer Troops and in the methods of carrying out the missions of engineer support for combat and an operation.

The questions of the massing of the engineer troops and means, the broad maneuvering of them in the course of an operation, and the actions of the POZ, the OOD, and the obstacle clearing groups and detachments as taken from the experience of the war under today's conditions have been further developed considering the equipping of the Engineer Troops with new equipment.

The appearance of new engineer weapons, the introduction of them in large quantities into the tables of organization of the branches of troops, and the further improvement in the organizational forms and principles of combat use significantly increased the capabilities of the formations and units of the branches of troops and the formations of the Engineer Troops in carrying out the missions of engineer support for combat and an operation which are carried out at a rapid pace and to a great depth.

The very rich experience acquired by the Engineer Troops during the war years in employing the engineer weapons under combat conditions, in combination with a broad scientific search and the immeasurably increased capabilities of our nation's industry have been the basis for a further improvement in the existing engineer weapons and the development of fundamentally new ones during the postwar years.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has been inestimable in indoctrinating the present generation of men in the Engineer Troops in a spirit of total loyalty to the motherland and to the CPSU, and in improving professional skill.

The men of the Engineer Troops, in continuing the heroic traditions of their fathers and elder brothers, are capable of carrying out the most complex missions of engineer support for modern operations.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal," 1977

Belov on Signal Troops

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 27 Oct 77 pp 53-59

[Article by Mar Sig Trps A. Belov, signals chief of the Armed Forces and deputy chief of the General Staff: "The Signal Troops"]

[Excerpts] The Signal Troops which were created upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin in October 1919 as an independent branch of the special troops, even during the interwar period were twice rearmed with Soviet-produced equipment.

The Great Patriotic War with particular convincingness showed the major role of military communications and affirmed that communications is the basic means providing troop command.

From the first days of the war, there was the urgent question of ensuring troop command and the organizing of uninterrupted communications between HqSHC and the General Staff with the fronts and the armies.

The task of providing uninterrupted communications during the initial period was complicated by the fact that the Signal Troops in entering the war were not fully equipped with the necessary means. But with the start

of the war, the delivery of this equipment to the troops even slowed down, since a significant portion of the industrial enterprises was transferred into the interior of the nation. There was a particular shortage in the new units, formations and field forces which had been called up and deployed on the broad front. Moreover, the commanders and staffs did not have experience in organizing command and the use of all the available means for establishing and maintaining uninterrupted communications with the subordinate troops; they underestimated radio communications. And this frequently led to the loss of command.

However, the difficulties of the initial period of the war were quickly surmounted. The Signal Troops began to receive regularly the necessary equipment and personnel, and this told quickly upon a rise in the quality of troop command in battle and an operation.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the system of troop command was continuously improved, the demands upon the quality of communications were constantly increased, and the arts of the Signal Troops developed.

In all the services of the Armed Forces and the branches of troops, the methods of organizing communications and the actions of the line and center units and subunits were constantly improved, and the tactical and technical data of the communications equipment were improved, while the quantity of it in the troops rose continuously. However, in a brief article it is impossible to examine in detail the results of the combat activities of the Signal Troops of all the services of the USSR Armed Forces, and for this reason below the article will largely deal with the experience of organizing communications in the Ground Forces.

During the war years, the art of employing radio equipment in troop command was improved. A major achievement in the practice and theory of organizing radio communications was its use by troops fighting toward one another in encircling and destroying large enemy groupings. Radio communications in a pincers movement were used successfully for the first time between the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts in encircling the enemy at Stalingrad in November 1942.

Radio communications assumed ever greater significance on the tactical level of command. For this, in the third period of the war alone, industry supplied the troops with 82,000 radios, and this provided firm, flexible and uninterrupted troop command and largely determined the success of combat.

In the aviation, armored and mechanized troops, in the airborne and amphibious troops, and in the partisan detachments and formations, the radio was not only the basic but often the only means of communications.

It is interesting to note that while at the start of the Great Patriotic War the radio nets were largely created in the fronts, armies and even in the divisions for the purpose of exchanging information between the commanders and the chiefs of staff, by the end of the war, in addition, special

radio nets had been organized for the artillery commanders, the air defense chiefs, the chiefs of the Engineer Troops, the rear, and so forth. This example shows not only the greater role of radio communications as a whole, but also that the transmitting of a large amount of information considering the specifics of command for each branch of troops had become impossible to carry out using the two or three radio nets of the combined-arms commander.

An important innovation was the organizing of communications on the level of the General Staff and the army staffs. In 1943, this was extended to all levels of command. Such communications made it possible for Headquarters, the commanders and also their staffs to better know the situation, to more efficiently command subordinate troops in the course of combat, and when necessary to assume command not only over the directly subordinate field forces, formations and units, but also on lower levels.

For example, at the beginning of October 1941, in the course of the defensive battles at Moscow, the command post of the Bryansk Front was subjected to massed enemy air strikes, and the commander of the front, Gen A. I. Yeremenko, was severely wounded. The commander and the staff of the front temporarily lost command of the troops. However, Headquarters, in having contact with the armies of the Bryansk Front, assumed command. As a result, the troops of the front retreated in an organized manner to the rear defensive line, and halted the further enemy advance at it.

In operations, clearly organized cooperation between all the branches of troops assumed decisive significance in achieving success. Here communications were organized in accord with the plan of the pending operation. Depending upon the situation, the use of various means was planned, however radio was the basic one. Wire communications were widely used for coordination chiefly on the defensive and in the forming up place for an offensive.

Radio communications for coordination were carried out over the radio links and nets. The radio links were created for communications between two cooperating formations and provided the most dependable radio communications between them. The method of organizing radio communications over a radio link was also widely used for communications of the command in the operational level of command.

For liaison communications on the tactical level, radio nets were organized and these made it possible to maintain communications between several staffs of the formations and units of the different branches of troops and adjacent units. They provided an opportunity to rapidly establish liaison communications with the regrouping of troops in the course of an operation.

The war showed the necessity of such means of communications which would make it possible to provide the effective handling of private conversations between commanders. The printing radio telegraph which was developed by Soviet radio specialists became such a means.

Radio printing-telegraphy played an important role in providing troop command on the operational and strategic levels, and significantly raised the level of telegraph communication services for the superior staffs.

Wire communications were also widely used during the war years. They were most often used in defensive operations, when an opportunity was presented to create a broadly developed communications network. In defending large cities, the underground cable communications lines of the municipal telephone networks were widely used in the interests of troop command.

In the second and third periods of the war, wire communications were organized not only on the defensive but also considering the pending going over to the offensive. Here the organization of wire communications was carried out over several independent links.

On the offensive, particularly in the course of pursuit, when the rate of advance grew sharply, the network of wire communications lines of the fronts and armies, as a rule, was reduced, and the wire communications of the front with the armies and the mobile groups were carried out through the auxiliary communications centers. On the tactical level, during the period of pursuit wire communications were not organized. The commanders and staffs controlled the troops using the radio and mobile means of communications.

According to our prewar views, it was felt that the use of telephone communications was possible only for internal communications in the large staffs, and for troop command, only on the tactical level of command. However, in the course of the war, as experience was acquired in organizing communications and as the troops received more modern equipment and line facilities, telephone communications were widely used on all levels of command. On the level of the General Staff and the staffs of the fronts, the staff of the front and the army staffs, an important role was played by the governmental high frequency telephone communications. Experience affirmed that telephone communications, in possessing a number of advantages, offered great opportunities for increasing the efficiency of command.

The war disclosed the necessity of widely using mobile means of communications, and in the units and subunits foot messengers, mounted messengers, skiers and motorcyclists were used as them. In the operational field forces, these were liaison vehicles, armored personnel carriers, tanks and aircraft.

Military postal communications played an exceptionally important role in maintaining the high morale of the Soviet soldiers and in providing uninterrupted communications between the front and the rear.

The signalmen had to solve problems which before the war had not been investigated even on the theoretical level. This was the creation of individual signal brigades of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK),

the use of separate and special communications centers, the introduction of signals commandant offices, zones and commandants, the appointing of chiefs of the operational signals links, and others.

The creation of signal brigades of the RVGK was dictated by the following circumstances. The concluding operations of the Great Patriotic War were characterized not only by great scope and a rapid rate of advance, but also by an ever increasing distance of the command posts of the fronts and the armies from HqSHC and its working body, the General Staff. The length of the communications lines exceeded 1,000 km. This led to a situation where the number of signals units directly under the Main Signals Directorate and serving these links sharply increased. Serious difficulties arose in controlling them. For the purpose of overcoming these difficulties, at the end of 1944, by a decision of the GKO [State Defense Committee] several signals brigades of the RVGK were created. This was the first time that such brigades were created, and, as the experience of their combat use showed, they fully justified themselves.

The introduction of the position of chiefs of the operational signal links of the Main Signals Directorate played an essential role in improving communications of the General Staff with the fronts and the armies and raising the responsibility for the state of communications. They were responsible for providing uninterrupted communications with one or several fronts fighting on one strategic sector. Such a form of directing the communications of the SHC and the General Staff had not been employed previously, but was fully effective in the period of the rapid advance of the Soviet Army.

With the shifting of the hostilities outside our nation, the lines and means of communications in the liberated nations began to be partially used in troop command. This caused additional difficulties related to the design features of the communications equipment, to the absence of communications plans for these countries, and to instances of sabotage by enemy agents. The Soviet troops, in advancing to the west, were forced to leave in their rear various garrisons and commandant offices for providing a normal life of the indigenous population. The strategic and operational reserves were concentrated in the rear of the advancing troops. In order to provide troop command and to create normal conditions for the work of the local institutions, signals commandant offices were set up.

However the signals commandant offices were unable to solve the entire complex of questions alone. The number of them grew, and consequently their control became more complicated. In the aim of improving leadership over the signals commandant offices and for making more effective use of the local institutions, as well as for providing dependable communications in the rear areas of the front on the territory of the countries liberated by the Soviet Army, a decision was taken to create special communications centers (USSN).

This was a new form for organizing communications of the superior command. The USSN were entrusted with the missions of providing communications for the command of the large garrisons with Moscow, for maintaining communications between the garrisons and the staff of the front (separate army) and the subordinate and adjacent garrisons, for providing transit operational communications and using the local facilities. The chiefs of the USSN had special units under them. They were assigned separate battalions or companies equipped with the necessary facilities and instruments.

The developed network of USSN and signals commandant offices substantially supplemented the overall communications system of the General Staff.

The very rich experience acquired by the Signal Troops during the operations of the Great Patriotic War lay at the basis of their postwar development. Officers and generals who were theoretically well trained and who had great experience in the war were involved in generalizing this experience, in creating a scientifically based theory of military communications and elaborating a technical policy. The basic problems were defined for the development of military communications in light of the requirements of military arts, and numerous aids were worked out. The troops received new guiding documents on communications. Many provisions related to the organization of communications as established and tested out during the years of the past war subsequently have not only not lost their importance but have become even more vital and timely.

In the postwar period, on the basis of generalizing and studying the experience of the war, the views have substantially changed on the organization and insuring of troop command in combat and an operation, and new demands upon the means of communications have appeared.

The experience of the war showed above all that for ensuring uninterrupted troop command, the combat readiness of the communications systems should be on a high level. Modern communications systems must dependably resist the destructive action of all weapons, and possess the flexibility and capacity to quickly reorganize in the course of combat. They should be highly mobile and operate dependably with the frequent moving of command posts and extended movements.

Analysis of the experience of the Signal Troops shows that their organizational structure should be continuously improved in accord with the increased demands upon troop command as well as the changing conditions for combat.

Under modern conditions, the necessity has arisen of an optimum balance between the different means of communications and their integrated development and use. Flexible and uninterrupted troop command cannot be provided with just one means of communications alone. Only the integrated use of stationary and field means of communications will make it possible to carry out this mission.

Characteristic in the development of military communications were the elaboration and introduction into the troops of radio relay equipment which opened up new opportunities for creating a unified communications system. Radio relay communications were actually used for the first time at the end of the Great Patriotic War, however their wide application became possible only during the postwar years. At the same time, work was successfully concluded on developing low-capacity multichannel light radio relay stations.

Our radio electronics industry developed a new range of means of communications which subsequently was modernized and updated on the basis of recent scientific and technical achievements.

Special types of telegraph and telephone communications were also introduced into the troops. On the basis of new equipment, there was a further development of the communications system in all levels of command, and their capacity and efficiency were increased.

The war showed that the combat teamwork of the signals units and subunits, their steadfastness in combat, and a comprehension by the personnel of the importance of the missions being carried out depended upon the level of party political work, and this was carried out continuously and on a differentiated basis with the various categories of signalmen. This work was based upon individual indoctrination and personal contact of the commanders and political workers with subordinates. It was aimed at instilling in the personnel total loyalty to the motherland, a belief in the ideals of communism, high vigilance, strictest discipline, the strict observance of the rules of concealed troop command, and the ability to provide uninterrupted communications under the most difficult situation. Combat experience and the experience of postwar development showed that success in party political work is achieved by those commanders and political workers who personally set an example in operating the means of communications, who have profound theoretical knowledge and can provide practical aid to their subordinates under the difficult conditions of carrying out a combat mission.

The appearance of nuclear weapons and other modern weapons has necessitated a continuous improvement in the procedures and methods for the combat use of the Signal Troops, and has placed high demands upon the political-moral state of the signalmen and their combat skills. The viability of communications, their reliability, capacity and concealment are assuming ever greater significance. Communications more than ever before have become one of the most important factors in ensuring the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Signal Troops, having joined the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October have reached this noteworthy date with high indicators in military and political training.

The military signalmen are presently highly skilled specialists who are totally loyal to the motherland and the party. They have perfect knowledge of the military equipment assigned to them and ably provide dependable communications under any conditions.

The commanders, staffs and political bodies of the Signal Troops are constantly improving the forms and methods of personnel training and indoctrination. A study of the combat experience and heroic deeds of the signalmen during the years of the Great Patriotic War provides invaluable aid in indoctrinating in the signalmen a high feeling of personal responsibility for defending the socialist motherland and a love for the profession of signalman.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal," 1977

Deputy Chief Sobolev on Party-Political Work

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 27 Oct 77 pp 60-70

[Article by Lt Gen M. Sobolev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The CPSU--Organizer of Party-Political Work in the Army and Navy"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and its satellites, in mobilizing all the forces of the Soviet people to raise the fighting efficiency of the Army and Navy, the Communist Party gave particular attention to strengthening the party influence in the Armed Forces, to strengthening the morale of their personnel and to improving party-political work. The party was constantly led by the instructions of V. I. Lenin that "where political work is carried out most carefully in the troops...there is no laxness in the army, its order and spirit are better and there are more victories."¹

The party Central Committee showed a truly scientific and creative approach to party development in the Armed Forces under the wartime conditions. In providing direct leadership over the party-political work in the Armed Forces, the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee defined its main directions depending upon the military political situation, it carried out a reorganization of the political bodies and party organizations, and was constantly concerned for raising their fighting efficiency and strengthening party influence on the masses of soldiers.

The wartime conditions necessitated a fundamental reorganization in the party political work in the Army and Navy. The VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] in the Directive of 29 June 1941 defined the political essence of the war, they fully disclosed to the people and the Armed Forces the threat hanging over the nation, and set out specific tasks to mobilize all the forces of the state to defeat the enemy.

In being guided by Lenin's instructions, the Communist Party, which from the first days of the war had become a fighting party, sent its best cadres into the Army and Navy. V. I. Lenin wrote: "How did we act during the more dangerous moments of the Civil War? We concentrated our best party forces in the Red Army...."⁴

In providing political leadership over the Armed Forces through its bodies in the Army and Navy, the VKP(b) Central Committee showed great concern for the strengthening and improvement of the work of the military councils, the political administrations of the fronts, and the political departments of the field forces and formations. Experienced party workers including members and candidate members of the party Central Committee and secretaries of the major party committees were appointed as members of the military councils and chiefs of political bodies. Among them was Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev who from July 1941 was in the army in the field. During the very first months of the war, the Central Committee dispatched around 8,800 party workers to leading party-political work in the Armed Forces.⁵ This helped substantially to strengthen the political administrations of the fronts, as well as the political departments of the armies, corps and divisions.

The conditions of the first period of the war brought to life extraordinary forms of party leadership in the Armed Forces. On 16 July 1941, on the basis of the Decision of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the regiments (ships) and divisions, the staffs, military schools and facilities both at the front and in the rear, the institution of military commissars⁶ was established, and in the companies, batteries and squadrons the institution of political instructors ("politruks").

The Communist Party placed enormous responsibility on its messengers in the Army and Navy. Under the difficult conditions when the enemy possessed significant superiority in personnel and military equipment and in the experience of waging war, the military commissars had to increase the fighting morale of the troops and a desire to stop the enemy at any price. The Regulation Governing Military Commissars as approved by the party Central Committee stated: "The military commissar is the representative of the party and government in the Red Army, and along with the commander bears full responsibility for the carrying out of the combat mission by the troop unit, for its strength in combat and unflinching readiness to fight the enemies of our motherland to the last drop of blood, and to defend with honor each inch of Soviet land."⁷

This was an important party measure. The military commissars played an enormous role in the strengthening of the Red Army and Navy, in raising the fighting efficiency of the troops and in improving party political work with the personnel during the first, most difficult period of the war.

An enormous role was also played by the political instructors as the most numerous detachment of political workers. They were constantly on the

firing line where the outcome of combat was decided. The preciseness of carrying out a battle order depended upon their courage, strength, endurance and ability to indoctrinate the men. PRAVDA wrote glowingly about them: "In the history of the Great Patriotic War, the political instructor will be inscribed as one of its glorious and honored figures, with automatic in hand, in a camouflaged jacket and helmet, going ahead and leading the men to achieve the elevated and noble aim of defeating the Nazis and liberating their fatherland."⁸

The political bodies of the Army and Navy were reorganized simultaneously with the introduction of the institution of military commissars. The political propaganda administrations and departments were transformed into political departments and administrations. This improved their party organizational activities and leadership over the party organizations. Additional opportunities appeared for increasing the effectiveness of party-political work in the troops.

In strengthening the political bodies in the Army and Navy, the VKP(b) Central Committee showed special concern for the Main Political Directorates of the Red Army and Navy which worked as departments of the VKP(b) Central Committee. Upon instructions of the party Central Committee, their organizational structure as well as the forms and methods of work were improved, and skilled personnel was added. In June 1942, during the difficult days for the Soviet troops, upon a decision of the Central Committee Politburo, the candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee, A. S. Shcherbakov, was appointed the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Upon a decision of the party Central Committee, under the Main Political Directorate, a Council for Military Political Propaganda was created, with the job of generalizing the experience of the party political work in the troops, and elaborating recommendations to improve this. Its members included the secretaries of the party Central Committee A. S. Shcherbakov (chairman), A. A. Zhdanov, and the Central Committee members D. Z. Manuil'skiy, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, I. V. Rogov, the candidate member of the Central Committee G. F. Aleksandrov, and the deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, F. F. Kuznetsov.

By the autumn of 1942, the command personnel had become significantly strengthened in comparison with the initial period of the war, and they had acquired experience in troop leadership under combat conditions. In turn the military commissars and political workers had increased their military skills. Many of them could be used in command positions. In considering the qualitative changes in the Soviet Armed Forces and particularly the command personnel, the party Central Committee on 9 October 1942 approved the decision to abolish the institutions of political commissars and political instructors, and established full one-man leadership.⁹

In the activities of the Communist Party to organize party-political work in the Army and Navy, an important place was held by the training and

indoctrination of political personnel. The expansion of the network of military political schools and the shortening of the period of instruction in them made it possible to train 57,000 political workers during the first 6 months of the war.¹⁰ From 1942, upon instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, in line with the greater technical outfitting of the army, new schools were created for the training of political workers for the tank, artillery, mortar and other units. By the start of 1943, over 95,000 political workers had been trained.¹¹ As a total during the war, the military political schools trained 125,200 middle-level political workers; some 112,140 political workers underwent retraining, including 41,000 of the middle and senior level.¹²

The political workers honorably carried out the missions entrusted to them. They indoctrinated the personnel of the units in a spirit of love for the motherland, the party and the Soviet people, they carried the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism into the masses of soldiers, and were in the most difficult and dangerous areas. "The political workers," stressed L. I. Brezhnev, "were the soul of the Soviet Armed Forces. They brought the party's word to our soldiers, and inspired them to a heroic and self-sacrificing struggle. From the political instructor to the member of the military council--they were where it was most difficult, strengthening confidence in the triumph of our just cause in the soldiers and indoctrinating courage, will and intrepidity in them."¹³

Many glorious pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War are linked with the name of L. I. Brezhnev. As the deputy chief of the political administration of the Southern Front and later as the chief of the political department of the 18th Army and the chief of the political administration of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, he took an active part in working out and implementing the plans for a number of major operations by the Soviet Army in the Caucasus, the Black Sea area, the Crimea, the Ukraine and in the liberation campaign abroad.

The most important task of the Communist Party in organizing party-political work, was the greatest possible strengthening of the Army and Navy party organizations. They were the basic element of the party in the Armed Forces. Here the soldier-communist was shaped as a political fighter of the party and received ideological tempering. The military party organizations during the first period of the war were filled out mainly with the party and general civilian mobilizations. On 27 June 1941, the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee approved a decision to conduct the first mobilization of communists and the better Komsomol members as political fighters. During the first 6 months of the war, 60,000 communists and 40,000 Komsomol members were sent into the Armed Forces.¹⁴ The political fighters comprised the nucleus of the party organizations. "The political fighter," wrote the newspaper PRAVDA during those days, "leads the nonparty people.... He is the cement which links the men of the Red Army by a single will and by a single desire to vanquish the enemy."¹⁵ As a total during the war years, some 1,678,000 party members and candidate members were called up

from the territorial party organizations into the Armed Forces. All in all the party sent around 60 percent of its membership to the front.¹⁶ This was the first time in the history of the party that the reallocation of party forces was carried out on such an enormous scale. This was of great significance for strengthening the Army and Navy party organizations and for raising the fighting efficiency of the troops.

Placement of Communists During Years of Great Patriotic War¹⁷

Year (1 Jan)	Total Communists	In % of 1941	Including			
			In Army and Navy Party Organizations	% of Total Communists	In Territorial Party Organizations	In % of Total Communists
1941	3,872,465	100	559,182	14.4	3,313,283	85.6
1942	3,063,876	79.1	1,234,373	40.3	1,829,503	59.7
1943	3,854,701	99.5	1,938,327	50.3	1,916,374	49.7
1944	4,918,561	127.0	2,702,566	54.9	2,215,995	45.1
1945	5,760,369	148.7	3,030,758	52.6	2,729,611	47.4
1946	5,510,862	142.4	1,814,781	32.9	3,695,901	67.1

One of the most significant phenomena in party development in the Armed Forces during the war years was the enormous growth of the military party organizations. From the first days of the hostilities, the influx of applications from the commanders and Red Army men requesting admission to the party increased continuously. This showed the great confidence of the Soviet military in the Leninist party as their leader and guide. In considering this, on 19 August 1941, the VKP(b) Central Committee approved a decree on the procedure for admitting Soviet soldiers who particularly distinguished themselves in combat (the applicant candidates submitted recommendations by three party members who had been members for not 3 years, as the By-Laws of the VKP(b) required, but rather 1 year, and who knew the applicant from joint work at least a year). And on 9 December 1941, a decree of the Central Committee was issued which permitted the admitting to the VKP(b) of servicemen who particularly distinguished themselves in combat after a 3-month period as a candidate.¹⁸

The decrees of the Central Committee on the party admission conditions significantly helped to increase the party ranks and raise the number of party organizations in the Army and Navy. As a total during the 4 years of the war, the party organizations of the Armed Forces admitted 3,787,647 persons as candidate members, and 2,376,587 persons as party members.¹⁹ Before the war, the party members and candidate members in the Red Army were 12.7 percent of the entire personnel. By the war's end, one out of every four soldiers was a communist.

The rapid growth of the ranks of the VKP(b) helped to increase the number of party organizations in the Army and Navy. While on 1 July 1941, there were 14,700 primary party organizations in the Armed Forces, in 1944, there were 67,000, and by the war's end their number had risen to 80,000.²⁰ All of this strengthened the party's influence in the Army and Navy and raised the fighting efficiency of the troops.

The change in the structure of the military party organizations was of important significance in the activities of the Communist Party to improve party development in the Armed Forces. In the second period of the war there was a sharp increase in the number of communists in the primary party organizations. For example, in the rifle regiments there were 100-200 and more communists. Under a combat situation it was very difficult to summon the members of such a large organization to the general meetings. The secretary of a regimental party bureau was unable to correctly and promptly place the party forces in the subunits. Many communists, particularly young ones, were little familiar with party life and the carrying out of party instructions. Life itself and daily practice demanded a reorganization in the structure of the party organizations of the Armed Forces and a shifting of the center of party work from the regimental level to the battalion one. Considering this, on 24 May 1943, the party Central Committee approved a decree which stated: "In amending the existing structure of the army party organizations, to establish the following structure of the party organizations in the rifle units of the Red Army: a regimental party bureau headed by a party organizer in a rifle regiment; a primary party organization headed by a party organizer in the battalion; a company party organization headed by a party organizer in the company."²¹ The institution of party organizer was the form of party leadership which best corresponded to a combat situation. The party Central Committee considered it necessary that the party organizer be a cadre worker in the party organizations of not only the regiments but also the battalions. The regimental party bureau assumed the functions of the party committee and could more actively influence all aspects of the life and combat activity of the unit.

During the war years the Leninist Komsomol was a reliable aid to the party. The VKP(b) Central Committee defined the ways for reorganizing the work of the Komsomol under the wartime conditions, and was constantly concerned for strengthening the party nucleus in it as well as improving the forms and methods of the work of the Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy.

The structure of the Komsomol organizations was reorganized by a decision of the party Central Committee of 24 May 1943. While previously the primary Komsomol organizations operated in the regiments and other individual units, in May-June they were set up in battalions and other subunits equal to them. Komsomol organizers were assigned to head the Komsomol organizations in the regiments, battalions and companies. The introduction of the institution of Komsomol organizers instead of elected secretaries was necessitated by the specific military situation, and provided an opportunity to effectively replace Komsomol leaders who had been taken out of action and to conduct Komsomol work continuously.

During the war years, upon the appeal of the party, 3.5 million Komsomol members joined the ranks of the Army and Navy.²² During this same period the army Komsomol organizations admitted 5 million Soviet soldiers to their ranks.²³

On the front all ideological work was carried out directly under the leadership of the party Central Committee. Its decrees "On the State of Agitation and Propaganda Work in Penzenskaya Oblast" (1942), "On the Immediate Tasks of the Party Organizations of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in the Area of Mass Political and Cultural Educational Work Among the Population" and "On the State and Measures to Improve Mass Political and Ideological Work in the Tatar Party Organization" (1944), "On the Organization of Scientific Educational Propaganda" (1944) and others represented a full-scale program for the actions of the party organizations and political bodies, and they were a law of life for all the communists and Komsomol members. The Central Committee considered the arming of the Soviet soldiers with knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, and particularly Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland, as a primary concern. The republishing of many works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism was organized. In 1941-1945, more than 500 publications of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were published with a total run of around 17 million copies.²⁴ In the indoctrination of the soldiers, particularly widely used were the special collections compiled from the works of V. I. Lenin: "O Zashchite Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [On the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland] and "Voyennaya Perepiska. 1917-1920" [Military Correspondence. 1917-1920]. These gave Lenin's works on the questions of party military policy and the instructions for the defense of the Soviet state. In 1942, the book was published "Lenin Vladimir Il'ich. Kratkiy Oчерk Zhizni i Deyatel'nosti" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Brief Essay of His Life and Activity]. In studying the biography of the leader, the men learned in a Leninist manner to defend the victories of socialism and they were imbued with a feeling of high personal responsibility for the fate of their motherland. Lenin's ideas of defending the socialist fatherland, having been mastered by the soldiers, became a great material force which developed into mass heroism on the front.

Political literature played a significant role in indoctrinating the personnel of the Army and Navy. It explained the just, liberation nature of the Patriotic War, and showed the heroism and self-sacrifice of the men and the commanders, as well as the revolutionary and military traditions of the army and the people. During the war years, 460 titles of mass political books were published with a total run of over 33 million copies.²⁵

The military press was a powerful means for mobilizing and organizing the men of the Army and Navy in the struggle against the Nazi invaders. The press included newspapers and magazines which were disseminated in large numbers in the troops.²⁶ The Communist Party reorganized all the work of the press, having focused its attention on a more profound and complete treatment of the nature and aims of the war and unmasking the bestial

essence of the ideology and policy of Nazism. On 24 May 1943, the party Central Committee approved a decision which stated: "In considering the increased significance of the army press, to oblige the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army to strengthen and improve the front, army and divisional newspapers, to raise in every possible way their role in the political, military and cultural indoctrination of the personnel of the Red Army and to make them the most important center of political work."²⁷

In carrying out the decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the military councils and political bodies added personnel to the newspaper editorial staffs, and were concerned with improving the content of the military press and its ties with the masses of Red Armymen. The rise in the level of the military press contributed to the ideological and political indoctrination of the men.

The party gave a great place to literature and art in the ideological and political indoctrination of the men and to mobilizing them to defeat the enemy. The party Central Committee urged all cultural leaders "to reflect the greatness of our historic days in works worthy of the heroes and heroism of the Patriotic War."²⁸ Inspired by the party, the writers, artists, composers and filmmakers in closely following events created numerous works reflecting the life of the fighting people. The public affairs article of A. Tolstoy, M. Sholokhov, A. Fadeyev and I. Erenburg, the works of V. Vasilevskaya, B. Gorbатов, L. Sobolev, A. Tvardovskiy, the plays of K. Simonov, A. Korneychuk and other authors, the films, pictures and songs of the composers I. Dunayevskiy, A. Aleksandrov, B. Mokrousov, A. Novikov, V. Solov'yev-Sedoy and others had an enormous impact on the men. They were widely used in party political work. The organizing of field theaters and concert brigades which were rightly a favorite of the Soviet soldiers was an exceptionally important form of ideological work.

In the party's ideological work on the front, the question of the ideological and political indoctrination of the young communists who had recently joined the ranks of the VKP(b) came to the forefront. It was essential to arm them with Marxist-Leninist theory, a profound understanding of party policy and current events, as well as an ability to conduct agitation and propaganda work among the personnel.

The VKP(b) Central Committee, having discussed the question of the state of admission to the party in the party organizations of the Red Army in October 1944, emphasized the necessity of sharply improving the ideological and political indoctrination of the communists.

The Directive of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army worked out on the basis of the instructions of the Central Committee and approved by it stated: "The main attention of the party organizations is to be concentrated on the task of the ideological and political indoctrination of the communists."²⁹

In carrying out the decisions of the party Central Committee, the political bodies developed extensive work to have the communists study the history of the Communist Party. Lectures and reports were given systematically and consultations were held. The method developed of the independent study of Marxist-Leninist theory by the party activists. The divisional schools of the party activists were restored; these had ceased to exist with the start of the war. Under the primary party organizations, political schools were recreated for the young communists. Party offices were opened in certain political departments of divisions, corps and armies. All of this helped to raise the political maturity, conviction and high political activeness of the communists, and to strengthen the party organizations of the Army and Navy.

Having subordinated all ideological work to the interests of defending the socialist fatherland, the party put verbal agitation and propaganda in the forefront. This form provided an opportunity to strengthen the vital contacts with the personnel of the Army and Navy and to know their needs and mood. During the difficult wartime summer of 1942, the VKP(b) Central Committee, having discussed the question of the state of party political work in the troops, approved a decree which drew special attention to the necessity of widely developing verbal agitation and propaganda, having involved in it the leading workers of the party, experienced commanders and political workers. Upon a decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Directorate of Agitation and Propaganda was organized in the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, and a group of regular agitators was created and they had great experience in political work in the masses. The groups of regular agitators were also organized in the political administrations of the fronts and the political departments of the armies. In the regiments and divisions, the position of agitator was introduced instead of propaganda instructor. In the subunits, the most experienced soldiers were promoted as agitators. A majority of them were communists.

Thus, the agitator became the basic figure in mass political work. In constantly being among the men, the agitators in their ardent Bolshevik word and through their personal example strengthened ideological conviction and morale in the men, and mobilized them to carry out the specific combat missions of defeating the enemy. In stressing the enormous role of agitators in all the life and activities of the troops, M. I. Kalinin said: "Our agitators, political workers and commissars are the face of the party in the Red Army. The Red Army men on the front cannot study the party program or the history of the Bolshevik party. They recognize Bolshevik traditions in the actions, in the political work and in the conduct of the commissars, political workers and agitators; through this channel a comprehension of the party and an understanding of the party by the broad masses of Red Army men are reflected."³⁰

The Communist Party and its Central Committee during all the Great Patriotic War were constantly concerned with raising the efficiency and effectiveness of party political work in the troops, in subordinating this to the missions being carried out by the subunits, units and formations.

In the first period of the war, in the course of the strategic defensive, the military councils, commanders, political bodies, and the party and Komsomol organizations carried out work to raise the moral-political training of the men, their psychological stability and tenacity on the defensive. The men were given the mission of stubbornly defending each line, to endure the enemy strike and halt him. The slogans of the party "Stand to the Death!" and "Not a Step Back!" were central in the party political work of this period. Great attention was given to indoctrinating in the Soviet soldiers a hate for the enemies of the Soviet state, to explaining the aim of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR, to disseminating materials on the atrocities of the Nazi invaders, and on the plundering and violence of the Nazis on our land.

In the course of preparing for and conducting offensive battles, the most important task of party-political work was the carrying out of the appeal of the party Central Committee "Forward, for the Complete Defeat of the German Invaders!" as well as ensuring the fulfillment of the battle orders and the creation of a high offensive drive in the men. Special attention was given to propagandizing the mass heroism of the troops and the feats of the men of the Army and Navy. The combat of the troops, as a rule, was carried out under definite, strictly thought out slogans which gave concreteness and purposefulness to the party political work. As a consequence of this, the political-moral state and the discipline of the troops were strengthened, and their combat might and strike force continuously rose.

In the concluding stage of the Patriotic War, the stage of the liberation of the European states, the troops were confronted with new missions, and the demands were increased on all party-political work. In considering this, the Politburo of the party Central Committee in May 1944 held a conference for members of the military councils of the fronts. Here they outlined the new tasks in the area of political leadership over the troops and strengthening the international indoctrination of the men. On the basis of the Politburo instructions, the military councils, the political bodies and the party and Komsomol organizations acquainted the men with the social and state systems of the liberated nations, the balance of class forces, the traditions, culture, everyday life and morals of the population.

During the war years the party gave unflagging attention to indoctrinating the servicemen in a spirit of friendship among peoples and a readiness to fight jointly against the foreign invaders. The work of the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and the party and Komsomol organizations were based upon the Marxist-Leninist theory of the nationality question, the Leninist nationality policy of the Communist Party as well as the decisions of the VKP(b) Central Committee on the questions of ideological and political indoctrination of the workers, and the instructions of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme High Command. Of great significance was the Directive of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army "On Indoctrinational Work With Red Armymen and Junior Commanders of

Non-Russian Nationality" of 17 September 1944. According to this in the political bodies of the fronts and the armies, the position was established of regular instructor for work among soldiers of non-Russian nationality. In many units and formations, special groups of volunteer agitators were set up for political work with soldiers who had not mastered or had poorly mastered Russian. Here important aid was provided by the obkoms and the central committees of the Union republic communist parties. Upon the proposal of the VKP(b) Central Committee, they assigned over 500 communists from the leading party and Soviet activists for working as agitators in the political administrations of the fronts and the political departments of the armies.³¹

Upon instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, a network of Red Army newspapers was set up, and these, like the pamphlets, posters and leaflets, were published in the languages of the Soviet peoples. Beginning with 1943, 50 such newspapers were published, including 11 in Uzbek, 10 in Kazakh, 8 in Tatar, 6 in Azerbaydzhani, 5 in Georgian, 4 in Armenian, 2 in Tadzhik³² and others.

The indoctrinating of the Soviet soldiers in a spirit of unshakable friendship among peoples, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism brought forth fruit. United by a single will and aware that the present and the future of each Soviet man were inseparably linked with the fate of the socialist motherland, the soldiers representing all the peoples of the nation did everything possible to defeat the enemy. "In this war," stressed L. I. Brezhnev, "the sons and daughters of the unified Soviet fatherland not only honorably defended their socialist victories, but rescued world civilization from fascist barbarism, thereby providing the strongest support for the liberation struggle of peoples."³³

And, as is noted in our new Constitution, "this victory strengthened the prestige and international positions of the USSR, and opened up new favorable opportunities for the growth of the forces of socialism, national liberation, democracy and peace throughout the world."^{33a}

The work of indoctrinating commanders and strengthening one-man leadership held an important place in the work of the party in the Army and Navy. In carrying out the instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the political bodies and party organizations instilled in the commanders a feeling of high personal responsibility to the party, state and Soviet people for fulfilling their service duties, and strict exactingness upon themselves and their subordinates, and they developed the ability to rely on the party and Komsomol organizations. The party organizations of the staffs and headquarters played a particularly active role in the work with the commanders. Thousands of officers and generals became masters of leading the troops and able mentors of the personnel.

In all the stages of the war, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of the Army and Navy devoted great attention to raising the

military skills of the personnel and to generalizing and disseminating the experience of the front. The military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations took the necessary measures so that each soldier knew the strong and weak points of the enemy, and was able to destroy enemy equipment. Constant work was done in the area of the moral and psychological conditioning of the soldiers and eliminating tank panic in them. Instructions, orders and other special materials were issued to help the soldiers. Rallies, meetings and conferences for the masters of military specialties were widely developed on the fronts. The leading men received orders and medals and chest insignias such as "Sniper," "Outstanding Machinegunner," "Outstanding Tankman," "Outstanding Torpedoman," and others. The feats of outstanding soldiers were described in leaflets and newspapers and in the talks of agitators. The diverse party political work, in being aimed at raising the level of military skills, was an important condition for achieving success in combat, for precisely carrying out the missions confronting the troops, and was one of the sources of the mass heroism of the troops.

An important means for strengthening the party's influence in the Armed Forces was the ensuring of the vanguard role and personal example of the communists in carrying out the combat missions, orders and instructions of the commanders and the demands of the military oath. Lenin's instructions that in the defense of the socialist fatherland, the duty of each conscientious communist is to be "in front of others on the front,"³⁴ were constantly observed during the years of the Patriotic War. The Central Committee constantly urged: "Communist and Komsomol members! Be in the front ranks of the fighters against the Nazi invaders!"³⁵ In combat the communists served as a model of steadfastness and courage. And this raised the spirit of the men, it strengthened discipline and organization in their ranks, and helped to carry out combat missions. For military feats and achievements committed during the years of the Patriotic War 2.5 million army communists received governmental decorations. Almost three-quarters of all the Heroes of the Soviet Union were communists. Among the full winners of the Order of Glory, a majority is communists. By their courage, steadfastness and heroism, they inscribed one of the most vivid and stirring pages in the history of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. The ideological maturity, conviction and combat activeness of the communists were a decisive condition in the strength and fortitude and the high fighting efficiency of the Army and Navy.

The Communist Party during the years of the harsh wartime testing worthily carried out the historically determined mission of the leader of the military organization of the socialist state. The Leninist principles of party leadership over the Armed Forces under wartime conditions were most vividly embodied in the activities of the party Central Committee to strengthen the military councils, the political bodies and party organizations. In following this immortal teaching, and in creatively developing and enriching it, the CPSU, in being, as is stated in the new USSR

Constitution, "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and state and social organizations,"^{35a} showed constant concern for a further improvement in party political work in the Army and Navy. This has been one of the key areas in the diverse activities of the Communist Party in the area of leading the Armed Forces under today's conditions.

The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the subsequent decrees of the party Central Committee have had a profound effect on the state of party-political work in the Army and Navy. They are a powerful force for raising the combat abilities of the Armed Forces and an effective means of the party's influence on the masses of soldiers, for shaping their ideological positions and instilling ardent patriotism and a constant readiness to defend the socialist fatherland. "Party political work with the personnel and their ideological tempering," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "have always been and remain a powerful weapon of our army. The strength of this weapon has been tested in the fire of engagements. And at present it frightens our enemies."³⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 56.
4. Ibid., Vol 45, p 383.
5. "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 171.
6. "Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny (Iyun' 1941 g.--1945 g.)" [The Communist Party in the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-1945)], Documents and Materials, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 47-48.
7. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union], Voenizdat, 1958, p 360.
8. PRAVDA, 22 March 1942.
9. "Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Velikoy...", pp 85-86.
10. Yu. P. Petrov, "Partiynoye Stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoy Armii i Flote. (1918-1961 gg.)" [Party Development in the Soviet Army and Navy (1918-1961)], Voenizdat, 1964, p 379.
11. "Istoriya KPSS," Vol 5, Book 1, p 317.
12. Yu. P. Petrov, op. cit., p 384.

13. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Speeches and Articles, Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 131-132.
14. "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p 15.
15. PRAVDA, 2 August 1941.
16. KOMMUNIST, No 15, 1967, p 99.
17. The Table has been compiled on the basis of data given in "Istoriya KPSS," Vol 5, Book 1, p 375.
18. "Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Velikoy...", Moscow, 1970, pp 55, 61.
19. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1965, p 365.
20. "Istoriya KPSS," Vol. 5, Book 1, p 377.
21. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 323.
22. Yu. P. Petrov, op. cit., p 422.
23. Ibid., p 427.
24. "Istoriya KPSS," Vol 5, Book 1, p 409.
25. Ibid., p 410.
26. By the end of 1943, 3 central military newspapers, 13 front, 128 army and corps and several hundred divisional newspapers were being published. In addition, 70 newspapers existed in the navy. The troops received millions of copies of newspapers and magazines from the party and soviet bodies. As an average there was one newspaper or magazine for every two-three soldiers.
27. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh...", pp 323-324.
28. PRAVDA, 26 December 1941.
29. Yu. P. Petrov, op. cit., p 431.
30. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 July 1942.
31. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny" [The History of World War II], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, p 307.

32. "Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR. 1918-1973 gg." [Party-Political Work in the USSR Armed Forces. 1918-1973], p 320.
33. L. I. Brezhnev, "O Pyatidesyatiletii SSSR" [On the 50th Anniversary of the USSR], Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 22.
- 33a. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [The Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR], Moscow, 1977, p 4.
34. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 39, p 245.
35. PRAVDA, 28 October 1942.
- 35a. "Konstitutsiya...", Article 6.
36. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh...", p 439.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal," 1977

10272

CSO: 1801

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Results of Medical Aid Team Competition

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77
pp 24-25

[Article by G. Sventsitskaya: "In the Finale--The Best"]

[Text] The "debris" smoked caustically, "fires" still sputtered here and there, but the medical aid teams, replacing each other, entered the "centers" of nuclear destruction and of chemical and bacteriological contamination, the places where the "injured" awaited their assistance.

This was the first All-Russian Medical Aid Team Competitions, which were dedicated to Great October's jubilee. Each team (there were 18 of them and two rural teams outside of the competition) "made it" to these final contests after many elimination competitions, having sustained more than one victory over serious rivals in their rayon, city, oblast, autonomous oblast, and finally, in their zone. The actual best of the best reached the finale. Representation was broad, with medical aid personnel from North Osetiya facing those who had come from the Arctic seaport of Pevek, Magadanskaya Oblast.

The organizers of the competitions must be given their due. They hospitably welcomed and housed the participants and, at all stages of the contests, they created the complex operating situation corresponding to the program, after having carefully thought about simulation down to the details. The medical orderlies were completely fitted out and operated in protective clothing, respirators, gas masks, and rubber gloves and boots. Soldiers from one of the units [chast'] of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District were invited to be bit-players. Two orderlies can't carry such a person on a stretcher or put him aboard the transportation, only the entire link can cope with this. And, the medical orderlies really worked up a sweat that could not be wiped away when one is wearing a gas mask. It was tough on all participants. But, under these conditions, they demonstrated not only varied ways to provide first aid, but real courage, patriotism, agility, and psychological self-control as well.

The fans and local representatives continually crowded around the scoreboard on which (and praise will be passed on to the secretariat for this) the indicators of all the teams that exited the "centers" were rapidly posted. They observed from a distance since entering the "centers" was strictly forbidden.

The next medical aid team to finish then appeared at the edge of the woods. It is in formation and is singing a cheerful resounding tune. These are the girls from Magadan who won the open-ranks inspection the evening before. They have won the support of a lot of fans.

Towards evening, after a short break, comfortable Ikarus busses took the medical orderlies to the competition closing ceremony. They marched onto the parade ground in even columns, in parade clothes, and with barely noticeable traces of fatigue on their faces. One would not believe that 2 hours ago these smart girls, as actual troops of civil defense [CD] non-militarized medical formations, had overcome enormous physical and moral stress and demonstrated high skill and mastery.

Thanks and gratitude rightly were earned not only by the prize-winners--the best trained medical orderlies from the hero-cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Novorossiysk, but also by all competition participants. The representatives from Tambov, Voronezh, Vologda, Sverdlovsk, and Kostroma made an excellent showing. The chief of the RSFSR CD staff, Lieutenant General D. A. Krutskikh, presented the awards: crystal cups, certificates, pennants, and souvenir gifts. The orchestra played, applause resounded, and the movie and still cameras clicked away. Medical aid team commanders and political instructors took away awards also, for having reached the national finals, for the best indicators in each of the three "centers", for answers at the theoretical contest, and for the best drill training, visual agitation, and amateur artistic work.

Honorary guests and representatives from the Ministry of Health, the committee of the Red Cross Society, and the Russian Federation CD staff applauded from the tribunal. Political instructor Natal'ya Kozhina (from Kostroma) solemnly read the appeal to all the medical aid teams and medical aid posts in the Soviet Union.

The envoys from the various corners of boundless Russia took home with them not only vivid memories of the capital, the visit to the mausoleum of V. I. Lenin and the grave of the Unknown Soldier, and friendly meetings, but the valuable know-how of one who has gone through a high-level competition.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1977

Problems Noted in Medical Aid Team Training

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec '77 signed to press 9 Nov 77
pp 26-27

[Article by G. Tashchiyev, chief of an installation CD staff, Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol'skiy Kray: "The Bitter and the Sweet. Thoughts on Medical Aid Team Training"]

[Text] Smiles on the faces of the plant medical orderlies involuntarily make me, chief of the installation CD staff, happy. And, how can one be anything but happy when behind you are all the agitations and emotions linked with an important stage in inspecting the readiness of CD medical formations--the competitions. We are in first place in the city for the third time in a row now.

Therefore, the travelling cup of the Nevinnomysk gorkom of the Red Cross Society was retired in our possession.

Year after year, the medical aid team at our everyday [bytovaya] chemistry plant has gathered speed and it did especially well this past summer when it passed every stage of the competitions without any penalty points. And, the struggle was serious for their rivals had also gotten stronger. And, the result was that the time and effort devoted to difficult training were well spent.

Every chief of an installation CD staff probably had difficulty in training his medical aid teams. But, has every one of them experienced the joy of success? Take us, for example. It was only 4 years ago that our medical aid team was in last place in the city. Now it is in first place. What does this tell you? It primarily tells you something about a lot of political-indoctrinational work, about the enterprise party organization's concern.

One reason for success is serious attention on the question of medical aid team composition. We selected for our nucleus exclusively volunteers. Therefore, in spite of the known cadre turnover, we have formed a permanent nucleus of 18-20 persons and we raised and tempered our command cadres "in combat."

For instance, take Lyudmilla Ivanovna Burtseva, the medical aid team commander. She is a foundry hand with two children. For labor indicators, her name is entered on the Board of Honor at the plant and she holds the title of shock worker of communist labor. In addition, she is the trade union group organizer of the shop shift. She is a donor besides, having voluntarily given her blood 14 times. It is significant that the goal-oriented active operations of our commander are noted in the umpire logs at all competitions without exception. Burtseva's role in training the medical orderlies is significant and for them her word is law. Thus, as we can see, the success of the medical aid team depended to no small degree on the commander.

And, on the political instructor Tais'ya Nikiforovna Kosilova, of course, she being a division senior engineer. She has shown herself to be an excellent organizer, was able to create a special microclimate in the collective, through example and a good word maintain the girls' spiritual enthusiasm, and she mobilizes them for excellent accomplishment of all missions.

Nadezhda Ivanovna Lokotko has been our communicator for 5 years. She always concerns herself with the training of each girl and with the material support of the team as a whole. She actively assists the commander during work in "centers of destruction."

Engineers L. Il'yasova, L. Burlyayeva, and V. Nikiforova and plant workers O. Gladkova and Z. Yezhova are our link commanders. All possess good special training and skillfully direct their links.

N. Agadzhanova, V. Dezhina, Ye. Seroshtanova, Ye. Avdonina, G. Zholudeva, and other rank-and-file medical orderlies also carry out their responsibilities well. Many of them are voluntary blood donors. Thus, stability of medical aid team personnel is an important factor for victory. And, plant management, the party committee, and the CD staff highly value the contribution our women make to CD.

The next reason for success is well-organized training. Here we will emphasize that our medical orderlies are involved not episodically, but throughout the entire year. The staff provides the women with the required training literature in order to raise special knowledge and maintain it at all times at a contemporary level. A task is assigned to each and each is told what to independently study, when to complete the assignment, and when to take the test.

I would like to bring to your attention the fact that we fully trust our experienced medical orderlies with conducting lessons on medical themes with the workers and employees who are studying the 20-hour universal minimum mandatory program. Many of them have been formed into groups which study questions that involve self- and mutual help for injuries, traumas, burns, and damage from radioactive and toxic agents. We look upon such lessons as a unique method for teaching the teachers themselves. They moreover must substantively prepare themselves for every lesson. The results are very good. We attract the orderlies also for duty at the aid station, although it is granted that this is done irregularly.

The staff has worked up special handbooks for the command element of the medical formation in which are enumerated all responsibilities and actions when working in various "centers of destruction."

We usually conclude our team training with 5-day refresher sessions and hold them just prior to the competitions. We check out the special training and take tests. It happens during the refresher sessions that we deviate somewhat from the official program, reducing to a minimum the hours of the theoretical lessons and increasing the time spent in practical work in "centers of destruction." It is this very special-tactical, as the military put it, field training that also has a great effect. We do all this without any arbitrariness, with full gear, wearing the protective means, creating the most complex situation possible. These lessons are not easy for the women, but the return is clear.

It would seem that everything is going well with us, on schedule and according to the plan. But unfortunately, not everything is smooth. There is the bitter and there are circumstances which seriously hinder us and impede matters. And, this leads me to rather sad reflections. I will tell you why.

It is known that medical aid teams seem to have two bosses. They are subordinate to the CD staff in their capacity as a non-militarized CD formation. But, the committee of the Red Cross Society must train them and organize the competitions. The fact sometimes occurs that neither one fully occupies itself with the medical aid teams. One depends upon the other or the concerns slide off one's shoulders onto the others'. One does not often encounter any real continuity.

Take this question as an example. Stocking the medical kits with the authorized items. To be blunt, even as of today this has not been solved everywhere. The medical kits come from the warehouse and do not contain anywhere near what is called for. The question arises as to where to obtain what is missing? Let's say that for many years we are unable to obtain amyl nitrate, individual bandage and anti-chemical packets, triangular bandages, and syringe tubes. We

supply the team with bandages with great difficulty. Whose concern is this? The installation allocates funds but local health organs and the Red Cross Society do not monitor whether it is possible in the city's pharmacies to get the required items in the requisite quantity. Umpires, of course, in exceptional cases permit you to "simulate" what is missing, which we do. We take some sort of ampules and write "amyl nitrate" on them or fill a flask with water and write "IPP" [individual anti-chemical warfare kit] on it. But, is this any way out of the situation?

The idea that during exercises there is no need to strictly discuss the state of completeness of medical kits with medical orderlies is slipping into the press in recent days. This is not their fault, it is said, but rather is the fault of the installation's management, bring it up to them. Take the easy way out, that is certainly not impossible. Otherwise, we are faced with a situation where replacement items are put in the kits instead of the real thing or, what is worse, you put in slips of annotated paper. But, you do not bandage a wound with a slip of paper and the medical aid team will not really be combat ready.

I am of the opinion that a demanding attitude towards medical kit completeness has to be sharply emphasized, moreover replacement items must be ruled out. And, in order that the installation management is not blamed, the corresponding organizations in my view, both at the Moscow level [tsentr] and locally, must more fully take up the questions of supplying medical aid teams with the requisite authorized items. This cannot be sluffed off onto the installation CD staff chiefs and the supply personnel. Moreover, we often are unable to do anything in spite of wanting to. Local pharmacies refuse us or agree to sell us crumbs. To hope that the items requested the first time will be delivered when a sharp need exists (if only prior to the competitions) means to take a chance. Thus, having the funds, the staff must be able to expend them where required.

Or take this problem. Supplying the team with the prescribed clothing. What do we see here? The medical orderlies are formed up for a ceremonial march. What a mish-mash of clothing! Pants and "mini-maxi" skirts, and dresses, and even some ancient capes and coverlets with an enormous cross on the chest. On the head--flight caps, berets, kerchiefs, and garrison caps. A gaudy picture, sometimes unattractive. If you look at the financial aspect, it is worse. For example, 22 teams participate in the city competitions. One parade uniform costs approximately 80 rubles. Doesn't this cost too much when looked at on a national scale? And moreover, all for the sake of showing off in a 30-minute parade once or twice a year? There is a single uniform for all formations and it is evident that we need to stick to it.

Team members are called upon to pass beneath the colors with a good marching song and even appear in an amateur artistic concert at certain competitions. The chief of staff has to wrack his brains on this, along with worrying about training. But, are the search for and practicing of a song, practicing amateur plays, and sewing parade uniforms fully justifiable? Would it not be better to spend both less time and less money on all of this? Uniform requirements need to be elaborated for all of these questions. In the final analysis, we are training medical orderlies for the accomplishment of specific missions

and not for festivals. It may well be that somehow I am incorrect, but please point out to me where.

Competition judging also leaves a bitter taste in my mouth. The role of the competitions themselves in the training and inspection of medical aid teams is enormous, undoubtedly. They serve as both an examination and an incentive to increasing readiness, and there is no other practical training to rival them. However, everything is fine when the umpires are well trained, principled, and just. Otherwise, one misunderstanding follows another during the competitions, nervousness appears, complaints arise, and orderlies sometimes refuse to participate in the competitions. Why go, they say, when it is known beforehand that preconceptions will come into play. We must bring an end to such phenomena. It seems to us that Red Cross organs are clearly not up to speed here. The training of competition umpires must be raised to a higher level. One way to achieve umpire objectivity, in my mind, is for neighboring oblasts to exchange well-trained groups of umpires for the competitions.

I could provide many examples of unfair attitudes on the part of umpires to a team at kray-level competitions, for example. But, we are not talking about personal complaints here. But, all the same, it is impossible for me to remain silent about the facts of the "independent actions" of several comrades locally.

CD staffs and committees of the Red Cross Society often add their own "supplements" to the official "Decree on Medical Aid Team Competitions." Here is an example. We in Nevinnomyssk looked at it in this way. Each orderly receives one penalty point for being 5 minutes late arriving at the competition area. It happens that, without even entering the competition, a team can collect a heavy penalty. And, even if it goes through all stages without a penalty, it ends up in last place. We consider this situation to be fundamentally unfair.

When evaluating the readiness of a medical aid team, one must be governed by extant official documents which regulate the training of CD medical formations, specifically by the training program, the textbook, and by the Decree on Competitions. Various auxiliary brochures which comrades sometimes turn to have for us no force of law and we often even never see them.

Or take this example. For some reason, the orderlies' skill in using the gas mask was not checked at the competitions in Stavropol'. In our opinion, this element cannot be left out of the competition program.

It is inconceivable to me and to other installation representatives why we are not allowed to observe the work of the teams and go to the centers of destruction. Of course, to enter them or coach your team en route is not allowed and to do so is simply a lack of discipline. However, to observe how the orderlies are doing in the competitions is useful, this facilitates adopting the know-how of the best and finding your own deficiencies. I propose at the end of the competition that the work of the best teams which have accumulated the least "penalties" in the different centers be demonstrated for all. Watching this would be very instructive.

Recently, a vehicle driver has been added to the team roster. Many consider

this driver to be an orderly. Is this the case? In our opinion, an individual from within the team can function as driver. And even better, have two or three orderlies crosstrain as drivers. We sometimes do not attach special significance to this. But, if you think about it and do some calculations, you find out that we solve a problem of state significance by training drivers from among the ranks of the medical orderlies. Why shouldn't we, along with our DOSAAF committees, initiate driver courses everywhere and make our contribution to solution of this problem? Of course, a great deal more thinking and discussing are necessary.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1977

7869

CSO: 1801

END